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‘When it comes to hazard, no one is an expert - especially not the 
experts.’ 
    Ulrich Beck 2009:35 
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Summary 
This PhD thesis explores how risk is governed within the Norwegian 
aviation transport system by using a risk governance framework. In 
recent years, the Norwegian aviation transport system has become more 
complex than ever due to increased air traffic, deregulation, 
relocalisation of the Civil Aviation Authority, globalisation of markets, 
and the introduction of supranational rules and regulations. The 
research problem is how risk is governed under such circumstances, 
focusing on the role of complexity, changes, and possible goal 
conflicts.  
My aims in this thesis are: 
1. to explore the risk governance system of civil aviation 
transport. 
2. to gain knowledge about the role of complexity, change and 
goal conflicts in the risk governance of civil aviation transport.  
 
As an analytical tool, the risk governance approach provides a 
terminology and typology for investigating risk governance processes 
and structures. Risk governance then meets the demand of covering 
different aspects of the process and structure of risk management, by 
focusing on the integration and inclusion of different actors, and by 
highlighting the importance of consistent and integrated processes 
throughout the system. In this thesis I incorporate the following 
elements into the risk governance framework: core risk governance, 
organisational capacity, actor network, social and economic climate 
and political and regulatory climate. This is an adaptation of the risk 
governance model described by Renn (2008). 
The thesis is based on a case study design, where the Norwegian 
aviation transport system is studied by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications (Ministry), the Civil Aviation Authority (Aviation 
Authority), and the Accident Investigation Board (Investigation Board) 
as the main units within the case. I have also utilised data from other 
parts of the system. The data was collected by interviews, documentary 
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analysis and observations. I conducted 46 interviews, read 22 accident 
investigation reports, a selection of public reports, and discussion 
papers from both EU and Norway, in addition to participating in 
meetings and seminars. 
Article I highlights the relationship between national and supranational 
risk governance and the challenges this relationship poses for risk 
management. The results of the study show that the transition from 
national responsibility for risk governance, to EU governance, poses 
both possibilities and challenges for the risk governance process within 
aviation: possibilities, in the form of formal structures for participation, 
and challenges in the form of integration and implementation of 
contextual knowledge within the EU regulatory framework. The 
involvement of different actors meets new challenges within the EU 
framework. The decision-making process is more formalised, which 
fits some actors well--like the Ministry, the Aviation Authority, and the 
Investigation Board, all of which are familiar with bureaucratic 
processes. Nevertheless, actors from industry itself might have 
problems meeting the demands of participating in the extensive risk 
governance processes in EU. Important information might get lost and, 
ultimately, the body of rules might be missing contextual elements due 
to a lack of participation from operative actors in the decision-making 
process. This lack of important contextual factors, together with a 
prescriptive regulatory framework, might create a vulnerability to risk 
governance given the circumstances of complexity, change and 
possible goal conflicts. Less focus on contextual factors might make the 
operators of the system less able to adapt to the actual circumstances. 
The transition towards a more powerful EU might also undermine the 
mandate of the actors within the risk governance of Norwegian civil 
aviation. The extension of the legal authority of the EU due to air safety 
(by Basic Regulation 216/2008), will impact Norway’s disposal of the 
national regulatory framework. When this change in regulatory 
framework is fully implemented, it will become questionable as to 
whether Norway is still an equal partner within the risk governance 
processes. The final risk governance conclusions are made in the EU 
Parliament and the EU Commission, the questions left to the 
Norwegian actors are contextual input to the risk assessment and 
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elaboration of decisions already made at top level within EU. As a non-
member state, Norway’s option is to agree and to take part in the input 
and execution phase of the governance processes. 
In Article II, the aim was to study how the institutional part (the 
Ministry, the regulator, and the Aviation Authority, the legislator), of 
the governance system contribute to safety in a change intensive 
system. The study explores how political priorities at the legislative 
level, and enforcing practices at the regulatory level affect risk 
governance in the aviation transport system. Our findings indicate that 
the sum of external and internal forces of change has made the control 
of the aviation system more unpredictable, especially due to the pace 
and simultaneousness of the changes. The changes make it difficult to 
understand the ‘big picture’ of the aviation system, and thus poses 
challenges with respect to regulation and inspection. Our results have 
documented that within the two studied organisations, no explicit 
operational safety policy exists. Today, the resources and network 
activities with the legislator seem too scant for capturing and making 
explicit an overall safety policy. With respect to the regulator, the study 
documents that the work force is responsible, flexible and has a hunger 
for elaborating new work practices to match the current changes. The 
study did not identify an increase in resources or frequency of 
inspection activities, neither a clear move towards a risk-based 
inspection philosophy. The process of restructuring and relocation of 
the regulators head office have set the development of new inspection 
methods back. The strong sense of responsibility and self-organised 
networking within the legislator and the regulator seems to be a buffer 
against possible negative side effects from the current changes, and the 
degree of informality in which this takes place seems to strengthen the 
safety conditions, but also induces a certain vulnerability due to the 
dependency of individuals. 
In Article III, we explored accident investigation practices in the 
Norwegian aviation transport system. The aim was to analyse whether 
the accident investigation practices mirror the complexity that features 
the aviation transport system. The study shows that a certain awareness 
of changes and complexity in the aviation transport system exists 
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among employees of the Investigation Board. This awareness and 
knowledge is only to a limited extent traceable in accident reports or 
accident models used by the Investigation Board. Results show that 
differentiation characterises the accident board’s investigation 
philosophy and that its investigation practices and accident reports 
include a variety of perspectives and methods. Our study has 
documented the existence of a normative framework in the 
Investigation Board for conducting investigations, one that is rooted in 
international and national regulations and laws. On the other side, 
informants advocate that an ‘open mind’ perspective with no fixed 
accident models or investigation procedures is best suited to avoid 
biases and preferences. Every investigation is perceived as unique, and 
the accident characteristics determine the way investigations should be 
conducted. Complexity can, to a certain extent, be traced in the 
Investigation Board’s practice through accident models such as the 
human-technology-organisation framework and an increased awareness 
of technological complexity. Nevertheless, complexity of 
organisational interfaces, interdependencies among actors, and 
historical and contextual factors are not identified as central aspects of 
the accident board’s investigation philosophy and/or investigation 
practice. 
Article IV describes some of the processes involved in balancing 
conflicting goals (e.g., between safety and operation) in a change-
intensive environment by using examples from Norwegian civil 
aviation transport. Based on the finding that there might be a tension 
inherent in the double-edged objective of Norwegian civil aviation to 
be both safe and community-serving, we explored the system’s ability 
to reach conflicting goals. The ability to meet multiple goals involves 
the use of both downward and upward resilience traits to address 
potential goal conflicts. By downward resilience, we mean that macro 
level directions and solutions prepare for resilience through clear goal 
structures, infrastructure, and procedures that handle the trade-offs 
between safety and efficiency. Upward resilience means that decisions 
made at the micro level in a system reflect a commitment to safety in 
case of goal conflicts. Changes, caused either by external or internal 
drivers, may alter these resilience traits by introducing loss of 
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oversight. Changes made at the macro level of the system might have 
unintended consequences on the micro level, and vice versa. Results 
show that the prioritisation of regional policy (community-serving) and 
an unwillingness to develop distinct goal rules for balancing safe and 
community-serving air transport, place downwards pressure on the 
aviation system. Despite deficiencies in the downward resilience, 
upward resilience traits at the micro level of the aviation system seem 
to counterbalance the picture by characteristics such as a clear 
commitment to safety, sacrificing decisions, and establishing resource 
buffers to handle safety in critical situations. A critical issue regarding 
resilience in the Norwegian aviation transport system seems to be an 
awareness towards vulnerability caused by the system’s dependency on 
upward resilience. 
Using the risk governance framework, this thesis concludes that the 
Norwegian aviation transport system includes a core risk governance 
process that comprises both deficits and surpluses. Surpluses are e.g.,  
involvements of actors with requisite knowledge about the aviation 
transport system through hearings, work meetings and lobbying, while 
deficits are e.g. the lack of  early warning detectors in form of risk 
based supervision, and lack of knowledge about vulnerabilities and 
trends within a change intensive system. Other surpluses come in the 
form of safety consciousness, willingness to learn, competence and 
flexibility within the work force, indicating a possibility to improve the 
core risk governance process. 
The organisation capacity element of the risk governance within the 
Norwegian civil aviation transport system shows deficits related to the 
changes in interfaces within the system. Due to the dispersion of 
knowledge, transformation of interfaces, and alteration of the Aviation 
Authority competence, a demand for strengthening the focus on 
networking across the system is present. The surpluses like professional 
knowledge, safety consciousness and informal networks will form a 
base to develop the organisational capacity. 
The social and economic climate, combined with the political and 
regulatory climate, forms the backdrop for the core risk governance 
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process. The study shows that the supranational EU-focus on 
standardisation and harmonisation in the regulation framework might 
come at the expense of implementation of contextual knowledge. 
Furthermore, the lack of national directing safety goals with the 
legislator and elaborated operational safety goals with the regulator, are 
a deficit for the risk governance processes. A system subjected to 
several changes, and with an economic climate focusing on cost-
effectiveness is in need of strong institutional focus and commitment to 
safety.  
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1 Introduction 
This PhD thesis focuses on the risk governance of a global transport 
system in light of changes, complexity and goal conflicts. The purpose 
of the thesis is to explore how a global transport system governs risk 
under complex circumstances. Such systems are exemplified here by 
the Norwegian civil aviation transport system, which is part of the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European 
Union (EU), significant organisations that promote safety in accordance 
with corporate aviation regulations. 
1.1 Background 
According to Alamberti (2001), civil aviation is an ultrasafe system. 
The civil aviation transport is a highly competent system with regard to 
safety, one managed through common worldwide agreements, 
extensive procedures, and a detailed regulation framework. Recently, a 
negative trend has been identified in accident statistics within the 
international commercial aviation business. The general trend for 
accident rates has shown an increase since 2005 in countries that are 
members of the European Civil Aviation Community1 (ECAC) 
(Eurocontrol 2009). Furthermore, the accident rate measured in 
European Aviation Safety Authority2 (EASA) registered, scheduled 
operations shows a decline from 2001 until 2005, followed by an 
increasing trend (EASA EU 2009). The negative trend is partly a result 
of two major accidents: the Spanair accident on August 20, 2008, in 
which 154 people died, and the Air France accident on June 1, 2009, 
that killed 228 people. The fact that Russian accidents are recorded in 
                                                 
1 ECAC is an intergovernmental organisation of 44 member states that has the aim of 
harmonising civil aviation policy and procedures.  
2 EASA is the EU agency responsible for developing and implementing safety rules 
and providing technical expertise, training and research. EASA consists of 31 member 
states.  
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European registers has also contributed to this negative trend 
(Richardsen, Director of Civil Aviation Authority Norway 02.09.2009). 
Previous research within the Norwegian aviation system shows that 
relationships among actors in the systems may be altered by different 
change factors, such as new business structures and geographical 
relocations (SL/REP 35/2005, Høyland et al., 2008, Aase et al., 2009). 
Changed relationships intended to reduce inefficiencies may, for 
example, also reduce the slack within the system and, thereby, 
influence the buffer capacity (Pettersen & Aase 2008, Pettersen 2008). 
Changed relationships might introduce tight couplings, and result in 
increased interdependencies within the system. An event in one part in 
the system may have effects on quite another part of the system (Aase 
et al., 2009), according to times and locations. The indications of 
altered interactions within the civil aviation transport system form the 
backdrop of this PhD thesis. The main question to be answered, 
therefore, is how risk is governed in a setting of complex and changing 
circumstances.  
This thesis focuses on the institutional parts of the aviation system in 
trying to grasp how risk is governed under the circumstances described 
above. Studies were conducted within the Norwegian Ministry of 
Transportation, the Civil Aviation Authority, and the Accident 
Investigation Board Norway. In addition, empirical data and results 
from a research project on parallel changes and aviation safety 
(Norwegian Research Council), of which my PhD thesis was a part, 
have been consulted to support my study. 
In the following section, I will describe the two main concepts used in 
this thesis: risk governance and global transport system.  
1.2 Risk Governance 
Governance describes the processes and structures related to collective 
decision making and policy making that involve both governmental and 
non-governmental actors (Nye & Donahue 2000). Risk governance 
applies these processes and structures to the regulation of risks by 
Introduction 
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focusing on principles where networks exercise authority, take and 
implement decisions (Mørth 2009). Governance became an issue within 
the EU in the late 1990s and was materialised through ‘European 
Governance, a White Paper 2001’ (EC 2001). The governance concept 
was introduced in response to the citizens’ distrust in institutions as 
tools for risk management, a distrust that induced reflection by the EU 
on the demand for extension of the knowledge base (Craye & 
Funtowich 2009). The aim of the risk governance framework was: ‘to 
provide a structure for combining the conventional practises of risk 
assessment, management and communication with the principles of 
good governance’ (IRGC 2009:3). By transitioning from risk 
government3 toward risk governance, the EU wanted to strengthen its 
role as a regulating body.  
 
The purpose of risk governance is to identify, assess, manage and 
communicate risks with the principles of accountability, transparency 
and participation in mind (Renn 2008, IRGC 2005). This movement 
towards more inclusiveness and participation in the risk rule work has 
occurred since the mid-1990s, partly as a result of the transition from 
public to private ownership (Hutter 2006a), of the difficulties with 
balancing complex issues (Mørth 2009), and of a governmental lack of 
knowledge in the face of complexity and multiple feedback (Bell 
2004).  
 
Several analytical frameworks are available to govern risk, most of 
which are techniques based upon accident data. There is also a new 
attention to risk-based techniques that illuminate the possible future 
risks to anticipate. Still, as the American National Research Council 
has pointed out, even if ‘techniques can illuminate the choices that 
society must make, they cannot substitute for a deliberative process by 
artificially simplifying complexity’ (NRC 1996:80). Techniques 
                                                 
3 Government as concept, symbolise an understanding of “steering” in a hierarchical 
manner,  carried out by the process of electing and voting on representants that would 
take care of public interests in between the election period (e.g, Pierre & Peters 2000). 
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implemented without consideration of the context are of limited value 
and might even understate possible risks caused by focusing in the 
wrong direction and, thereby, understate other possible risks. Rather 
than implementing techniques, risk management must take into 
consideration the ongoing picture. Parson (2004) points out that 
complexity, uncertainty and flux have implications for diversity, 
dynamism, and decentralism of input in the process of risk governance, 
which, thereby, results in better output than employing a traditional 
command and control perspective. 
 
The Risk Governance White Paper (EC 2001) published by the EU 
Commission initiated the risk governance framework as a means of 
developing an integrated, holistic and structured approach to risk 
governance. The International Risk Governance Council4 (IRGC) 
(2008) followed up the 2001 white paper by focusing on systemic risks 
and gaining knowledge on how these risks are embedded in the larger 
scientific, societal, political and economic context. The IRGC stated 
that systemic risks are not confined to national borders and, thus, need 
to be managed by cooperation among actors from government, 
industry, academia and civil society. The main goal in risk governance 
is ‘to enable societies to benefit from change while minimizing the 
negative consequences of the associated risks’ (IRGC 2008:4). 
 
In relation to the white paper on governance, (EC 2001)  (a working 
group was established in 2002 to improve the quality and design of 
laws (EC 2002). The group tries to connect regulations to the 
governance principles in producing and implementing policy rules. 
According to the group, the following principles were important in a 
governance framework of regulation:  
                                                 
4 In 2003, the IRGC was founded at an annual risk conference by scientists, 
governmental leaders and industry leaders as an initiative that reflects  an experience 
of the knowledge society’s problem with delivering factual certainties, risk 
communication decision-making based on voluminous information, fast pace in 
technological development, demand for effective risk management, and changing 
organisational responsibility.  
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 Impact assessment, for making policies capable of handling the 
side effects of risks at both the EU and national levels. 
 Consultation, early and effective conferring with interested 
parties. 
 Simplification, making compliance with the rules more 
effective and easier. 
 Access to regulation by the affected parties, meaning that laws 
must be coherent, consolidated, and available. 
 Structures, to handle these principles.  
 Implementation, to ensure that the consequences of the laws are 
fully understood and considered.  
 
To gain insight into risk, researchers have traditionally searched for 
answers by conducting accident analyses. Extensive analyses using 
thick descriptions have functioned as an eye-opener regarding the 
complex and interconnected origins of accidents. Accident analyses of 
for instance, Three Mile Island (Perrow 1999), Challenger (Vaughan 
1996), Friendly Fire (Snook 2000), and Columbia (Vaughan 2005) 
show that accidents in complex systems and organisations have a 
variety of explanations: ‘interactive complexity’ and ‘tight coupling’ 
(Perrow 1999) ‘deviation from normal operations’ (Vaughan 1996), 
‘practical drift’ (Snook 2000) or ‘performance variability’ Hollnagel 
(e.g., 2004). The analyses shows that multiple and diverse actions and 
goals within organisations or systems might result in unintended 
consequences.  
In order to acquire an understanding of risk in a global system 
perspective, accident analyses are only partly sufficient. Other sources 
of information are necessary to broaden the picture of what constitutes 
risk and how it may be governed.  
1.3 Global transport systems 
Traditionally, transport systems have been a national public 
responsibility, with public ownership. Market deregulation has 
removed restrictions on businesses between national borders, which 
Introduction 
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means the transport systems are not only more available to private 
businesses, but are also more in need of supranational risk governance.    
 
Freedom is a hallmark of a global system, freedom for both the actors 
to operate across borders and freedom for the workers to move across 
national borders. During the last few centuries, there has been a 
movement towards globalisation, not only within the EU and the 
European Economic Area (EEA), but also worldwide. This 
globalisation is first and foremost encouraged by the economies of 
scale (Lemonie & Dagnæs 2003), resulting in a focus on economic 
efficiency; hence, merging, outsourcing, downsizing, and relocation 
have become important features of globalisation. Within transportation, 
structures have been reorganised, meaning that transport systems have 
become transnational and now appear fragmented, with differentiated 
units of actors.  
 
The market situation within transportation has been globalised during 
the last 30 years. This is especially valid within civil air transport, 
where market deregulation occurred in the early 1980s in the EU, when 
the creation of One Single Market began. Deregulation hit Norway in 
from 1994 to 1998, opening the market to free competition and giving 
different suppliers access to both market entry and market exit (Starkie 
2008). Public ownership was phased out in favour of the private actors, 
and the actor picture within the aviation transport system has expanded 
with several national and international airline companies. The air traffic 
is more integrated across borders and has become more complex and 
interrelated. Thus, the deregulation of the economic borders calls for a 
safety regulation of the market that takes into account the new 
hallmarks of the transport system, trying to govern risk in a system of 
competition, complexity, and interrelationships on a global scale, as 
well as within each of the units that form the aviation transport system. 
1.4 Research problems and aims  
In this thesis, I will explore the Norwegian aviation transport system 
with respect to essential aspects within the risk governance framework. 
Introduction 
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Important features are common goals, structures, deliberation, 
networking, and influence in the decision-making process related to 
risk (Zürn 2000, Bell 2004, Renn 2008, Mørth 2009). My focus is on 
the institutional level of the risk governance system of aviation.  
The research problem is how risk is governed in a system that is 
characterised by complexity, changes, and possible goal conflicts.  
Based on the research problem, the research aims of this PhD study are 
twofold: 
1. To explore the risk governance system of civil aviation 
transport. 
2. To gain knowledge about the role of complexity, change and 
goal conflicts in the risk governance of civil aviation transport 
system. 
I explored risk governance by searching for structures and processes in 
four different studies. The first study was an examination of the 
governance structures of the aviation transport system (Tjørhom 
forthcoming). The second study explored the role of the legislator, the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication, and the regulator, the Civil 
Aviation Authority, and their relationship (Tjørhom & Aase 2007). The 
third study analysed accident investigation practices within aviation 
transport related to interdependencies, complexity and uncertainty 
(Tjørhom & Aase 2010). The fourth study explored goal conflicts as 
part of risk governance, referring to the difficulties in handling trade-
offs between safety and efficiency (Tjørhom & Aase forthcoming).  
1.5 Research questions 
The following research questions have guided my analysis of the four 
studies on risk governance: 
1. How is risk governance conducted within the global aviation 
system? 
Introduction 
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2. How do the  national legislator and the regulator conduct their 
roles in change intensive settings? 
3. Is the framework for conducting accident investigations in 
accordance with the current complexity and change picture 
within the aviation system? 
4. How are trade-offs between safety and efficiency (goal 
conflicts) handled within the Norwegian aviation transport 
system? 
1.6 Limitations 
An exploratory study has the purpose of building ‘rich descriptions of 
complex circumstances that are unexplored in the literature’ (Marshall 
& Rossman 2006:33). In order to explore the risk governance 
framework of the aviation transport system, one must capture the 
actors’ perspectives from units in the entire globalised system. In this 
thesis, I focus on the upper, or institutional, levels of the system. All 
data are collected at the institutional level (EU, National Ministry, 
Aviation Authority, and Investigation Board) and may limit the 
analysis of relationships between the institutional level and the rest of 
the aviation system. The interviews and observations were all 
conducted within the Norwegian aviation transport system, which 
means that I relied on these informants’ experiences, written documents 
and web pages to explore the EU system. The focus on data collection 
at the institutional level has been compensated for by my participation 
in a broader research project, where data from other parts of the 
aviation system were made available to me (airport operation, air traffic 
control, airline maintenance). I have also benefitted from my master’s 
thesis, in which I collected data on technical airline maintenance.  
As a theoretical framework, I have used risk governance terminologies 
and typologies (De Marchi 2003, Renn 2008, Hutter & Jones 2007), 
together with governance in regulation (Parson 2004, Bell 2002, Craye 
& Funtowicz 2009). This has been useful but challenging, since the 
Introduction 
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framework is relatively new (1990s) and lacks the development of 
operational concepts. This PhD study can be seen as a contribution to 
the empirical exploration of risk governance. I have chosen the risk 
governance framework because it calls attention to contextual and 
relational issues, in addition to pinpointing the actor perspective (Renn 
2008). Institutional theories (e.g., Scott 2001, Powell & DiMaggio 
1991) that may have been a natural alternative choice have, therefore, 
not been pursued.   
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises two parts. Part 1 forms the background to my 
research. It introduces my empirical field, the theoretical framework 
and methodological issues, and then discusses my findings related to 
the research questions, then work is concluded and further implications 
of this research study presented. 
Part 2 contains the four articles that have been part of my thesis work:  
 
Tjørhom, B. B. (forthcoming) Risk governance within aviation. 
Accepted for publication in Risk Management: An International 
Journal.  
Tjørhom, B.,  & Aase, K. (2007). Safety and changes in the Norwegian 
aviation transport system– What is the role of the legislator and the 
regulator? In: Aven, T & Vinnem, J.E (Eds.) Risk, Reliability and 
Societal Safety, Vol. 3, pp. 2143-2149. Taylor & Francis, London. 
Tjørhom, B. B., & Aase, K. (2010) The role of complexity in accident 
investigation practice. International Journal of Emergency 
Management, Vol. 7, No.2, pp.167-189. 
Tjørhom, B. B., & Aase, K. (fortcoming) The art of balance: Using 
upward resilience traits to deal with conflicting goals. In Hollnagel, E., 
Woods D & Wreathall, J. (Eds.) Resilience Engineering in Practice: A 
Guidebook. 
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2  Context 
In this chapter, I start by defining the kinds of risk I am examining in 
this thesis. Thereafter, I give an overview of the risk level within the 
aviation transport system, followed by a short introduction to the 
regulatory framework within aviation. I then provide condensed 
descriptions of the main actors in the aviation transport safety 
governance system. Within the thesis, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Transport and Communication is mentioned as the Ministry, the Civil 
Aviation Authority Norway as the Aviation Authority and the Accident 
Investigation Board Norway as the Investigation Board.  
2.1 The risk types within aviation 
The risks my thesis is concerned with are those in which the knowledge 
about outcomes and probabilities is not only missing, but also very 
difficult to establish (Stirling 2009, 1999, Renn 2008). The risks that 
challenge the decision-making process, are thus in need of an 
integrative systemic approach, risks that are ambiguous, uncertain and 
complex (Renn 2008). Ambiguous risks are those that have many 
possible outcomes; uncertain risks are those where the level and burden 
of scientific proofs are scanty; and complex risks are characterised by 
scant scientific proof and many possible outcomes that are caused by 
the interdependencies and interrelatedness within an extensive system. 
One example of such complexity in the risk picture is a result of 
increased aviation traffic, which has caused a new density in air space. 
Such density creates a new picture of complexity in air traffic 
management. Within this thesis, risks that can be handled by statistical 
risk analysis, named ‘simple’ by Renn (2008) are not discussed, as my 
focus is on those risks where lack of knowledge characterises them as 
ambiguous, uncertain and complex. To make prudent choices about 
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such risks, the aviation transport system needs to understand the 
concerns of its stakeholders5 (Renn 2009, 2008).  
The aviation transport system is considered a very safe system and 
might have the appropriate requisites to sustain such a risk level, even 
in the changing circumstances caused by a systematic and thorough risk 
focus. ‘Flying is the safest way of travel’, as stated by Stoop and Kahan 
(2005:115), is a common statement. Civil aviation transport is a 
fascinating system in terms of safety issues. Given that parts of the 
system have tight couplings, and operation of the system is highly 
complex (Hollnagel et al., 2006, Leveson 2004, Perrow 1999, 
Rasmussen 1997, Vaughan 1996), it seems counterintuitive when 
statistics tells us that it is the safest transport system in the world 
(Amalberti et al., 2005).  
Studies (Wreathall 2008, Høyland 2007, Baker et al., 2005, Sexton et 
al., 2000) have documented the value of knowledge transfer related to 
safety issues from the civil aviation transport system to other sectors. 
The system is heavily regulated and employs a highly professional 
workforce that values teamwork as important to accomplishing its daily 
work. The workforce is highly aware of the risks of air transport 
(Pettersen & Aase 2008, Høyland et al., 2008, Tjørhom & Aase 2007, 
SL/REP 35/2005, Tjørhom 2001). 
But regardless of the fact that the aviation transport system seems to 
feature an extensive focus on safety work, the worldwide accident rates 
in the last years show a negative trend. This negative trend is even 
more pronounced within the European Civil Aviation Conference 
ECAC (consisting of 44 European countries), which has shown an 
increase in accidents since 2004. 
                                                 
5 Stakeholders are actors with interests in either the outcome of negative adverse 
affect of an activity or by the risk management options to act resilient (Renn 2008) 
Stakeholders in my case are structured into organised groups (Tjørhom forthcoming).  
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The recent statistics show a decrease in the accident rate worldwide and 
within ECAC countries from 1990; since 2002, the worldwide curve 
has straightened out, while the accident rate within the ECAC has 
increased since 2004, as depicted in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figur 1.1 Large Western Built Jets – Passenger Flights Fatal Accident Rate. 
Worldwide, ECAC Member States. 1st January 1987 – 30th June 2009 (3-year 
moving average) (Source ECAC). 
With regard to the numbers related to Norwegian aviation accidents, 
Table 1.2 shows that the positive trend in the accident rate between 
1970 -2006 seems to have been reversed by an increasing trend in the 
accident rate: 
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Figure 1.2 Accident within Norwegian aviation. (Source Aviation Authority).  
In this thesis, the accident rate is not valued as sufficient for measuring 
safety level; nevertheless, the trends in aviation safety are one of 
several indicators by which to measure risk levels.  
A report to the Norwegian Parliament states that safety in aviation is a 
result of the way organised aviation is carried out (SL/REP 35/2005). 
To maintain such a high safety level, the report recommends that 
different actors within the civil aviation transport system prioritise their 
safety responsibility. The recommendations are directed towards 
system oriented approaches to safety in order to follow up the ongoing 
changes to which the aviation system is subjected.  
Even though the aviation transport system have the features of 
prioritising safety in a sufficient manner, the complexity and changes 
pose challenges to sustaining the risk level. It is an unfortunate fact that 
in a dynamic situation, people tend to behave as if the risk situation is 
still following the old routines (IRGC 2009) and thus continue to 
maintain the previous regulatory framework. Or, if there is a 
willingness to react to fundamental changes, the response is often too 
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slow due to the challenges of recognising the effects of these changes 
on safety issues (IRGC 2009).  
2.2 A brief summary of the regulatory framework  
The regulatory framework for the global aviation transport system was 
shaped by international conventions and adopted into supranational 
bodies as a commonly agreed upon rule. This framework was then 
adjusted to contextual factors and implemented by the different nations’ 
aviation laws. As a result of the establishment of the European Union 
(EU) and the European Economic Agreement (EEA), these conventions 
were elaborated as the body of laws, rules and procedures according to 
a supranational framework. 
The conventions were shaped by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) as a comprehensive set of common regulations, 
the International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS). The 
SARPS comprises a set of standards, or annexes, one for each of the 
defined areas within aviation transport, e.g., personnel licensing, 
airworthiness of aircraft, and accident investigation (SL/REP 35/2005). 
In Europe, the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) was organised to 
elaborate, develop and implement common certification codes to the 
industry, based on the ICAOs annexes. In 1987, the JAA’s work was 
extended to operations, maintenance, licensing and certification/design 
standards for all classes of aircraft, with the Joint Aviation Regulations 
(JARs) regulating the different areas within aviation. Norwegian 
aviation is regulated by the Norwegian Act of Aviation, June 11, 2003. 
A new regulatory framework was created as a result of the adoption of 
EC No 1592/2002 by the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union. The JARs were converted into ‘Parts’, where the 
main content within the standards were retained. The European Safety 
Agency was set up in 2003 to elaborate and supervise the rule work.  
With the transition from a JAA to an EU framework for regulation, a 
supranational European legal authority for regulation was established. 
This has resulted in the European Economic Area (EEA) adjustments 
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within the Norwegian Act of Aviation. When the new Basic Decree 
216/2008 and the Single European Sky are implemented in EEA, 
Norway must ratify this extension of the legal authority of the EU and 
make new adjustments to the Norwegian Act of Aviation, June 11, 
2003. 
2.2.1 ICAO 
The Convention of International Civil Aviation, also known as the 
Chicago Convention, was signed by 52 states in 1944 to deal with 
aviation subjects worldwide. Based on the Chicago Convention, the 
worldwide organisation, International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), was founded in 1947 as a United Nations organisation. 
ICAO’s mandate is to secure international cooperation and the highest 
possible degree of uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures 
and organisations regarding civil aviation matters. There are currently 
190 member states in the organisation. ICAO is governed by a Council 
consisting of 36 of the member states. The Council elaborates the 
standards and recommended practices, denoted as Annexes. The 
Annexes seek to harmonise standards related to safety, as well as to 
facilitate audits of the member states (ICAO 2009). According to the 
ICAO, safety management depends upon two cornerstones: a State 
Safety Programme (SSP), in which each state works out its own 
guidelines according to the safety annexes, and a Safety Management 
System (SMS) within the organisations, proving that they have 
performed systematic safety work in accordance with such principles as 
accountability and having structures for safety, policies and procedures 
(ICAO 2009). 
2.2.2 EASA 
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is the European 
Union’s community agency for aviation issues. The EASA was 
established to implement EU rules. A gap existed between the number 
of internal market directives elaborated by the EU Commission and the 
number of directives in force in the member states. As a result of the 
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widening of this gap, the EASA was established to achieve better 
implementation (Groenleer et al., 2008).  
The EASA’s regulatory framework is built upon Joint Aviation 
Authority (JAA) guidelines for aviation safety. As a community 
agency, EASA is governed by European public law and has its own 
legal regulatory authority through the EU Commission, the Council of 
European Union and the EU Parliament. Community agencies are 
initiated by the EU with the aims of decentralisation, higher profile for 
the tasks, development of know-how, and integration of different 
interest groups in a dialog about the tasks, thereby facilitating the 
dialog at a European and an international level. The EASA was 
established by the EU in 2002 and has two missions (EASA 2009): 
1. To provide expert advice to the EU for drafting new legislation;  
2. To carry out executive tasks such as the certification of 
aeronautical products and organisations involved in their 
design, production and maintenance. 
The Commission of the European Communities decided that there 
would be an extension of the tasks for which EASA was responsible. 
This extension should encompass air operations and flight crew 
licensing together with authorisation of third-country operators 
(operators outside the EU or EEA). This extension is laid down by 
Regulation (EC) (No 216/2008), and has to be ratified by the member 
states and the members of EEA.  
All the member states and the non-member states, with the participants 
from the Commission, are part of the management board, which defines 
the agency’s priorities. 
2.3 The Norwegian aviation transport system 
The Norwegian civil aviation transport system is part of the global risk 
governance system of civil aviation through the above-mentioned 
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organisations; it also is a member of other international organisations 
(e.g., Tjørhom forthcoming). 
The Norwegian civil aviation transport system is strongly influenced by 
the military system. The main reason for developing the civil aviation 
transport system is NATO’s influence in the Norwegian infrastructure 
and the simultaneous demand for a civil infrastructure around the 
military bases (Høyland et al., 2008). The civil infrastructure for air 
transport made it accessible to governmental and private actors entering 
the market. Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and Braathens pass into the 
market and developed the main airports and infrastructure. In 1966-67, 
the short take-off and landing ports were also included in the route 
network. The infrastructure for aviation was of great importance to 
Norway to shorten the distance between the north and south parts of the 
country. The scheduled service on the outskirts of Norway was handled 
by private companies, which submit tenders to the government. From 
1994 to 1998, there were changes in the competitive situation. 
Deregulation gave private actors access to the infrastructure and the 
airports, provided that they met the safety regulation demands. This 
made a great shift in the competitive conditions and increased the focus 
on efficiency and earning power. The changed competitive situation 
resulted in large-scale production and, thus, business merging, 
downsizing, and restructuration (Høyland et al., 2008). 
The partly government-owned company, SAS, bought the private 
company Braathens in 2001, which meant that SAS had a monopoly in 
Norwegian air transport. This situation changed when the private 
company, Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, entered the market in 2002; it 
started with domestic flights and entered the international market in 
2003. 
The Norwegian aviation transport system also comprises several other 
business actors. Globalisation has resulted in the representation of all 
the big aviation companies in Norway. As a result of the changes in the 
business structure, technical support has been organised in independent 
juridical units. There are several handling companies, and, due to the 
focus on aviation security, security companies are important parts of 
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the system. Other companies are related to cleaning, food, design and 
production of various types of equipment.   
In 2003, the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport Management Agency 
became two separate divisions: the Civil Aviation Authority Norway 
(Aviation Authority) handles supervision and AVINOR handles 
operation of the airports/airport security. At the same time, there was a 
political decision in 2002-2003 to localise the governmental 
supervision outside the capital of Norway (SL/REP 17/2002-2003, 
SL/REP 32/2004-2005). In addition, there was a new focus on cost 
reduction in AVINOR (Take-Off-05). 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (Ministry) has the 
overall responsibility for aviation safety. During all those years with 
ongoing changes, the Norwegian governmental regulatory framework 
has been quite consistent in stating its goal of being a society-serving 
and safe air transport system. The responsibility for carrying out the 
work in order to fulfil these goals is delegated to the Civil Aviation 
Authority and the Norwegian Investigation Board.  
As a result of the EU entrance into aviation regulatory framework, the 
rulemaking process left over from common agreements made by 
member states in collaboration with the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) 
and International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) has been 
transitioned into a decision-making process in the EU, made by 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) as the legal authority. This 
transition means not only that the decision-making process has changed 
and that the rules have been made legally valid, but also that the nature 
of the rule making process has gone from being a framework to a more 
detailed rule work (Tjørhom forthcoming). Simultaneously, there has 
been a transition from detailed supervision that checks to pinpoint 
compliance at the worker level to supervision that focuses on system 
audits, checking the procedures within the company. 
Given these changes (SL/REP 35/2005), the Norwegian Parliament 
ordered a report that would evaluate the safety situation within the 
aviation transport system. That report concluded with recommendations 
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to the NCAA about system-oriented, risk-based supervision and 
extension of the relocations process. The AVINOR were recommended 
to evaluate some of the processes within their cost reduction program 
and to stop further progress in Take-Off-05. Aviation companies were 
told to evaluate the consequences of merging and to focus on cultural 
integration. 
2.3.1 The Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
The Ministry has a superior responsibility for managing the Norwegian 
aviation transport system. Its responsibility covers four categories of 
work (SL/REP 46 99/2000): 1) administration of framework conditions, 
laws and regulations, 2) aviation safety work in general, 3) the 
department of government for the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority 
and the Accident Investigation Board Norway, and 4) international 
collaboration and negotiation. Administrative work is delegated to the 
Air, Post and Tele Department, which has a separate aviation unit and 
reports to the political direction. The aviation unit consists of 13 
employees, reporting to the manager. The employees have backgrounds 
and competences in political science, economics and law.  
2.3.2 AVINOR 
In 2003 the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport Management became 
AVINOR, a state-owned stock company with approximately 3000 
employees. The main objective of AVINOR is to plan, develop and 
operate the Norwegian aviation network consisting of 46 airports. The 
operations within AVINOR encompass responsibility for air traffic, 
control towers, control centres, and the technical infrastructure for 
aircraft navigation. AVINOR introduced an ICAO-initiated, cost-
reduction project, Take-off-05 (SL RAP 35/2005, Høyland et al., 2008, 
Lofquist 2008), subsequently to their constitution in 2003. The project 
had considerable significance due to the resulting reorganisation, 
downsizing and relocation (Lofquist 2008).  
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2.3.3 The Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority 
The Civil Aviation Authority Norway (Aviation Authority) is an 
independent public administrative body under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry, with approximately 160 employees. The Aviation Authority’s 
main objective is to oversee aviation safety within the Norwegian 
transport system. The Aviation Authority constitutes the rule work and 
runs the supervision of airports (aviation safety, companies, and 
aircrafts. Due to  regional considerations a political decision was made 
(SL/ REP 17/ 2002–2003), to relocate the Aviation Authority from 
Oslo, Norway’s capital, to Bodø, a town 1230 kilometres north of Oslo. 
This had implications for its competence and knowledge, since a large 
number of its employees resigned their positions (Eriksen et al., 2009). 
2.3.4 The Accident Investigation Board Norway 
The Investigation Board was established in 1989 in accordance with 
ICAO’s recommendation.  The board has been gradually expanded; by 
2005, it had become a multimodal investigative board with the mandate 
to investigate incidents and accidents on the seas, roads and railways. 
The Investigation Board has a director and a staff of 13 administrative 
and safety specialists, plus seven inspectors in the aviation unit. The 
Investigation Board is an independent, non-punitive unit with the 
mandate by the Ministry to establish post-accident knowledge in order 
to prevent future incidents and accidents. The non-punitive 
investigations identify conditions that might be beneficial in preventing 
incidents and accidents, a goal-based mandate that leaves it up to the 
Investigation Board to decide the scale of its investigations.   
2.3 Government-initiated studies of aviation 
safety 
Several governmental initiatives have surveyed the risk level within 
aviation in order to maintain safety within a system subject to 
deregulation, privatisation, relocation and mergers. Rosness et al., 
(2005) cite studies in Sweden, the US and the UK in the Norwegian 
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government-initiated report on aviation safety in 2005, SL/REP 
35/2005. Deregulation was initiated in 1978 in the US by the Airline 
Deregulation Act; in 1992 in Sweden, and in 1994 in the UK. The 
results from the UK and the US have shown no increase in the accident 
rate after deregulation. Because of the media’s attention to aviation 
safety, the industry became more aware of and focused on safety issues, 
and the media focus has been given as one factor influencing the steady 
accident rate. The conclusions indicate that new businesses have been 
under observation, because start-ups need one to two years to reach the 
same safety level as well-established businesses. With regard to near 
accidents, the increased numbers are explained by the simultaneous 
actions taken to reduce the number of air traffic controllers and to 
implement deregulation, which highlights the importance of monitoring 
simultaneous changes to the system in order to identify the eventual 
impact on safety,  due to the alteration of the former system (Rosness et 
al., 2005).  
The changes in Sweden’s aviation system were initiated in 1975 when 
its supervision was relocated; deregulation started in 1992 and changes 
in business structures in 1993. Results of deregulation, relocations and 
mergers in Sweden have been positive, with no increase in the accident 
rate. But the mergers were challenging, especially due to the new 
collaboration. The report called attention to the importance of strong 
supervision during times of change and the associated challenges 
resulting. Continuous observation of the aviation transport system is 
essential, as is allowing enough time to adjust safety management 
practices in accordance with the changes (Rosness et al., 2005). 
In the Switzerland, a report on aviation safety was ordered after a five-
year period with four serious accidents and several near accidents 
(NLR 2003). The report studied whether or not the structures for 
managing aviation safety within Switzerland were sufficient. This study 
focused on aviation safety as a product of the safety management 
system. The NLR study made several sector-wide recommendations, 
such as governmental development of safety objectives, addition of 
safety personnel resources, creation of more divisions between units 
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responsible for safety and production, and creation of an investigation 
board.  
The Norwegian government ordered a report in 2005 (SL/REP 
35/2005) whose objective was to ‘investigate how aviation safety will 
be maintained in the light of the major change processes taking place 
in the Norwegian civil aviation sector’ (SL/REP 35/2005). The study 
encompassed the period from 2000 to 2005; several research institutes 
and universities participated in this process. The conclusions and 
recommendations were directed to issues that would prevent adverse 
events resulting from the initiated changes. These recommendations 
included:  
 The creation of systematic, holistic and risk-based supervision 
by the NCAA and a holistic safety perspective by the Ministry 
and the airline companies. 
 The provision of double staffing in the NCAA’s relocation 
phase. 
 The performance of a review of AVINOR’s cost-cutting 
program, Take-Off 2005.  
 Consideration of the need for extra staff in AVINOR. 
 A focus on the collaboration between management and 
employees in the cost-cutting programme. 
 Requiring the NCAA and the business operators to perform 
overall and systematic safety administrative routines. 
 Consideration by the Ministry to conduct a safety impact 
assessment due to the initiated change. 
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3 Theory 
This chapter presents a brief introduction to risk perspectives, to the 
development of risk governance as an analytical framework, and to 
relevant theoretical contributions concerning complexity, change and 
goal conflicts.  
3.1 Risk perspectives 
Risk Management of Everything by Power (2004), states that factors 
such as a more demanding context for the organisations, followed by a 
political need to maintain the myths of control, have set the stage for a 
risk management society. The huge number of crises, scandals and 
possible future happenings discussed in the media create an urgent need 
for solutions. As Power said, ‘Individuals, organisations and society 
have no choice but to organise in face of uncertainty, to act ‘as if‘ they 
know the risks’ (2004:59). 
Risk as an interdisciplinary research area stems from the realisation of 
the practical challenges in risk management (Renn 2008, 1992, Taylor-
Gooby & Zinn 2006a,b, Krimsky & Golding 1992). Risk management 
and assessment started out with a technological scientific perspective, 
followed by a realisation of the impacts of psychological and 
sociological risk issues (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn 2006a,b, Slovic 1992, 
Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992). 
Given the features of the Norwegian aviation transport system, which is 
a complex sociotechnical system, the risks might be connoted as 
systemic (OECD 2003), meaning that the main part of the risks are 
embedded in a social or political context (Renn & Klinke 2004) and are 
therefore not simple (Renn 2008). In order handle systemic risks (Renn 
& Klinke 2004), an interdisciplinary approach with input of data from 
various functions and geographical areas of the system is required.  The 
continuous expansion of complex systems has given rise to a demand 
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for further attention to contextual factors and the extensions of 
knowledge bases. The scientists who claim to possess superior 
knowledge (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn 2006a) were challenged by the 
scientific tendency to pretend to be dependable even when their models 
failed to capture possible unforeseen interdependencies between 
operations at different parts of the system (e.g.,  Snook 2000, Vaughan 
1996,) or contextual variables (Wynn 1996, 1992) 
My risk perspective includes different scientific approaches depicted in 
a model elaborated by Taylor-Gooby & Zinn (2006a). Figure 3.1 
presents the constructivist-realist continuum and the 
individual/subjective-social/collective continuum of risk approaches in 
Taylor-Gooby and Zinn’s  analysis. My perspective on risk is 
positioned in the middle of the figure made visible by adding the risk 
governance concept to the model.   
 
Figure 3.1 Different approaches to risk. Adopted from Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 
(2006a:407). 
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Within the realist perspective, the methods have been inherited from 
the positivist tradition, stating that the scientist’s work is about 
naturalistic facts that can be observed and counted, and about which 
agreement can be gained, caused by their appearance in the world. 
Using the probabilistic yardstick, one might be able to calculate the 
probability of a future event. Such calculations are helpful tools that are 
prevalent in medicine, insurance and technical estimates, where the 
scientists translate expected gains and losses into objective measures. 
The challenges with such calculations may be a result of scant data and 
an inability to depend on the stability of the causal agent over time 
(Cohen 1996). It will also cause difficulties by deriving individual 
probabilities from estimations done over groups of events. A third 
problem is in those cases where interdependencies intervene between 
the cause and the effect (see chapter 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). 
At the opposite end of the figure where the constructivist approach is 
placed, the risk perspective is based on approaches occupied with the 
variability in risk perceptions. The constructivists assume that the risk 
perceptions vary either at an individual level or within the social 
context (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn 2006a). The sociological approach view 
the context as influencing how risk is focused within a regulatory 
framework or risk regulation regime, and thus the regulatory 
framework directing the risk decisions (Hood et al., 2001). As Figure 
3.1 shows, the governmental way of regulating risk is seated in the 
social constructivist end of the continuum. The governmentality view 
notions risk as being calculative discourses (Reith 2004) illustrating the 
fact that the professed detachment of science from politics needs to be 
contested (e.g., Jasanhoff 2004, Weingart 1999). The risk decisions are 
taken within the closed circle of politicians and ‘experts’ and thereby 
preclude further discussion. When people with a stake in the outcome 
of risk decisions (e.g. the farmers in Wynne’s example from the 
handling of Chernobyl 1996), became aware of the shortcomings 
within the expert risk assessment, they start distrusting the 
government’s assessments. Wynne’s study showed that expert 
calculations lacked knowledge of local conditions (1996). In addition, 
expert assessments are of scant value unless people trust the experts or 
the institutional systems (e.g., Power 2007), and especially if there is no 
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transparency in the process (White & Eiser 2006). The Challenger 
Space Shuttle accident in 1986, the Bhopal accident of 1984, and the 
Chernobyl accident in 1986 are all disasters that gave rise to distrust in 
the scientific contribution to risk assessment.  
The precautionary principle also became important in situations with 
social or political ambiguity (Stirling 2007) in order to secure a trade-
off between risks and benefits. Additionally, the interconnection of 
science and politics (Jasanoff 2004, Webler & Tuler 1999) calls for 
either variety in expert knowledge (Beck 2009, Liberatore & Funtowicz 
2003) or refraining from reserve the word ‘experts’ for scientists. 
As mentioned, I place risk governance in the middle of the axes in 
figure 3.1., in order to demonstrate my view of an appropriate 
framework for risk decisions. To establish a sufficient risk perspective 
given the systemic risks, we need several knowledge bases. The 
differentiation between expert and layman fades away and the operator 
of a system might then become as much of an expert as the scientist, 
due to the establishment of the sufficient knowledge of risk 
governance. In addition, the dimensions between the individual and the 
social have to be less distinct so that the contribution from both 
psychology and sociology may function as a theoretical framework in 
order to establish appropriate governance structures and processes.  
Given the risks associated with uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity, 
there is clearly a need for more sophisticated risk assessment and risk 
management procedures in situations where risks might not be simple 
(Renn 2008). In order to extend the knowledge base, stakeholders have 
to become part of the risk decision making in a deliberate manner in 
forms of, for example, a dialogue-based risk communication (e.g., 
Löfstedt & Boholm 2009).  In my opinion, the scientific deliveries from 
technical, psychological and sociological research make a valuable 
contribution to risk management, but, they must be related to the 
context in which they are going to be used (Renn 2008). Given a cause-
effect relationship, scientific probabilistic risk assessments offer an 
adequate foundation for policy making. When complexity, ambiguity 
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and uncertainty characterize the risks, one must adjust the risk 
assessment and risk management accordingly.  
Millstone et al., (2004), conducted a comparative study of different risk 
assessment policies within the EU and USA in which three different 
models for risk assessment policies were outlined. These models offer 
insight into various views of the implementation of knowledge, and 
what kind of knowledge is valued in the risk policy assessment stage. 
The report identified the technocratic model, the decisionist model, and 
the transparent model (Millstone et al., 2004).  
The technocratic model states that the policy decisions should rely on 
scientific risk assessments free from political and economic values. 
Within this linear model, the communication flow goes from experts to 
government and then down to the industry and public.  
The decisionist model questions the reductionist risk assessment model.  
The possibility of decomposing the risks into analytical assessments for 
use in policy making seems to be out of the question. The judgement 
and trade-offs between benefits and risks are not fully understood until 
they have materialised. The science alone is insufficient as input in the 
judgement about the acceptable risk level. The decisionist model then 
differs among actors within the assessment and risk management stages 
of the process. Scientists are making the assessments; other actors are 
involved during the risk policy making and management. The social, 
economic, cultural and evaluative considerations are important for 
estimating the existence, likelihood and magnitude of the risks and to 
have sufficient information to define the acceptable risk level.  
The transparent model differs from the previous models by pinpointing 
the importance of the political bias that might be inherent in the expert 
assessments. Therefore, the assessments should rely on different 
viewpoints. The policymakers should explicate what risks they expect 
to prioritise, while relying upon multiple inputs during a deliberate 
process in which assumptions and world views are criticized. The risk 
managers then are responsible for the transparency within the process 
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of trade-offs between risks and benefits. Such a transparent model is in 
accordance with my view on risk policy making. 
Within this thesis I focus on the types of risks in which there are 
uncertainties about the future (Zinn 2006). Such risks are in need of 
deliberate decision making (Habermas 2004, 1995) involving the 
application of knowledge, from stakeholders in different parts of the 
system, familiar with the hazards and affected by risk producing 
outcomes (Pestre 2009, Stirling 2009, 2008, Renn 2008, 2004, Renn et 
al., 1995, Klinke & Renn 2002, Wynne 1996, 1992). 
3.2 Risk governance 
3.2.1 Governance theory 
As a concept, governance is replacing democracy in political science 
(e.g., Mørth 2009, Gaventa 2006, Pierre & Peters 2000). When 
different forms of democracy are emerging all over the world, there 
seems to be a hollowing out of democracy as a concept (Gaventa 2006). 
The way of practicing democracy may be questioned due to the real 
participation of citizens. Governance is superseding democracy as a 
concept to describe the processes of citizen involvement and 
participation in collective affairs, or the collective decision-making 
made by governmental and non-governmental actors (Renn 2008, 
Bauer & Schneider 2007, Gaventa 2006, Van Kersbergen & Van 
Warden 2004, De Marchi 2003).   
The literature offers a wide range of definitions of governance. 
According to Bauer and Schneider (2007), governance might be 
described as: ‘a system of rules in action (i.e. applied by social actors) 
by which desired societal states of affairs are approached (positive 
control), and undesired states avoided (negative control). In this 
respect, governance also refers to feed-back mechanisms by which the 
difference between a desired state and the status quo is de-tected in 
order to enable a society to keep itself in a viable range’ (2007:11). 
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Bell uses the following definition (2002: 1) ‘ ([governance is about]the 
use of institutions and structures of authority to allocate resources and 
coordinate or control activity in society or in any other relevant 
environment; including the economy.‘  
‘European Governance, a White Paper’ (EC 2001) described 
governance as ‘rules, processes, and behaviour that affect the way in 
which power are exercised at European level, particularly as regards 
‘openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence’ 
(EC 2001:10). 
Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden (2004) reviewed the governance 
literature and arrived at some conclusions about commonalities within 
the definitions:  
 Focus on pluricentric processes. 
 Pay attention to autonomous but interdependent networks where 
hierarchies are less important. 
 Point to processes. 
 Pinpoint the facts that relations between actors pose specific 
risks caused by each actor’s autonomy, which calls for 
institutions to handle the relationships. 
Additionally, many of the governance approaches are normative, rather 
than empirical. 
Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden (2004) concluded that these common 
features makes the concept of governance into a bridge among different 
disciplines, defining a new way of organising both the process and 
structure of management.  
The governance turn within the EU might be viewed either as a turn 
towards more a participatory style of exercising power (Caporaso & 
Wittenbrink 2006), caused by a need for broadening the expert pool 
(Hutter 2006a,b, Wynne 1996, 1992, Liberatore & Funtowicz 2003) or 
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as progress towards more influence by the market (Hutter 2006a,b, 
Pierre & Peters 2000). According to Mørth, these two ways of looking 
at governance impose quite different interpretations on legitimacy 
processes. When viewing governance as a turn towards the market, this 
is legitimated through output legitimacy or efficiency; the reverse is a 
means towards better democratic processes, input legitimacy (Mørth 
2009). The two that tend towards governance, input and output 
legitimacy are part of the same coin; governance structure is a result 
both of the need for more knowledge and of a move towards 
outsourcing risk management (Hutter 2006, Zürn 2000).  Within this 
thesis it will be interesting to determine whether both input and output 
legitimacy seems to be of interest to risk governance of the Norwegian 
aviation transport system.  
3.2.2 Different perspectives to risk governance 
In table 3.2.2, various scientific disciplines with their belonging 
approaches to risk governance are presented. To gather the perspectives 
in such a simplified manner has the advantage of giving a general idea 
of the main arguments within each discipline. Yet, it has the 
disadvantage of leaving out important distinctions and progression 
elements within each perspective to risk governance. Within each 
discipline there may exist controversies according to risk decision and 
policy making, and the researchers themselves often hold a 
multidisciplinary scientific perspective. Nevertheless, in table 3.2.2 
main arguments within risk governance of an 
economic/technical/psychological perspective, a political perspective 
(political science and law), a sociological perspective, and an 
anthropological perspective are presented.  
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The risk governance perspective as outlined in Renn (2008) and also 
described and discussed by others (e.g. Stirling 2009, 2008, Rosa 2008, 
Løfstedt & von Asselt 2008, IRGC 2005, De Marchi 2003) offers a 
framework that incorporates and encompasses the generated knowledge 
from the above mentioned perspectives. Instead of resting the risk 
policies on single theoretical frameworks, risk governance adapts 
knowledge from the interdisciplinary research community (Renn 2008). 
An integrative framework offers the advantage of appealing to risk 
policy makers, researchers and managers at all levels of society from 
various scientific disciplines (Rosa 2008). Such framework is therefore 
timely in this PhD work given the transnational risks within the 
aviation transport system. When deregulation becomes a fact, one must 
reconsider geographical borders across nations with regard to risk 
regulation. The movement from government to governance is also a 
movement from national economies towards a transnational economy, 
with the hallmarks of interdependencies and complexity. ‘They [risks] 
tend no longer to be geographically, regionally or nationally restricted, 
but are global. They [risks] are complex and increasingly entangled 
with different areas’ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn 2006b:25). Removal of 
trade borders creates more complexity within a system and calls for 
new tools, methods and varied knowledge to handle the risks. The 
governance ideal has entered into risk management, due to the 
acknowledgement of uncertainty, and ambiguity within scientific 
results and, the complexity that feature our systems,  thereby, following 
a need for precautionary principles and broadening of the knowledge 
base (Stirling 2009, 2008, 2007, Wynne 1996, 1992, De Marchi 2003, 
Klinke & Renn 2002, EC 2001).  
3.2.3 Risk governance models 
The governance model opens up and includes more actors during the 
process of appraisal, assessing, evaluating and managing risks. Renn 
(2008) uses the concept of the ‘transparent inclusive model’ as a way 
both to assess and manage risk. This model views risk assessment 
within the previous models (the ‘technocratic’ and the ‘decisionistic’) 
as framed by the political and societal context (Jasanoff 2004) 
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Millstone et al., (2004) stated about the ‘transparent model’: ‘In this 
model, scientific risk assessments are seen as framed by legal 
requirements and by social, economic and political judgements, and 
those up-stream assumptions therefore contribute to setting the agenda 
of the scientist responsible for risk assessment’ (2004:22). By making 
the risk model transparent, the coupling between science and politics is 
taken into consideration. This transparent model is inclusive with 
regards to actors and stresses the framing of risk, the stage of 
characterisation, and the evaluation. The model can be represented as in 
Figure 3.2 (adapted by Millstone et al., 2004, Renn 2008:10). 
 
Figure 3.2.2 The transparent risk model, adopted from Millstone et al., 20046. A 
core risk governance model.  
                                                 
6 Renn (2008:48) and  IRGC (2008:8) describe the five phases in core risk governance 
in another model, a model which illustrates the phases, by linking them as an ongoing 
process of pre-assessment, appraisal, management, and communication., where 
communication is an important part of the ongoing process with all the other 
elements. Within this thesis I have chosen Figure 3.2  since it illustrates the 
Risk 
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The elements of core risk governance process are well known in the 
literature: risk assessment, risk evaluation and risk management. The 
transparent model is remodelled by Millstone, inspired by the National 
Research Council 1996 (NRC), Washington, D.C. The NRC focuses on 
involvement, interactions and transparency throughout the stages in the 
model. Previous models used scientific input, or expert assessments, as 
a starting point to dialogue. Adding this risk assessment policy and pre-
assessment steps means to include the various perceptions of risk in the 
input phase of the risk management process (Millstone et al., 2004, 
Renn & Klinke 2004, Pidgeon 1998, Wynne 1996), when facing new 
risks with elements of uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (Renn 
2009, 2008, Renn & Klinke 2004). The transparent model is realising 
the coproduction of science and politics (Jasanoff 2004, Liberatore & 
Funtowicz 2003, Webler & Tuler 1999, Otway 1992), the 
democratisation of risk and regulation (Hutter 2006b), and the fact that 
scientific knowledge is hardly value-free (Renn 2008, Jasanoff 2004, 
Liberatore & Funtowicz 2003, Webler & Tuler 1999, Weingart 1999, 
Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992, Otway 1992, Wynne 1992). 
As the NRC pointed out in 1996, many analytical frameworks and 
techniques are available for measuring the adverse output of an event 
(e.g., fault trees and hazop analysis), but it is important to remember 
that risk assessment techniques come up short in cases of uncertainty, 
complexity and ambiguity: ‘techniques can illuminate the choices that 
society must make, they cannot substitute for a deliberative process by 
artificially simplifying complexity’ (NRC 1996:80).  
Within a transparent risk model, the process of risk assessment and 
management must be deliberative (Renn 2008, 2004, Renn & Klinke 
2004). Deliberation in risk governance means that the process has to 
‘debate the criteria of truth, normative validity and truthfulness’ (Renn 
                                                                                                                    
differences among the technocratic, decisionist, and transparent risk models in an 
appropriate manner.  
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2008:303). More precisely, the relevant issues must be discussed by 
exchanging observations and viewpoints, so that the discussion within 
the decision-making process might search for balance among the 
arguments. A discussion based on the new information follows the 
realisation of arguments. According to Renn, this discussion should be 
‘putting the facts into a contextual perspective’ (2008:285). 
Establishing meetings and arenas that reflect the criteria of a deliberate 
process should then give the opportunity to frame risk challenges based 
on broader knowledge. The advice from the NRC is that a good 
decision-making tool is made up of an analytic deliberative process 
where the search for solutions captures as many as possible of the 
adverse effects of an activity (NRC 1996). The mutual learning through 
the deliberative process is essential (Renn 2008, 2004, Renn & Klinke 
2004, Daniels & Walker 1996, Habermas 1995). 
The core risk governance framework consists of the core elements as 
presented in Figure 3.2 -- risk assessment policy, risk assessment, risk 
evaluation and risk management -- but it also stresses the deliberative 
elements of inclusive communication, both to enunciate the information 
to stakeholders and to establish a two-way dialog in all the stages of the 
risk handling process (Renn 2008). The core elements described in the 
transparent risk governance model constitute the core risk governance 
process within the risk governance framework. However, the 
framework also covers the conditions that affect the core risk 
governance process. These conditions might be described as contextual 
elements as the IRGC model ‘Risk governance in context’ (2007:20, 
Renn 2008:354), which illustrates core risk governance processes 
surrounded by elements that impact risk management (Figure 3.3). This 
is in line with Hood et al., (2001) who make a corresponding 
distinction between the context and content of a regulatory regime. 
Where context refers to the policy backdrop to the risk regime, and 
content concerns the ‘inner life’ of the regime, Hood et al., (2001) refer 
to structuralism (e.g., Parson, Luhman, and Foucault) by using context 
as anchored in the backdrop, whether or not the content is pointing to 
the arguments of an organisation’s inherent nature of creating its own 
order independent of social policies (e.g., March & Olsen 1989, 
Vaughan 1996, Perrow 1999, Snook 2000). The governance model then 
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creates an analytical tool to describe the ‘collection of organizations 
that made up the regulatory system rather than of the operation of any 
one of them in isolation’ (Hood et al., 2001:185). The risk governance 
model is also consistent with Rasmussen and Svedungs’ (2000) view of 
modelling risk management and regulatory rule making as several 
nested levels of decision making. 
According to Renn (2008), good governance rests on three 
components: sufficient knowledge, legally-prescribed procedures, and 
social values (like the statement of goals, objectives and contextual 
factors).  
 
Fig 3.3 The contextual risk governance model, adopted from IRGC 2007:20 
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See Figure 3.2 
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The organisational capacity, the actor network, the social and economic 
climate, and the political and regulatory climate operate as the context 
of the risk handling processes. The layers in the model have to be 
considered in a risk governance framework, as elements that both 
impact and are reflected in the core risk governance process.  In an 
ideal world, the elements might have been viewed as a whole existing 
in an integrated process, wherein the entire system is capable of a 
nimbleness in the case of complexity and the call for continuous 
learning (Paquet 2001). The contextual elements that influences the 
core risk governance processes illustrated in Figure 3.3, will be 
elaborated below.  
The organisational capacity refers to the assets, skills and capabilities 
within the organisation (Renn 2008).  
The assets comprise the knowledge base and structural design of risk 
management. Organisational assets encompass the established rights 
and duties, the resources in the form of the economics, and the 
appropriate structure to handle the risk, the knowledge, expertise and 
experience. These elements must be integrated as a whole by the fourth 
asset, organisational integration. Without a comprehensive system to 
handle the organisational assets, they will be of less value for risk 
governance.  
Skills are of importance to make use of the assets. Important skills 
related to risk management are flexibility, vision and directivity. 
Flexibility is required to maintain the organisation’s functioning even 
during disturbances (Weick & Suthcliffe 2007); vision is helpful to 
imagine the unimaginable by, for instance, scenario building. 
Directivity refers to the importance of perception. By being willing to 
extend the scope of one’s perception, the skills will be strengthened.  
Capabilities might be viewed as a structure with several successive 
layers, constituting the ability of an organisation to make use of its 
assets and skills. Capabilities consist of the relations acting as inclusive 
decision making, alleviating any conflict that has a negative impact on 
risk. In addition to the relations, structural networks have to be 
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constituted, and, finally, there must be regimes that take care of the 
overall rules to manage risk.  
Actor network 
Power (2007:2) proclaimed that ‘the dominant discourse of risk 
management has shifted from the logic of calculation to that of 
organization and accountability.’ This statement underlines the 
movement from relying solely on experts in the assessment phase of 
risk governance. The risk governance framework stresses the 
requirement of opening up participation in both the formulation and the 
information part of governance (Stirling 2008, 2007, Liberatore & 
Functowicz 2003, Wynne 1996, 1992) and of gaining the approval of 
non-state actors involved in shaping the regulatory framework (Craye 
& Funtowitz 2009, Hutter 2006a,b, 2001, Kirwan et al., 2002, 
Rasmussen & Svedung 2000). The actors that should be involved in 
risk governance processes are those with a stake in the outcome of an 
event or activity.  
Risk governance covers both structure and process. The appropriate 
structure must be constructed in order to involve the actors.  ‘European 
Governance, a White Paper’ (EC 2001) mentioned several tools for 
involvement, from information by green and white papers on 
communications, through communication by advisory committees, 
business test panels and ad hoc consultations. But, they also stated the 
need to make these tools more effective and open, especially in cases 
with hearings. 
Within the aviation transport system, stakeholders can be defined as all 
of the actors constituting the system, from the employees at the 
institutional part to the employees at the operational part of the system 
as well as the passengers (Leveson 2004, Rasmussen & Svedung 2000, 
Rasmussen 1997). They might be involved as socially organised groups 
with interests in the outcome of the regulatory framework. It is 
necessary to understand all the actors in order to frame the risk, make 
an appropriate assessment and follow with a judgement of acceptability 
and tolerability regarding the risk level. An understanding of the actor 
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network is important in order to have a communication flow and 
decision making based on all the relevant knowledge within the system.  
The involvement of actors can take different forms, but establishing an 
arena that empowers the participatory bodies, beside transparency and 
accountability in the processes, is important to a foundation of trust 
(Renn 2008).  
The closing part of the risk assessment process, the way to reach the 
solution, is just as important as the inclusiveness of the actors. Based 
on the risk governance ideas of acquiring different knowledge bases 
within a risk domain, it is important to foster a dialogue hallmarked by 
a deliberative approach (Renn 2004) in order to provide an appropriate 
bridge to this knowledge. 
Much of the activity on this level focuses on networking and meeting 
activities due to risk-related issues in different organisations. The 
inputs to the decision processes are based on the importance of 
contextual knowledge from all parts of the system. The deliberative 
approach is rooted in Habermas’ (2004, 1995) ideas of communicative 
action, where he points to the need to engage the citizen in joint, 
rational decision making. A deliberate approach could also be related to 
dialog-based risk communication (Löfsted & Boholm 2009). Risk 
decisions are both knowledge- and value-driven (Renn 2004). The 
normative standards should be attributed to the actors involved and to 
the society, as such (Renn 2008, 2004).  
Social and economic climate  
In this layer of the governance model, I include the economic and 
social climates as constituting this contextual level. Renn (2008) 
mentioned the following as elements of a social climate:  
 Trust in regulatory institutions. Jasanoff (2004) has claimed that 
in times of change, the trustworthiness and authority of 
individuals and institutions are questioned. Trust in regulatory 
institutions allows the citizen to leave most of the risk issues to 
the government (Giddens 1991, Lupton 1999, Jeffcott et al., 
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2006), state that individuals relate their actions, attitudes and 
expectations to the social system that constitutes their context.  
Trust, then, makes the society more efficient by fostering a high 
degree of informal collaboration across various actors within 
the society (Svendsen & Svendsen 2006). In a study built on 
European Social Survey numbers, the Norwegians expressed a 
relatively high degree of trust in political institutions. (Listhaug 
& Ringdal.08 in Aftenposten 20.07.08).  
 Perceived authority of science. Beck (2009) stated that the 
uncertainties about scientific contributions have created a 
scepticism towards the experts’ risk assessments, thus   realising 
the challenge with ‘sound science’ (Blair 2003) and thereby the 
need to expand the knowledge base (Wynne 1996, 1992, 
Stirling 2008). This dawning experience of the absence of 
‘sound science’ implies the need for a shift within the risk 
assessment phase of the core risk process from expert deliveries 
towards a deliberately transparent framework (e.g., Renn 2008, 
Millstone et al., 2004) Nevertheless, the scientific results are 
valued as an important knowledge base within risk assessment 
where the causal effects are simple to derive. In situations that 
are complex, uncertain and ambiguous, the scientific results and 
expertise from other involved stakeholders are part of the 
knowledge base.  
 Degree of civil society involvement. As just stated, a framework 
wherein the citizens experience trust towards institutions will 
foster engagement by civil society.  
Hovden (2002) described, by research on the oil sector, economic 
trends that might influence a industry’s regulatory framework: 
 Income, financial pressure and market uncertainties. These 
factors have been prevalent since deregulation and the ensuing 
changes in competitive conditions. Due to the financial 
situation, there is a cost pressure also within the aviation 
industry (Tjørhom & Aase forthcoming). 
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 Cost cuts that impact the regulations. Hovden (2002) referred to 
the Norwegian Offshore Cost Effective Initiative (NORSOK) 
process (changing the regulatory regime within the Norwegian 
oil sector due to the need for cost cuts) as resulting in decisions 
that satisfied requirements within an economic framework 
rather than seeking safety improvement. 
 Economic incentives in contracts. The framework for tendering 
is based on competitive issues, which is caused by the relative 
challenges with measuring safety compared to economy (Gaba 
2000), thus creating a tension due to the lack of safety 
indicators within the tender.   
During the last decade, the social and economic climate factors within 
civil aviation have been characterised by liberalisation, competition, 
cost effectiveness, regional politics, and a public demand for protection 
against terror attacks. The study from oil industry might then be worth 
noticing in risk decision making in the aviation industry.  
Political and regulatory climate 
According to Renn (2008), regulatory climate reflect a country’s way 
of governing or the features of the risk domain. Renn (2008) 
differentiates several styles of empirical risk regulatory culture, for 
instance, the consensual and the corporatist. Renn (2008, 2001) has also 
described a new normative regulatory climate, the meditative 
regulatory climate, which may fit well to meet the demands of 
openness and public participation.  
The consensual approach is more like ‘clubs’, where decisions are 
made behind closed doors. According to Renn (2008), the 
collaborations take form among closed circles of actors with the aim of 
reaching their predefined goals. There are few discussions within the 
group. Trustworthy communications among public and other groups are 
important. The discussions are only extended to other actors when 
further insights are needed, or in cases where the constitution of the 
club is threatened. This consensual approach is in line with the former 
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aviation collaboration on common agreements within the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the Joint Aviation Authority 
(JAA).  
The corporatist approach is distinguished from the consensual approach 
by having more formalised structures and a focus on transparency 
during the process. The network is built by representation of 
stakeholders valued as important due to their knowledge bases. 
Different actors like scientists, experts, and employees are invited into 
the network in order to provide comprehensive input to the discussions. 
There is predictability within the meeting structure and the actors 
invited. This approach also seems to focus on risk communication to 
gain trust. The corporatist approach has been the dominant style in EU, 
but, according to the white paper on risk governance (EC 2001), the 
focus has changed to involvement. The white paper stated that 
principles of good governance focus on opening up the policy process 
in order to involve more stakeholders.   
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there are many initiatives and 
thoughts about involving the actors. And these initiatives, along with 
the ‘European Governance, a White Paper’, have produced a movement 
towards more transparency and communication, both in Europe and in 
the US (Renn 2008). Renn denotes this way of regulating as the 
meditative manner, a regulatory style that is open to negotiations 
among stakeholders at all levels, providing all the actors with scientific 
expertise and strengthening the interpretative role of scientific 
expertise. According to Renn (2008), this meditative risk governance 
style can only be realised as an evolution of close interactions by 
governmental and non-governmental actors.  
Risk is a borderless phenomenon (Smith & Fishbacher 2009), which 
means that the risks we are facing depend upon others’, as well as our 
own, choices (Renn 2008). This interdependency implicates common 
regulations that capture the challenges pertaining to interrelation, 
interactions and emergence. The management of risk should, then, at 
the institutional level, reflect the complexity and interwoven nature of 
risks. To establish a framework that ensures that each participant 
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complies with the rules, one has to be careful while making the 
regulations. The regulator has to structure a process that involves the 
actors in a partnership manner. The partnership model related to the 
information process, together with inspections to determine 
compliance, will, in Renn’s (2008) opinion, ensure that each of the 
actors is working to reach the same safety goals. 
The former JAA and ICAO frameworks for establishing common rules 
were highly in accordance with the consensual approach. The system’s 
structure was much less formal, and it left the common agreements, 
elaborated as a framework or ‘goal rules’ (Grote 2008, 2004), to the 
national government to complete the rule work. With the transition to 
the European Aviation Safety Agency EASA, the structures for the 
collaborations were strengthened and the rule work was established by 
law, two factors that have made the regulatory climate more transparent 
and powerful (Pierre & Peters 2009). But when stating some features of 
the EASA as a regulatory climate, it is worth mentioning that this 
system is in the melting pot, yet to come in force. Morgan & Yeung 
(2007) referred to the decision-making process within the EU as a 
negotiation between actors relatively narrow in their reflection mode. 
Smith and Fishbacher (2009) ask if it is possible to develop a 
framework to rule that addresses the complexity, interdependencies, 
interconnections and emergence that follow a transnational transport 
system.  
3.3 Critical comments to the risk governance 
framework 
The holistic interdisciplinary perspective proposed within risk 
governance holds several challenges regarding both structural and 
processual elements. Some of these issues are discussed in Renn and 
Walker (2008). Below I will present some of the critical comments to 
risk governance as a comprehensive framework for risk. The comments 
are structured according to three challenges: risk as a concept, the 
purpose of the model, and the deliberative approach. 
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Risk as a concept 
According to Rosa (2008), a risk governance framework is in need of a 
clear definition of risk, a definition he finds absent in the International 
Risk Governance Council’s work (IRGC 2005). Rosa claims that 
definitional clarity in forms of premises for generating knowledge is 
the foundation of a sufficient theoretical framework. Such knowledge 
forms the basis for the methods of exploring, measuring and managing 
the risk field. In other ways, the way risk is defined and understood 
gives rise to the way risk issues are treated. As shown earlier in the 
chapter, risk may be understood along a scientific continuum from 
realist to constructivist, or from an individual/subjective end to a 
social/collective (figure 3.1). Different scientific disciplines relate to, or 
perceive differently, the ontology, epistemology, rationality, and power 
structures of risk (table 3.2.2). This diversity in risk perspectives and 
understandings is a challenge in itself, and in Rosa’s (2008) opinion a 
lack of clear definition in the risk governance framework becomes a 
threat to the interdisciplinary discussions of risk due to a lack of 
guidelines in forms of a scientific logic. 
The purpose of the model 
Holism is a two-sided coin; in its effort to capture the entire risk 
governance picture, the framework clearly falls short in delivering 
necessary simplifications. A risk governance framework needs the 
balance between sophistication and simplification (Löfstedt & von 
Asselt 2008), meaning that the framework should cover the systemic 
risk issues without ignoring important factors (Stirling 2007), yet are 
simple enough to model the risk system. Löfstedt & von Asselt (2008) 
expressed the need for further simplification within the risk governance 
framework as presented by the International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC). This is a question of who will use the framework. Maybe the 
most valuable intention with the risk governance framework is the 
holistic picture it offers, providing leaders and governments with a 
mental picture of risk governance (North 2008). If the risk governance 
model creates more awareness, then resources needed to elaborate the 
framework might be available. A risk governance framework suited for 
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research aims such as creating evidence-based scientific knowledge 
needs a higher degree of both complexity and accuracy than a risk 
governance framework appointed to guide, for example, government 
leaders. For my research aims of exploring a global transport system I 
found the framework to have a degree of complexity that covered 
important features of the system.  
The deliberative approach 
Another challenge disputed by several authors (e.g., Löfstedt & von 
Asselt 2008, Rosa 2008) is the deliberative approach added to the 
policy making process in the risk governance framework. This 
communicative normative ideal, described comprehensively by 
Habermas (e.g., 2004, 1995) is still a normative ideal in need for more 
clarification through empirical studies: “Many arguments in favour of 
analytic–deliberative processes and their theoretical foundations 
provide ample evidence for their potential contribution to improving 
risk evaluation and management. It is still an open question whether 
deliberation can deliver what it promises in theory. The empirical 
account is still open and incomplete” (Aven & Renn forthcoming:208). 
Realizing the various and often substantially different risk perceptions 
amongst actors, groups, and units within a system it seems 
inconceivable that a common learning process could be realised. On the 
other hand, today’s realisation of the variety within risk perceptions, 
and the lack of knowledge that features a whole range of risk issues 
might pull towards the ideal of deliberation. If we open up to a 
pluralistic process, the actors participating in the debate are equal in 
terms of valuable arguments concerning risk issues (Rosa 2008). 
Another concern is, then, how conclusions should be made. A valuable 
democratic process can prevent powerful vested interests from 
determining decision making (Tait 2008). Lack of clear guidelines 
within the risk governance framework on how to reach conclusions 
may result in what Rosa calls a manipulated speech community (2008) 
where power issues come to the fore and may lead to ignorance of 
important risk issues. If the openness and pluralism stated in the risk 
governance framework become too relativistic, the ideal of democracy 
might diminish in light of power structures. Another challenging 
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question related to the deliberative approach regards representativeness: 
Who is going to choose the actors to represent a unit, according to what 
criteria, and how do we account for what is relevant knowledge or not? 
What about economic resources for participation from relevant parties? 
3.4 Complexity 
Complexity refers to situations within a system where the interactions 
of components within the system make it difficult to predict possible 
outcomes. Due to interactions and interrelationships, the causal links 
become invisible and individual variations or adjustments at one part of 
the system might have unforeseeable effects on other parts of the 
system (Hollnagel e.g., 2009, 2008, Rasmussen 1997, Perrow 1999, 
Bertalanffy 1968).  
Le Coze (2005) pointed to some of the characteristics by studying a 
system holistically -- in preference to a decomposition study, where one 
attempts to divide a system into analytical units. Decomposing a system 
may lead to loss of relevant information, especially due to interactions 
among elements. The number of variables and interdependencies makes 
it inconvenient to model relationships. A holistic study may offer the 
following advantages: 
 Acquisition of insight into global interactions and 
interdependencies 
 Knowledge about  the relationships between the system and the 
changes, caused by studies of processes 
 Understanding of complex interactions among humans, 
technology and organisational factors 
Complexity becomes an issue when systems become extended or 
transformed. Caused by changes in the system, there are no longer any 
obvious connections between cause and effect. And the effects might 
show up long after the cause (Renn 2008). Senge (1990:364) 
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differentiated two sorts of complexity. ‘Detailed complexity’ is when a 
case has many variables; ‘dynamic complexity’ is when cause and 
effect are not close in time and space and when there is an obvious lack 
of connection between interventions and outcomes.   
The term ‘complexity‘ within safety science is often connected to the 
term ‘system’; these have the hallmarks of tight couplings and 
interconnections (Perrow 1999). A complex system might be described 
as ‘possessing’ an elaborate set of interconnections and non-linear 
feedback loops, some of which are hidden or impossible to anticipate 
(Weick & Suthcliffe 2007:92).  Perrow and Weick represent different 
views about the possibility of managing these systems. Where Perrow 
(2007) advises that society break these systems down into smaller 
entities and move such production out of rural areas, Weick and his 
followers (High Reliability Organisations and Resilience Engineering) 
might agree with this stand, but, globalisation is a fact and production 
systems are a part of the worldwide economy. The complex systems are 
therefore a reality which has to be taken into consideration. 
According to Renn (2008), uncertainty is often a result of incomplete or 
inadequate reduction of complexity. Risk assessment often rests upon 
this uncertainty caused by the trouble with modelling cause-effect 
within today’s complex systems. How could it be possible to partition 
this system into manageable entities in order to assess its risk level?  
The concept of political and economic complexity (Høyland et al., 
2008, Vaughan 1996) refers to factors at the macro level, where 
decisions are made. Decisions made at the top level of the system 
pertain to the whole system (Westrum 1996). Provisions or rules from 
different levels, held together with changes within these provisions 
create, complexity related to adjustment, compliance and interpretation. 
In a study of the Challenger accident, Vaughan (1996) revealed that 
political and economic relations were important explanations of the 
causes of the accident. Vaughan found that the managers operated in a 
world invented by political leaders that cut resources and that the 
NASA leaders responded to these cost cuts by increasing the flight rate 
and thereby increasing the workload. Turner and Pidgeon (1997) 
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pointed out that when an organisation’s attention is concentrated on 
some issues, the decision makers may fail to consider important 
information about other issues.  
According to Renn (2008), uncertainty in risk analysis is often a mix of 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties; he further stated that it is essential 
to know the difference between them. If the uncertainty is aleatory, the 
randomness in outcome is a fact, and it is impossible to state a 
prediction that is more accurate. Conversely, if the uncertainty is 
epistemic, meaning that one lacks knowledge about a case, more data 
must be collected to arrive at a more precise starting point from which 
to begin the risk governance process. 
3.5 Goal conflicts 
During the period of this study, the cost pressures and efficiency have 
been a current issue within aviation (Høyland et al., 2008, Loqfquist 
2008), a focus which is characteristic of the prevalent social and 
political climate. The cost effectiveness is easy to make objective by 
stating clear goals, followed by indicators to measure these goals (Gaba 
2000). Examples of indicators are timeliness, regularity and economy 
(Tjørhom & Aase forthcoming). In situations where the operator has to 
handle goal conflicts, between, for example, regularity and safety, the 
means to handle such a conflict might create tensions (Pettersen & 
Aase 2008, Woods et al., 1994). Analysis of aircraft accidents has 
shown that, for example, acceptance of too long duration between de-
icing and take-off contributed to the Dryden accident (1989) (Evans et 
al., 2006). Too narrow procedures and rules may contribute to 
conflicting situations for the operators and, in worst cases, contribute to 
wrong decisions that result in catastrophic accidents. The origin of such 
conflicting goals, between the situation per se and the designed rules, 
stems from inadequate contextual factors (Woods et al., 1994).  
Within a changing environment, with efficiency trends it becomes 
prevalent to enforce and state clear safety goals (Tjørhom & Aase 
forthcoming, Aase et al., 2009, Grote 2008, 2004, Cook & Rasmussen 
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2005). These goals may be stated within a regulatory framework, thus 
becoming a part of the risk governance.  
Within a risk governance framework, it became obvious that there are 
also goal conflicts within the elaboration of the core risk governance 
process. Stirling described such a goal conflict by addressing the 
inherent tension and power elements of governance (2008), pointing to 
different imperatives to governance. These imperatives are the 
normative, the substantive or the instrumental. Referring to Stirling, the 
normative reason for choosing governance is ‘because it is correct’, the 
substantive reason is selected to fulfil the objective of better ends (often 
related to the discussions of precautionary principle), and last, the 
instrumental is chosen to reach particular ends.  So, even if the risk 
governance perspective is chosen, there might be an inherent tension 
and a potential danger that, for example reputation is the imperative. 
According to Power (2007, 2004), a risk framework is a disguised 
picture of trustworthiness. Giving such an instrumental reason for 
choosing governance might create tension towards the elaboration of 
rules. Efficiency might be prioritised before safety, even in the core risk 
governance process of prioritisation of safety goals.   
The apparent visibility of the efficiency goals in contrast to the 
indistinctness of safety goals (Cook & Rasmussen 2005) calls for 
clarification of safety standards and procedures in order to keep this 
objective uppermost in the operator’s mind. Grote (2008, 2004) stated 
that the safety within many organisations and systems has been viewed 
as a product of procedures and rules; in situations with uncertainties, 
there are calls for elaboration of flexible rule work.  
3.6  Changes 
Turner & Pidgeon (1997) claimed that focusing attention towards one 
area of activity within an organisation might negatively impact other 
activities the organisation is responsible for. Woo & Vicente (2003) 
indicated that increasing competition within socio-technical systems, 
such as commercial airplanes, forces the system to ‘do more with less’ 
(2003:253), and Hale & Baram (1998) declared: ‘lessons learned in 
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aerospace and defence industries reveal that the root of many accidents 
lies in poorly managed change’ (1998:189). 
Procedures and rules might be an appropriate way to manage safety 
within a stable system, but, in dynamic, fast-paced situations, within 
technological and organisational changes there are often lags in 
development of safety rules and regulation (Becker 2007, Rasmussen 
1997), creating the discrepancy between prescribed work and real work 
(Bourrier 1998). As systems become more complex and interrelated, 
the regulatory styles have to open up to flexibility (Wilpert 2008). Both 
the technological change and the competitive environment foster short- 
term financial decisions ahead of long-term issues such as safety 
(Lofquist 2008, Jeffcott et al., 2006, Becker 2002, Rasmussen 1997). In 
order to keep the safety level high in changing situations, feedback 
mechanisms must be established (Rosness et al., 2004), safety 
information exchanged and learning fostered in the system interfaces 
(Wiig 2008) to develop the safety system to fit new situations. A 
complex system calls for open-minded discussions to capture the 
ambiguities to which the systems are subjected (Rosness et al., 2004), 
and to prevent a decrease in the safety boundaries ( Rosness et al., 
2004, Rasmussen 1997).  
Studies (Lofquist 2008, Jeffcott et al., 2006, Rosness et al., 2005, NLR 
study 2003) show that systems subjected to structural changes might be 
vulnerable to important safety aspects, such as communication lines, 
flexibility, trust, and learning. Changes within organisational structures 
create degradation in the information flow (Rosness et al., 2004) and 
might be a reason for operational drift (Snook 2000). Likewise, the 
tension between centralisation and decentralisation of control (Jeffcott 
et al., 2006), calls for a flexible structure to anticipate any unwanted 
side effects of a decision. When organisational structures change, work 
groups may become dispersed or recreated and expertise lost (Pettersen 
2006), which might impact the ability to function flexibly in 
circumstances calling for the requirement to anticipate decisions and 
operations (Jeffcott et al., 2006). An experience of commitment to 
safety production by management is of importance to trust issues and, 
thereby, may create tensions in the operational staff in decision 
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situations (Jeffcott et al., 2006). Furthermore, the important learning 
aspects of safety production might be threatened by a burdensome 
focus on procedures (sometimes conflicting) and the resulting blame 
when they are violated (Pidgeon & O’Leary 2000). A tendency to focus 
on blame fosters a non-reporting attitude, with the loss of possibilities 
to learn from incidents and accidents. Systems subjected to changes 
which decrease complexity and create more tight couplings (Perrow 
1999) and intractability (Hollnagel 2009) are in need of data and 
evaluation of processes to learn and keep the safety production at a 
high level.  Within aviation, the Dryden accident in 1989, the Bijlner 
accident in 1992, and the ValueJet accident in 1996 resulted in a shift 
in focus from a simple cause-effect explanation to a system focus, and, 
thereby, led to changes in safety legislation (NLR-CR-2003-316).  
In 2008, the report from a Norwegian research project on changes 
within the aviation system, ‘Every little bit helps? Risk Challenges and 
Parallel Change Processes within the Norwegian Transportation 
Sector’, 2005-2007’ (Høyland et al., 2008) concluded that among the 
cases that were studied, there was a range of characteristics that 
integrated and strengthened the crosswise safety work within the 
Norwegian aviation transport system. Such characteristics are a high 
degree of professionalism, awareness of safety, and safety 
responsibility within the work operations. Furthermore, procedures and 
new technologies, in combination with willingness to learn and 
strengthen competence, are highly focused. The challenges to the safety 
work in this change-intensive situation seem to be affiliated with the 
restructuring of the system, which created new interfaces between the 
actors (the reorganisation and relocalisation of the Aviation Authority, 
the separation of the maintenance unit for the airline companies, 
together with relocalisation of line maintenance), who might be 
vulnerable to the practice of safety work within the Norwegian aviation 
transport system.  The study has shown that the relational premises are 
strongly influencing the possibilities to operate safely in a change-
intensive situation. Thereby, the new interfaces seem to be the main 
challenge due to continuation of the safety focus across the aviation 
transport system (Høyland et al., 2008).  
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4 Methodology  
This chapter introduces the methodological issues related to exploring 
the risk governance of a transport system. I present the background for 
my research, the research design, my method of data collection, and 
then explain how I ensured the quality of my findings.  
4.1 The background for my research 
I began this PhD study in light of my master’s thesis, ‘Safety Culture 
within Heavy Maintenance at Braathens Technical Service, Sola’ 
(Tjørhom 2001). The knowledge I acquired during data collection, from 
observations, interviews and attendance at different congresses and 
dialogues, was my starting point. The conclusion of my thesis was that 
the employees within the unit of my study held a common awareness of 
safety. The study showed a safety culture denoted by Reason (1997) 
consisted of just, reporting, flexible and learning elements. Based on 
these results, I found the aviation field to be an interesting window into 
safety work in practice.  
I embarked in this research at the request of an organisation focusing 
on safety issues, the Solaconference. The Solaconference is managed 
by employees and retired employees of the Norwegian aviation system. 
This organisation wanted to extend its work with annual safety 
conferences to encompass aviation safety research. The collaboration 
between the University of Stavanger and the aviation system started 
with workshops in which safety challenges and questions experienced 
within the aviation transport system were matched with challenges 
within risk and safety research. A research proposal to the Research 
Council of Norway was developed with input from a reference group 
within the Norwegian aviation transport system. That proposal 
suggested scrutinising whether or not the ongoing trends (deregulation, 
downsizing, merging, and relocalisation) in the society affected the risk 
management of the Norwegian aviation transport system. The 
overarching question was whether or not the traditional analytical risk 
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management tools used for safety management come up short in this 
new situation. In other words, is the prevailing risk management system 
in accordance with the ongoing changes to which the system is 
subjected? The proposal resulted in the collaborative project ‘Every 
Little Bit helps? Risk Challenges and Parallel Change Processes within 
the Norwegian Transportation Sector, 2005-2007’ (Høyland et al., 
2008). Four of us were affiliated with the University of Stavanger. We 
also collaborated with the Norske Veritas (DNV), and with Rogaland 
Research, now the International Research Institute of Stavanger (IRIS). 
During the project period, 2005-2008, this reference group, along with 
members of the aviation transport system in Norway, held and attended 
meetings. The purpose of these meetings was to present findings and 
search for further paths in the research in partnership with the actors 
from the empirical field.  
The current PhD project was a part of this project. Within the research 
group and the reference group, I benefited from having research fellows 
assist me in elaborating the conceptual framework (Marshall & 
Rossman 2006). This collaboration improved my work and was helpful 
in refining my ideas and concepts. Nevertheless, my participation in the 
project also presented the challenge of distinguishing my own work 
from that of my colleagues. 
4.2 Research design 
Before choosing a research design for my study, it was important to 
define the scope of the research. The scientific position gives direction 
for every step in the research process (Winter 2000). A theoretical 
choice points to the worldview of the researcher. The choice of theory 
provides a lens through which one looks out upon the world, one that, 
as Blaikie (2000) said, ‘highlights certain aspects while at the same 
time making other aspects less visible’ (2000:159). Every kind of 
scientific view puts some aspects in focus and leaves out others. As 
Gilbert said (1993), ‘a shift in perspective changes the shape of the 
social world’ (1993:1).  
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4.2.1  Description or prescription of risk 
governance 
As pointed out in chapter 1, the main research aims of this PhD-study 
have been to explore the risk governance system of civil aviation, with 
attention to the role of complexity, change and goal conflicts. To 
explore the aviation system with regard to these issues may point 
towards a pure descriptive approach of trying to explain how 
complexity, change and goal conflicts play a role in governing risk 
within aviation. A descriptive scientific ideal is often connected to a 
constructivist way of deriving data and knowledge about the outer 
world (Hansson 1999). The pure descriptive ideal, as opposed to the 
prescriptive normative ideal viewing the outer world as given 
objectivity, seeks contextual and full descriptions of the empirical field 
in order to grasp knowledge (e.g., Snook 2000, Vaughan 1996). 
My PhD work has an explorative nature with the initial focus on the 
processes and structures constituting the aviation system’s way of 
handling its safety work and managing its risks. At first, the study 
relied on a socio-technical system approach (Alamberti 2005, 2001, 
Leveson 2004, Rasmussen 1997) as a framework chosen by the 
research project in which this PhD work was a part of (Høyland et al., 
2008). This framework created the selection of units to be studied in the 
Norwegian aviation case. In this phase of the PhD work, research topics 
were developed and chosen based on my interaction with the aviation 
system, and research questions and/or assumptions were based on 
collected data or previous studies. According to Yin (2003), and Miles 
& Huberman (1994) there is no contradiction between an explorative 
research design and the development of research questions and research 
assumptions. Qualitative analysis could identify causal mechanisms on 
a local level in a complex network of events and processes within a 
situation (Miles & Huberman 1994:147).  Additionally,  the format of 
journal articles also requires a structured presentation of research 
questions and/or assumptions, data material and analysis.  
In the latter phase of my PhD work, I have used the theoretical 
framework of risk governance (Renn, 2008, Stirling e.g., 2008, 2004, 
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De Marchi 2003, Klinke & Renn 2002) to explore the civil aviation 
system, characterized in forms of the core risk governance model 
(figure 3.2) and the contextual risk governance model (figure 3.3). This 
might be interpreted as a shift from a more descriptive research 
approach to a normative approach using models to describe the aviation 
system. As such, every kind of model used to analyse data has the 
aspect of normativity embedded by directing the research in a 
predefined way, and thus the danger of trying to get the data to fit the 
model (Le Coze 2008). The risk governance framework has been 
chosen based on findings from the earlier phases of the PhD work 
stating the importance of the actor network, and the importance of 
consistent and integrated risk processes throughout the aviation system 
when the system is characterized by complexity, changes and goal 
conflicts. In my opinion, the risk governance model holds concepts and 
theories that reflect my research position, displaying an 
interdisciplinary approach to the establishment of risk policies, thereby 
having the ability to adapt to any particular system of risks. As such, 
the risk governance framework is in a middle position given the 
normative descriptive research continuum (Murphy 1994). The risk 
governance models imply an opening up of the risk processes to a 
wider pool of knowledge, giving them less normativity than a more 
centrally governed risk regulation framework. A bottom-up view on the 
risk decision making processes indicates a transition from a purely 
normative approach to more descriptive processes to risk policies 
including various risk perceptions (Bradbury (1989). However, the risk 
governance framework’s focus on deliberate communication in line 
with an integrative risk communication (Löfstedt & Boholm 2009) is 
an ideal situation in need for empirical research in order to elaborate 
processes and structures that fulfill the goal of generating better 
outcomes of the deliberation (e.g., Mørth 2009).  
So far, the risk governance framework has mainly been applied as an 
analytical tool in case studies of risk challenges such as new technology 
(e.g. nanotechnology, gene technology) and environmental issues (see 
Renn & Walker 2008 for case examples) where risks are featured by a 
high degree of uncertainty, and that impact the community as a whole 
(Renn & Walker 2008). I found it interesting to see whether the risk 
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governance framework was also relevant for an industrial system 
encompassing all types of risks from those that are connoted as simple, 
to risks featured by uncertainty and in need for knowledge generation 
and value deliberation (Renn 2008, Aven & Renn forthcoming). Thus, 
the exploration of the risk governance system of civil aviation in this 
PhD study has combined a descriptive approach with few predefined 
analytical categories with a more normative approach using the risk 
governance framework with its belonging concepts. This has in my 
opinion given the PhD study a richer analysis within the areas of actor 
network, organizational capacity, and political and regulatory climate. 
4.2.2  Choosing a design 
The aims of my study were to explore the risk governance of the 
Norwegian aviation transport system, and to gain knowledge about the 
role of complexity, change and goal conflicts (see p.7). Whereas the 
overall project focused on the system, my goal was to explore its 
institutional levels and, thus, also to explore these actors’ networking 
with external organisations and collaborators.  
To study these themes, I chose an explorative research design in the 
tradition of interpretative social science. ‘Exploration’ means building 
‘rich descriptions of complex circumstances that are unexplored in the 
literature’ (Marshall & Rossman 2006:33), and exploratory studies 
give information about phenomena by revealing underlying structures 
(Marshall & Rossman 2006). In the case of changes to which the 
system is subjected, there is a need to investigate the relationships 
within the system and the impact this has on risk governance. There is 
also a need to discover important categories of meanings within the 
system. I intend to bring to light the patterns, meanings and categories 
of the actors at the upper level of the transport system. The 
interpretative approach focuses on data collection pursuant to life 
worlds, interactions, and social meanings or intersubjectivity as being 
beneficial to answer the research questions (Bonhnsack 2004, Flick et 
al., 2004, Denzin & Lincoln 2000). Using an interpretative approach, I 
was able to examine the theoretical interest of my data material and 
Methodology 
60 
 
thereby connect the collected data to a scientific relevant theory (Honer 
2004).  
Within an explorative design with an interpretative perspective 
(Kringen 2008, Corbin & Strauss 2008, Ragin 1994, Patton 1990), I 
have explored the system’s ability to handle risk governance in 
complex change processes that circumvents previous structures. A 
study of ‘opening up processes’ of risk management through involving 
those with diverse knowledge and establishing a broader deliberate 
process within a system (Renn, 2008, 2005, Stirling 2008, 2004, 
Wynne 1996, 1992) shows a need for a broad range of data and calls 
for the interpretive explorative research design. Such an explorative 
design was valuable to collect data on different processes and structures 
within the system. The data collection methods included actors 
informing me about their experience of the risk management situation, 
acquiring information about the structures and statement from 
documents, and gaining access to information about the social 
meanings within the Norwegian aviation transport system by 
observation.  Together these data gave me a broad range of information 
about the risk governance processes.  
The exploration by interviews were based on predefined categories, 
sensitising concepts (Corbin & Strauss 2008, Ragin 1994), negotiated 
within a reference group consisting of actors in the system. The 
sensitising concepts were clarified and elaborated through interviews, 
text analysis and observations. This process was conducted analytically 
by matching the concepts derived from the data with related theoretical 
concepts, searching for patterns and then linking the data to those 
concepts. Research questions and assumptions to guide my four articles 
were based upon the outcome of this structuring process.  
4.2.3 Research Strategy  
The objective of this study is to explore a transport system within a risk 
governance framework. Due to the explorative nature of the research 
assumptions, I based my research design on a qualitative case study 
approach (Yin 2009, 2003, Blaikie 2005, Stake 2005, Seale et al., 2004, 
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Ragin 1994). Case studies are a strategy to gain profound insight into 
real-life phenomena within their context (Yin 2009, 2003), and, to gain 
insight into how the process is carried out. There are different 
approaches to case studies, depending on whether or not the researcher 
wants to compare cases. I chose an embedded single case design (Yin 
2009, 2003, Blaikie 2000), so I studied different units within a single 
context and explored a single, embedded case. The embedded units 
were selected from different organisations constituting the institutional 
part of the aviation transport system with the objective of gaining rich 
data material from them concerning the risk governance of the system.  
A case study gave me the advantage of elaborating the richness of risk 
governance and extending the context. An exploratory study is distinct 
from a descriptive study according to the completeness in description 
(Yin 2003). Where the descriptive study presents a thorough 
representation of the case or cases, the exploratory study pinpoints 
some important issues and creates a foundation for further research. 
The Norwegian aviation is a comprehensive system difficult to capture 
and describe. I found an exploratory study of value to indicate 
important topics regarding risk and safety in socio-technical systems.  
It might be difficult to draw a line between the case and its 
surroundings, but it still has to be unique among other theoretical 
constructs and empirical units (Stake 2005). The case was the 
Norwegian aviation risk governance system, an extensive case, where I 
had to narrow down the topics of interest in my research design to 
make the research manageable. As mentioned earlier, the selection of 
research topics was done in collaboration with the reference group 
consisting of actors with expertise in safety issues within the 
Norwegian aviation transport system. Provided with research topics 
that I developed into a semi-structured interview guide, I searched for 
in-depth information in the interviews and relied on multiple sources of 
textual and observational evidence, along with previous studies with 
the same theoretical propositions (e.g., Høyland et al., 2008, Pettersen 
2008, Snook 2000, Vaughan 1996). Altogether, this richness in data 
material led to a profound comprehension of the research phenomena.  
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The units chosen were the Ministry of Transport and Communication 
Norway, the Civil Aviation Authority Norway and the Accident 
Investigation Board Norway, which I viewed as the critical embedded 
units (Flyvebjerg 2004, Yin 2003), that provided important information 
about the risk governance within the aviation transport system. My 
participation in the project ‘Every Little Bit Helps? Risk Challenges 
and Parallel Change Processes within the Norwegian Transportation 
Sector’, 2005-2007’, afforded me access to data from other parts of the 
transport system. The main method of data collection was interviews, 
and I also applied textual material and observational data through 
participation in different gatherings. 
According to Yin (2009, 2003), the guiding questions in the study 
should define the case or cases. Given my purpose to explore a global 
transport system in relation to a risk governance framework focusing 
on complexity, goal conflicts and change (see research aim above), my 
guiding questions must elicit information on the research aims (see 
research questions on p.7-8). 
4.3 Data collection and analysis 
The data was collected in a qualitative tradition through interviews, 
textual analysis and observations. Qualitative research might be defined 
generically as ‘a situated activity that locates the observer in the world’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln 2008:4). I was interested in capturing the world of 
my informants by an explorative approach, interpreting the data in a 
search for information about the informants’ experience of risk 
governance issues, what kinds of structures and networks the 
informants experienced and were a part of, and how they experienced 
the interrelations within the aviation transport system. The documents 
gave me information about the formal structures, expressed goals and 
process work within the governance system. The observations were 
helpful in giving me insight into communications and social 
understanding and expressions of risk issues within the system. 
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Table 4.3 gives an overview of my case study, data sources and 
selection of actors within the units. The total data material comprises 
46 interviews, about 22 accident reports, a selection of public reports, 
web pages with organisational information, participation in annual 
conferences arranged by Aviation Authority, AVINOR and Flight 
Operative Forum (a conference directed to flight operative personnel in 
management positions), the Solaconference, and dialogues when 
participating in seminars and working groups to arrange scientific 
conferences within the field of aviation.  
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Table 4.3 Units, data sources, themes and selection of data source 
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Next I will give a summary of the data collection and analysis phase, 
followed by an analysis of the studies’ trustworthiness related to the 
data collection and analysis phases (Chapter 4.4).  
Interviews 
I conducted 11 interviews in May 2006 with the employees in the 
Ministry and 26 interviews in the Aviation Authority in August 2006 in 
Oslo and November 2006 in Bodø. In May 2007, I conducted the last 
seven interviews with the employees of the Accident Investigation 
Board Norway (Investigation Board). In conjunction with the 
interviews, I carried out four member check interviews (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985) to validate my information in May 2009. Each interview 
lasted about 60-90 minutes. The time span was chosen to allow for the 
possibility of deepening the research topics; more than an hour is 
particularly difficult to ask of the interviewees. The interviews were 
conducted in one-to-one situations, but two interviews in the Aviation 
Authority were performed by two researchers, seven of these 
interviews were conducted by a colleague, and two of the interviews in 
the Investigation Board were organised in pairs.  
According to Kvale & Brinkmann (2009), ‘the qualitative research 
interview attempts to understand the world from the subject’s points of 
view, to unfold the meaning of their experience, to uncover their lived 
world prior to scientific explanations’ (2009:1). My interviews were 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, 
Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006, Fontana & Frey 2005, Merton et al., 1990), 
presenting the informants with a predefined set of questions categorised 
according to the purpose of my exploration. The semi-structured 
interview guide allowed the interviewees to respond by telling their 
story (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006). Guided 
by my intention to explore risk governance in a global transport system 
and gain knowledge about the role of complexity, change and goal 
conflicts within risk governance, I was interested in the informants’ 
opinions, world views and experiences of safety in a transition phase 
and tried to shape the questions in a way that would capture their 
perspective. The thematic questions were in categories that should 
Methodology 
66 
 
capture the perceptions of safety related to the ongoing changes (see 
Table 3 and Enclosure 1). As preparation for the interviews, I e-mailed 
the informants a one-page information sheet on my project. The 
interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim (Kvale & Brinkmann 
2009). 
Each interview setting is an interactive one, where the meaning is 
created in the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee, 
so it is important to ask if the result of the interview exists 
independently of that relationship (Denzin & Lincoln 2005). Due to 
bias in the data material, this challenge was handled by collaboration 
with research colleagues, in addition to extensive exploration of the 
data material.  
The way that interviewers practice is important for the dependability of 
the research (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, Morse et al., 2002). In order to 
gain knowledge of things we cannot directly observe, by ‘making it 
possible to the person being interviewed to bring the interviewer into 
his or her world’ (Patton 1990:279), I had to be aware of the 
asymmetry in power between the interviewer and the interviewee 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). I sought to make up for this by 
establishing a situation that felt reliable and relaxing to the interviewee 
(Fontana & Frey 2005). By reassuring the interviewee about the value 
of his or her knowledge, I conducted in-depth interviews (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985) by creating a relaxing atmosphere in which the interviewer 
and the interviewed are peers.  
Documents 
Written documents were valuable data sources for exploring the 
structural and some of the process activities within the Norwegian 
aviation transport system by providing information about the activities, 
intensions and ideas within my units. Written documents (Patton 1990) 
such as reports, hearings, white papers, decrees and laws were 
scrutinised in the search for information about processes and 
statements. I used the documents to 1) increase my knowledge about 
the field, to 2) provide a basis for defining my interview guide, and 3) 
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recognise the kinds of statements that were made. Patton pointed to the 
value of recognising the discrepancies between what is stated in a 
program and what ‘does not happen’ (1990:235). In this study, the 
documents were also been doing the opposite, to recognise the kind of 
safety statements made within the written documents.  
The study has applied information from publicly available documents 
in order to explore the system and construct a base of information about 
structures, objectives, processes and written prioritisations within the 
aviation organisations, the affiliated employee organisations, and the 
government’s statements and objectives. The main text sources have 
been public documents (see Table 4.3), organisational web sites and 
reports from accident analyses. The main part of the text has been 
available through Internet sources (Bernard 2006). 
My documentary analysis was based on reading and rereading the 
textual materials to search for the features of the cultural world into 
which the documents are windows (Peräkylä 2005). During the 
analysis, I scrutinised the documents for the categories identified by the 
interviews: safety policy, safety goals, safety prioritisation, safety 
practices, network and structures.  
A central part of the documentary analysis was the accident reports. 
Five accident reports were chosen for in-depth analysis to identify the 
prevailing investigation philosophy, accident model(s), causes, 
conclusions, and recommendations. Severity and time span were the 
main criteria for the selection of the accident reports. Accidents with a 
high level of severity were chosen with the expectation that the reports 
were based on extensive in-depth analyses that included all important 
issues that might have an impact on the course of events. By analysing 
these reports from the more serious accidents I could explore whether 
or not the accident investigations reflected the current complexity and 
change picture within the Norwegian aviation transport system. 
Furthermore, I chose 17 accident and incident reports from less serious 
events to sharpen my insight into how the Investigation Board reports 
events. Accidents over a 10-year time span were chosen with the 
expectation to observe a certain development in investigation 
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philosophy and accident model(s). Table 1 in Article 4 shows the 
accidents included in the main selection of investigation reports. 
I also read and reread the reports and white papers within the EU in 
order to understand the safety work and structures of the work within 
that system. I also reviewed the documents of the Norwegian 
Parliament to capture the safety goals, safety prioritisations, 
responsibility and processes within the aviation safety. Together with 
the web sites that stated each organisation’s work, all these textual 
materials constitute a part of the data within this thesis. The main 
documents relevant to this thesis are mentioned in Figure 3 and are 
shown in the reference list as web addresses. 
Observations 
Observation was a helpful tool for exploring the communications and 
expressions about safety issues within the Norwegian aviation transport 
system. The data collected by observations became a bridge between 
the actors’ information about their safety experiences given in the 
interviews and the information about structures, goal and processes, 
collected by my documentary analysis. For me, observation was an 
instrument for completing the information collected by interviews and 
documents. As Patton (2002) expressed it, ‘To understand fully the 
complexities of many situations, direct participation in and observation 
of the phenomenon of interest may be the best research method’ (21). 
My ability to take part in meetings, gatherings and social settings 
allowed me to access a rich source of information. I was participating 
within the field as a member of the system when I was contributing 
with lectures and speeches as a researcher, or as non-member in the 
role as a student. Both of those roles gave me in-depth information 
about the aviation transport system. The experience of participating 
was of value to ‘become an insider’ (Blaikie 2000) and I was therefore 
better able to seize the social actors’ expressed safety perception. When 
listening to and taking part in conversations, I was able to catch the 
actors in the system’s interpretations of the safety concept. These 
observations helped me stay closer to the integrity of the phenomenon 
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and to utilise the same concepts as the social actors being studied 
(Blakie 2000:241). I chose the concepts of change, transition, safety 
and trade-offs between safety and production partly in the meetings 
prior to the project, as a means of translating the scientific issues into 
the framework of the informant.  
Web pages 
Related to exploring the EU system, an extensive part of the data was 
collected over the Internet. I searched web sites to collect information 
about the organisations’ members, missions, goals and activities. The 
industry organisations, the institutional organisations, and the EU 
system were all explored by searches of their web sites. 
Secondary data 
In addition to my own data material, I accessed data collected by 
colleagues from other parts of the Norwegian aviation transport system. 
The main parts of this data were from interviews in AVINOR (Hauland 
et al., 2007), the Braathens Technical Service (Pettersen 2008), and 
questionnaire data from the entire Norwegian aviation transport system 
(Bjørnskau 2005). These secondary data were used in Article 4, ‘The 
art of balance: Using upward resilience traits to deal with conflicting 
goals’. 
Analysis 
The analytical part of an exploratory case study is more like a constant, 
on-going process than a fixed step in a research design. The process has 
moved from the themes elaborated to guide my studies to theoretical 
considerations about these themes and then back again to the data 
collected in order to identify processes, variations, and patterns. The 
last analytical consideration was done by analysing the data according 
to the risk governance framework. 
My analysis started out in search of identifying patterns within complex 
circumstances. I was seeking answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
(Yin 2009, 2003), in order to understand how the actors in the aviation 
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transport system were acting upon risk issues, and why they were 
acting in the manner they did. These questions were explored in the 
data collection, categorised and connected to the theoretical framework. 
Over time, the nature of the exploration process changed and became 
more confirming, aiming at testing ideas, concepts and patterns (Miles 
& Huberman 1994, Patton 1990). Patton described such a process as 
‘moving back and forth between inductive, open- ended, and 
phenomenological encounters with programs to more hypothetical- 
deductive attempts to verify hypothesis or solidify ideas that emerged 
from those more open-ended experience…’ (1990:194). 
The interviews, built up of themes founded on interactions with the 
reference group were audio-recorded (Rapely 2004), transcribed and 
categorised (Miles & Huberman 1994). The purpose of the interviews 
was to identify categories that illustrated the informants’ experiences 
according to conditions within the governance model in a transition 
phase and to search for relationships between the categories in order to 
analyse them according to risk theories. I began with a mix of 
sociotechnical system theoretical views and the aims of the project 
‘‘Every little bit helps? Risk Challenges and Parallel Change Processes 
within the Norwegian Transportation Sector, 2005-2007’ and made the 
sensitising questions (Corbin & Strauss 2008, Ragin 1994) focus on 
structures, processes and actors within the system. This was done by a 
back-and-forth reflection of my own and by tying together the 
reference group’s comprehension of valuable themes that will illustrate 
the change picture within the aviation transport system. The reference 
group came up with following themes: change in the knowledge base, 
new interfaces and unclear distribution of responsibility. These themes 
were further elaborated by results of the phase of asking sensitising 
questions (Corbin & Strauss 2008) to understand and elaborate the 
important topics in an interview guide that should reflect the role of 
complexity, change and goal conflicts. As a result of this reflection 
phase I added the following themes to the interview guide: change 
processes, safety goals, safety practice, networking and structures of 
relationships. With these themes, I began to ask theoretical questions 
(Corbin & Strauss 2008), questions that guided me to search for 
processes, variations and patterns within and between the established 
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themes in order to code the material. Coding (Schmidt 2004:255) 
‘means relating particular passages in the text of an interview to one 
category, in the version that best fit the textual passages’. I was coding 
the data material by marking the text with colours in search of patterns 
and differences within the interviews’ themes. The empirical categories 
were converted by this exploration into theoretical categories in a 
practical manner (Corbin & Strauss 2008) according to problems for 
discussion in articles, e.g., complexity, accident investigations and goal 
conflicts. 
The textual analysis was conducted with the purpose of identifying an 
overall picture of the mandates of the different groups of actors within 
the aviation system. I was searching for information about participants, 
the organisation’s main goal, and their role in the broader decision-
making structure. In addition, documents and observational data were 
used to obtain a general knowledge of the aviation industry. Together, 
these data sources provide adequate information for addressing issues 
of expressed facts as opposed to the actors’ own perceptions of risk 
governance, decision structure and the possibility of influencing 
decision-making processes. The current data material represents a valid 
description of risk governance system in Norway. Nevertheless, the 
data material represents perceptions and descriptions at a certain point 
in time and, given the change-intensiveness of the Norwegian aviation 
system, exploration of the system at another point in time might give 
different descriptions.  
In the compilation phase of my thesis work, I explored for other 
patterns and processes by analysing my results in an overall theoretical 
framework. By theories on risk governance analysed my findings in 
search for an overarching structure for my data material.  This analysis 
was done with the aim of putting my data into a new theoretical 
framework that was scant in the empirical data. 
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4.4 Research quality? 
How does one document the truth in an interpretative and explorative 
case design? Winter says, ‘Reality in a quality research is concerned 
with the negotiation of truths through a series of subjective accounts’ 
(2000:6). Pluralisation of life worlds (Flick 2004), requiring a 
multifaceted way of studying the empirical field, means that the 
researcher must take part in the life and experiences of the whole 
person or the person within a setting (Winter 2000). I have strived to 
take into consideration this required multifaceted way of study by my 
use of various forms of data material, while collaborating with 
colleagues in triangulating the data during the case study. The 
triangulation strategy has been a means to clarify meanings and 
patterns within the whole research process (Stake 2005). A fruitful aim 
has been to avoid misinterpretations and prejudicing the various data 
points and perceptions from research colleagues. In addition, the 
closeness to the empirical field during all the stages of the research 
process has been valuable in confirming and rejecting my observations 
and interpretations. To capture the truth is, during the whole process, to 
ensure that the work done is in line with the tradition within the type of 
research design, in search of trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba 1985). 
Morse et al., (2002), called attention to the importance of making a 
distance between the constructive (during the process) and evaluative 
(research outcome) phases. The distinction between the process and the 
outcome are of particular interest in qualitative research, where the 
interactions between the field and the researcher make the research 
iterative, thereby making it easy to get lost in reformulations.  
4.4.1 Trustworthiness 
Lincoln & Guba (1985) asked, ‘How can an inquirer persuade his or 
her audiences that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention 
to, worth taking account of?’ (1985:301) they also developed some 
criteria to achieve that purpose: credibility, transferability, 
dependability and conformability. 
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Credibility refers to the truth value within the study; this is a question 
of confidence in the truth content of the data to reassure that the study 
is credible (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Lincoln & Guba recommend 
several techniques to deal with credibility. As mentioned in my 
description of the data collection, I have utilised their recommendations 
about prolonged engagement in the field, triangulation, peer debriefing 
and member checks. The reference group and my affiliation with the 
field were beneficial to me with respect to prolonged engagement in the 
field. The attachment to the field means that I have continued to take 
part in conferences and meetings, to take phone calls to the actors, and 
continue the dialogue with the field even after the interviews were 
finished. The fact that the Internet sources are updated frequently was 
also valuable in keeping track of the field.  Triangulation was taken into 
consideration in the design phase by a group of researchers discussing 
my project in the data collection phase, by coming to some interviews, 
and by using others’ data. Peer debriefing was a part of the process 
where the project participation gave me access discussions of concepts, 
data, analyses and findings. The member check technique was used 
during my project as comments to my presentation of research design 
and research results on various seminars. Additionally, I requested and 
received feedback from the Accident Investigation Board due to the 
investigation article.  
The criterion of transferability is satisfied if the findings are valuable in 
other contexts. According to Lincoln & Guba (1985), transferability 
claims thick contextual descriptions. Only a profound understanding of 
the case will make it possible for other researchers or practitioners to 
find value in it and judge if the findings are also applicable in their 
contexts. I have thus endeavoured to describe the context and the data 
collection in great depth to make this study accessible to others. 
Achieving transferability also depends upon purposeful sampling 
(Patton 1990), so I aimed for variation and richness in the sample 
among the informants, documents, reports and observations in order to 
elaborate a detailed and rich base of data.  
Aspiring to capture the depth and the breadth of meanings within the 
chosen case unit, I selected interview informants with a preference for 
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ensuring diversity regarding their sections, professions and positions. 
This was especially of value within the Aviation Authority, which 
consists of 146 people. Within the other units, I covered seven out of 
nine of the Investigation Board, and nine out of 13 of the Aviation 
Authority. In addition to selecting by profession and position, I used the 
‘snowball’ method (Patton 1990), picking some informants based on 
advice from key informants. I asked people from the reference group to 
inform me of ‘who knows a lot about this topic’; some my informants 
also told me several times, unsolicited, ‘you should talk to ….. she 
knows a lot about this topic’.  
The accessibility of public documents and reports through web sites 
made it possible for me to explore written documents from several 
angles, at any time. I was also able to access different arenas within the 
Norwegian aviation transport system throughout my PhD thesis work. 
The dependability criterion rests upon credibility. If the chosen inquiry 
design and strategy are proven to be appropriate, then the dependability 
criteria will be handled by further checking that this credible strategy 
has been followed during the entire study. Dependability is assured if 
the findings show stability over time. The techniques available for this 
are to analyse the data independently, using the same interview guide; 
to provide the same conditions with each group; and to prepare the 
transcripts immediately. In my study, the data was analysed by several 
researchers, because some of them also worked on the project ‘Every 
little bit helps’ and my supervisor co-wrote some of the articles. The 
same interview guide was used within the units of the case, but differed 
a bit between the units because the progression in the research allowed 
us to concretise and give more direction to the research.  
Confirmability is the neutrality of the researcher and the importance of 
making explicit the bias that may occur within the study (Miles & 
Huberman 1994). This criterion was met by awareness about possible 
subjectivity, which can be avoided by an ‘audit trail’ (Akkerman, et al., 
2008, Lincoln & Guba 1985), that is, by having a thorough examination 
of the study by an outsider to avoid subjective bias. Such an audit trail 
should be visible so that there are logical links from the data to the 
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findings by use of appropriate analytical methods, the proper use of 
categories and ensuring that there are quality interpretations (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985). I sought to meet the audit trail criteria in this thesis by 
providing a thorough description of my data collection, its processing 
and transformation into findings. The fact that two of the interviews 
were done with a colleague was also helpful for checking that my 
perceptions were in accordance with others’. The duality in 
interviewing by leaving seven of the interviews to a colleague was also 
a way to ascertain whether or not the informants’ responses to other 
interviewers conformed to the responses I received.  As a participant on 
a research group, I was able to check my assumptions in collaboration 
with both the research group and the reference group.  
4.4.2 Methodological considerations 
To explore risk governance within the Norwegian aviation transport 
system as a case, gave rise to methodological considerations such as 
operationalisation of concepts, selection of units, and choice of data 
collection methods.  
The risk governance framework was adopted in the compilation phase 
of this PhD study, which means that the data collection had already 
been done. This use of theoretical concepts from risk governance 
framework in my data might then be considered a weakness since the 
data sometimes will lack the depth and breadth to explore the 
theoretical concepts fully. Nevertheless, I found the available data 
sufficient to explore the risk governance of the Norwegian aviation 
transport system. 
The operationalisation of the concepts were done by an iteration 
process. The actors’ reflection, together with the theoretical framework, 
constitute the foundations of the choice of operational concepts. By 
such a coupling of actors’ experience and theoretical debate, the 
concepts to be used in my study become apparent. In order to narrow 
down the scope of the study I made the choice of complexity, change 
and goal conflicts, as main topics. 
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Collaboration with other researchers in the research project of which 
this PhD study was a part became a means to overcome the challenge 
by selection of units, considering the institutional level as my main 
analytical level. The units of my case were then chosen to be the 
institutional actors of the Norwegian aviation transport system, and, 
interviews were used as the main source of data, to provide information 
on the actors’ own experience with risk governance. Additional data 
was collected from documents, web pages, and observations. Data from 
other parts of the system than the institutional, also gave supplementary 
data, given my objective of exploring the aviation transport system.  
A main methodological disadvantage in my PhD study is the collection 
of data from the EU level part of the governance system, using merely 
written documentation in the forms of web pages, reports, rules and 
regulation, and a few interviews with some of the Norwegian actors 
participating in the global governance process. Further interviews and 
observation within the EU risk governance arenas would clearly have 
expanded my empirical knowledge of the aviation case. Instead, my 
study relies upon a selection of documents available and the interviews 
with some of the Norwegian actors which have participated in the EU 
governance processes.  
Another challenge of exploring a complex system such as aviation was 
to decide when data saturation had been accomplished. In this process, 
the member check interviews were valuable.  
One of the main advantages of my case study was access to an 
abundance of data through extensive participation in aviation seminars 
and activities, member check interviews, and from the availability of 
information through documents, reports and home pages. 
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5 Summary of results 
This PhD thesis explores the risk governance processes related to the 
globalisation of civil aviation and inquires into the role of complexity, 
change and goal conflicts in such processes.  
5.1 Main results 
I explored the institutional level of a global transport system through 
four articles. By using interviews, documents, and observations I tried 
to explore the complexity, changes, and goal conflicts of the system 
related to risk governance. Table 5.1 shows the research questions and 
the findings in each of the articles. 
Within each of the articles, the research questions appear as more 
detailed than in the table, e.g., Research Question 2 is developed into 
two research assumptions in Article 2: 1) In order for the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication to fulfill its  responsibility for the 
totality of the aviation transport system, this requires resources, 
network, and an overall safety policy making explicit how to prioritise 
between conflicting goals, and 2) In order for the Civil Aviation 
Authority to handle simultaneous changes such as transition from 
national to European legislation, geographic relocation, and the effects 
of deregulation, this requires flexibility in competence, networks, 
increased inspection activity, and an overall safety policy. 
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5.2 Article I 
‘Risk governance within aviation’ 
The study explored the structure, actors and relationships within risk 
governance of the Norwegian civil aviation and its relation to the global 
aviation transport system via the European Union (EU) and the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The article is based 
on data from interviews with actors at the institutional level of the 
Norwegian aviation system and from textual data from documents and 
web sites concerning the supranational aviation organisations.  
The study showed that Norwegian aviation actors participate in an 
extensive number of relationships within the global aviation system, 
such as intergovernmental organisations (ECAC, Eurocontrol, ICAO 
and, JAA7), legislative actors (national, laws and EASA), and industry 
associations of airline companies, air traffic controllers, pilots and 
technicians (e.g., IATA, NEAP, IFALPA, IAOPA,  IFATCTA, 
EBAA8).  
The study also showed that the actors’ experiences of the structures, in 
the form of decision processes and rules formulation, and the 
knowledge processes, in the form of information flow and integration 
                                                 
7 ECAC: European Civil Aviation Conference, Eurocontrol: The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, ICAO: International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, JAA: Joint aviation Authority, EASA: European Aviation Safety 
Agency  
8 IATA: International Air Transport Association, NEAP: North European ANS 
Providers, IFALPA: International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association, IAOPA: 
International Council of Aircraft Owner and Pilot Associations, IFATCA: 
International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations, EBAA: European 
Business Operation Associations. 
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of contextual knowledge, are in accordance with the requirements of 
the risk governance processes. There are collaborations within the 
regulatory framework based on the principles of confidence in the 
system, experience of competence, and a feeling of contributing during 
the different stages of risk governance. The contextual expert 
knowledge seems to be highly integrated in the governance framework, 
the industry actors seem to use their contacts by lobbying, and the 
industry and governmental actors are present together in working 
meetings. In addition, although the process is viewed as legitimate and 
follows the definition of a bottom-up framework, there seems to be a 
distinction between industry actors and governmental actors in terms of 
their experience of the knowledge processes and structures. The 
legislators and the actors from the management level of the regulator 
are more satisfied than the industry actors are with the transition to EU 
governance. Governmental actors experience decision-making 
processes as accessible as a result of the transition to an EU framework, 
while industry associations worry about an extended distance to the 
governance process.  
This study also highlights the change in Norway’s institutional role due 
to the expected extension of the EU’s role as the aviation safety 
legislator. Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 establishes common 
legislative regulatory framework within the European Union. This 
transition from a common understanding based on the ICAO and JAA 
agreements to an integrated regulatory approach might have an impact 
on Norwegian participation in the risk governance process within 
aviation. Norway is part of the EASA safety agency, but as a non-
member of the EU, Norway is neither part of the EU Commission nor 
of the EU Parliament. The EASA is an executive agency, while the 
Commission and Parliament make the final decisions about safety 
regulation. As a non-member of the EU but as a member of the 
European Economic Agreement (EEA), an eventual decision by the 
Norwegian Parliament to ratify the legislation (EC) No 216/2008 may 
negatively affect the Norwegian participation in the European 
Governance model since Norway is not represented on the EU 
Commission or in the Parliament. This non-participation in the EU 
seems to deprive Norway of access to the decision-making process 
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within the EU Parliament and the Commission. A diminished 
participation could lead to a regulatory framework that fails to consider 
important Norwegian safety concerns. 
The transition towards an EU risk governance framework of the 
Norwegian aviation transport system might then create goal conflicts 
within the operational parts of the system. Due to the complexity that 
characterises the system, the outcomes of prescribed regulations 
become hard to determine. Unforeseen consequences of interactions 
might emerge and a transition to a detailed regulatory framework is a 
counteraction in a situation that calls for attention to emerging risks. 
As such, the globalisation of risk governance within aviation poses both 
possibilities and challenges for the Norwegian aviation system: 
possibilities in the form of formal structures for participation and 
preparation of rules, and challenges in the form of integration and 
implementation of contextual knowledge within the EU regulatory 
framework.  
 
5.3 Article II 
‘Safety and changes in the Norwegian aviation transport 
system – What is the role of the legislator and the regulator?’ 
The article focuses on the impact of the political and regulatory levels 
on core risk governance processes in change-intensive settings. The 
data material consists of 38 interviews, document analyses and 
observations conducted in the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (Ministry) and in the Civil Aviation Authority Norway 
(Aviation Authority).  
The study documented that, within the two units explored, no explicit 
operational safety policy exists beyond a twofold objective for aviation 
to be safe and community-serving. The absence of directing safety 
goals created frustration among the employees in the Ministry and the 
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Aviation Authority. We found that to compensate for this, a strong, 
individual safety consciousness among all informants acted as a buffer 
against possible negative effects and that there was a broad informal 
network within the national aviation system with multiple contact 
points (Høyland et al., 2008, Pettersen 2008, 2006, SL/REP 35/2005, 
Tjørhom 2001). Employees are open-minded, eager to learn and to 
improve their competence in safety issues. With regards to handling the 
change intensity in the aviation system, we did not identify any 
increases in resources or frequency in inspection activities or any 
moves towards a risk-based inspection safety policy.  
The network of international organisations and the EASA seems to be 
well developed and focused on by the Ministry and parts of the 
Aviation Authority. Nevertheless, there seems to be a discrepancy 
between the Ministry and the Aviation Authority regarding their 
experience with communication and relationships in an appropriate 
network, as well as between the two organisations. Whereas the 
Ministry reported frequent contact with the Aviation Authority, 
employees in the Aviation Authority experienced a lack of formal 
networking.  
In the article, we claim that for legislators to follow up their 
responsibility for the totality of the aviation transport system requires 
resources, network, and an overarching safety policy that is explicit 
about how to prioritise conflicting goals. The results documented that 
the resources and network activities within the legislator seem scant for 
capturing and making explicit an overall safety policy. An operational 
safety policy will make it possible for the rest of the transport system to 
prepare concrete safety objectives and to develop limits for how to 
prioritise conflicting goals. 
Our second assertion is that for the regulator to handle simultaneous 
changes, such as the transition from national to European legislation, 
geographic relocations, and the effects of deregulation, flexibility is 
required in competence, networks, increased inspection activity, and a 
safety policy that is explicit about how to prioritise conflicting goals. 
The results document a work force that is responsible, flexible and 
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eager to adopt new work practices to match the current changes. The 
process of restructuring and the relocation of their head office have set 
back the development of new inspection methods.  
This article then shows that the actors within the aviation system are 
aware of the lag in regulatory framework given the intensiveness of 
change. The actors demand elaboration of knowledge about the new 
risk situation. This finding displays a perception of the complexity and 
uncertainty related to risk management by the employees at the 
institutional level of the system.   
The implications of the study are that there are strong demands to 
establish a structure for information handling, along with the need for a 
distinct safety goal structure within the national aviation transport 
system.  
 
5.4 Article III 
 ‘The role of complexity in accident investigation practice’ 
How risk is governed depends upon how risk is understood, and how 
risk is understood is often based on how accidents are understood. In 
this article, we studied how knowledge and experience about risk are 
developed, using accident investigations as the main knowledge base. 
The objective of this study was to explore whether or not the 
investigation philosophy and/or practices in the Norwegian aviation 
transport system reflect the increasing complexity and change intensity 
of the system, encompassing both core risk governance elements and 
contextual elements.  
The study is based on seven semi-structured interviews of informants in 
the Accident Investigation Board Norway (Investigation Board) and 
analysis of accident reports, including five reports from serious 
accidents in 1989-2001 and a random selection of 17 accident reports 
as supplementary data material.  
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Our study has documented that a normative framework exists in the 
Investigation Board for conducting investigations, one that is rooted in 
international and national regulations and laws. The normative 
framework has not resulted in the development of a set of operative, 
common working practices for sound investigation, except for an 
assessment of alternative methodological approaches in the start-up 
meeting. On the contrary, informants advocate that an ‘open mind’ 
perspective with no fixed accident models or investigation procedures 
is best suited to avoid biases and preferences. Every investigation is 
perceived as unique, and each accident’s characteristics determine the 
way an investigation should be conducted. 
The Investigation Board’s investigation philosophy developed as a 
result of a general development in accident theories, resulting in, for 
instance, the 1994 ICAO resolution stating that investigation practices 
should, to a greater extent, emphasise underlying factors such as 
organisational and management issues. Other reasons for the 
development of the investigation philosophy and/or investigation 
practices are the Investigation Board’s processes of networking and 
collaborations with other countries and its own improvement measures. 
Even though the informants display some awareness of the changes and 
complexity in the current aviation transport system, they do not relate 
development in investigation practices to these characteristics. Rather, 
they connect the development over time to individual preferences and 
previous external (international transportation accidents) and internal 
(Namsos 1996) investigation reports.    
This article also documents that the employees within the aviation 
system are aware of the new situation, and that they experience of need 
for new tools to investigate accidents. The changes and complexity 
imply a demand for elaborating the methods of investigation in order to 
reveal new accidents and incidents explanations.  
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5.5 Article IV 
 ‘The art of balance: Using upward resilience traits to deal 
with conflicting goals’ 
The management of prioritising conflicting goals is prevalent in risk 
governance. It is impossible to cover all potential conflicts in the rules 
and regulations, thus the different actors within the aviation transport 
system must adapt and develop their own priorities. This study 
described some of the processes involved in balancing conflicting goals 
in a change-intensive environment. As the analytical framework, we 
used the concepts of ‘downward’ and ‘upward’ resilience. Downward 
resilience refers to the macro level directions and solutions that prepare 
organisations for resilience through a clear goal structure, 
infrastructure, and procedures for safely handling the goal conflicts. 
Upward resilience means that decisions made at the micro level reflect 
commitment to safety in the face of goal conflicts. In a situation where 
a system is subjected to changes, complexity and ambiguity might alter 
the resilience traits caused by the loss of oversight at both the macro 
and micro levels of the system.  
In this article, the Norwegian aviation transport system is viewed as 
one system in its capacity to handle risk prioritisation. The institutional 
and management levels are viewed as the top level of the system, and 
different operators at different levels are viewed as actors in the sharp 
end of the system. Altogether, the different levels should form a base 
for organisational capacity in dealing with conflicting goals.  
The study was based on data from several research studies in 
Norwegian aviation (Aase et al., 2009, Tjørhom & Aase, 2009, 2007, 
Høyland & Aase, 2009, Høyland et al., 2008, Pettersen & Aase, 2008, 
Pettersen, 2008, Hauland et al., 2007, Pettersen, 2006, Bjørnskau, 
2005) that covered empirical data from different levels of the transport 
system. The study gave an account of three units: the 
legislation/regulation case (38 interviews); the air traffic controller 
(ATC) airport operation case (126 interviews at five airports and 
qualitative free text data from a questionnaire survey with 231 
Summary of Results 
86 
 
respondents); and the maintenance case (participant observation, 15 
interviews, informal discussions and free text data from a questionnaire 
study with 283 respondents). 
The results showed a deficit in the structural framework of the 
Norwegian aviation transport system due to the lack of guiding safety 
goals. The Ministry is responsible for the framework condition for 
aviation safety, and its goal is twofold: to contribute to increased safety 
and to serve the community. The political situation and prioritisation 
might colour the importance of each of these goals. The unwillingness 
to develop distinct goal rules for safety creates insufficient 
organisational capacity within the Norwegian aviation transport system. 
The result shows that, in situations with goal conflicts, the regional 
policy (community-serving) often takes precedence over safety issues. 
The unwillingness to state clear safety policies and to elaborate safety 
goals creates a deficit in the downward resilience, which again creates 
pressure on the operational levels of the system. 
The study further showed that the assets and skills at the operational 
level are prevalent in the different upward resilience traits. The actors at 
the micro-level reported goal-conflicts due to the lack of clear and 
elaborated safety goals; they also experienced economic issues taking 
precedence over safety. The operators referred to a lack of commitment 
to safety from managers, pressure to work overtime, and a lack of time 
to resolve safety issues. Nevertheless, the decisions made at the 
operational level show knowledge, competence and flexibility to handle 
trade-off situations where safety is at stake. Sacrificing decisions 
(Woods 2006), meaning that one prioritises safety and sacrifices 
efficiency, are seen as an important issue in bottom-up risk governance. 
This study documents the necessity of consistent risk governance 
within the micro, meso and macro levels of the aviation system. Risk 
governance of a system requires coherence through the different layers 
in the model (Figure 3.3). All elements from political and regulatory 
context, through organisational capacity and into the core risk 
governance processes has to exercise a coherent focus to the prevalent 
risk situation of the aviation transport system.  
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5.6 The relationship between articles and thesis 
summary 
When explaining the relationship between the risk governance 
framework presented in the thesis summary (part I) and the articles 
(part II), it is useful to present the timeline of the different articles 
(figure 5.6) in relation to the theoretical influence and concepts used.  
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Figure 5.6. Article timeline, theoretical influence and contributions to 
risk governance 
As figure 5.6 depicts, the first phases of the PhD work (articles II, III 
and IV) were influenced by theoretical frameworks such as the socio-
technical system approach, accident and investigation theories, and 
resilience engineering. The main concepts used were safety, changes, 
interactions, complexity, and goal conflicts. The latter phases of the 
PhD work (article I and thesis summary) were influenced by a risk 
governance framework using the concepts of risk, governance, 
regulation, actor network, organizational capacity and complexity. 
The main concepts used in articles II, III and IV were explored by 
developing themes for data collection based on the theoretical 
influences as shown in figure 5.6 in addition to an iterative process with 
the larger research group in ‘‘Every Little Bit helps? Risk Challenges 
and Parallel Change Processes within the Norwegian Transportation 
Sector’ (2005-2007)’, and the reference group  consisting of actors 
from all levels of the Norwegian aviation transport system.  The main 
themes in data collection for all four articles were safety policies, 
interpretations of safety management criteria, the practicing of safety 
management and risk management, the actors’ commitment to safety, 
competence and capability available, perceptions of specific changes in 
the aviation system, and types of interactions and/or network activities 
amongst the actors.  
As noted in figure 5.6, there is a shift from using safety as the main 
concept in the first phases of the PhD work to using risk as the main 
concept in article I and the thesis summary. The data collection and 
analysis were done by using the safety concept as defined by Gherardi 
& Nicolini: “the final outcome of a common collective construction 
process which involve people, technologies, textual and symbolic forms 
assembled within a system of social relations” (2002:192). The choice 
of safety as a main concept rather than risk in my PhD project was a 
choice taken within the research group ‘‘Every Little Bit Helps? Risk 
Challenges and Parallel Change Processes within the Norwegian 
Transportation Sector’ (2005-2007)’. Using risk governance as a 
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theoretical framework in the latter phases of my PhD work made it 
natural to use risk as a main concept. I found this shift unproblematic 
since my comprehension of safety was based on safety as a process, 
involving the various actors and technology in an interrelated system 
(Gherardi & Nicolini 2002). Within the risk governance framework, 
risk is conceived as outcome, uncertainty and a formula to combine 
these elements in order to mitigate the risks (Renn 2008).   In hindsight, 
it might have been favourable to deliberately use both the safety 
concept and the risk concept in the main data collection activities. The 
actors within the aviation system might differ in their perceptions of the 
two concepts and may have offered me different answers when 
reflecting on risk rather than safety. The risk concept might have 
induced perceptions concerning uncertainties and the management of 
new and unknown risks, while the safety concept might induce the 
informants’ thoughts on procedures and compliance with safety 
systems. Nevertheless, I asked the informants to reflect upon safety not 
only as a fixed product but also as a process depending on 
relationships, competence, resources, and structures.  
As figure 5.6 shows, article II is based upon a socio technical system 
approach, searching for safety prioritization, safety practices and the 
relationships between the actors in the aviation system. These issues fit 
well with the core risk governance process according to risk 
assessment, policy making and management of risks within a system. 
The actor network at the institutional level was also explored within 
this article, together with the political and regulatory climate by 
focusing on prioritizations and resources within the regulation process 
of a change intensive transport system. The two research assumptions 
stated in the article were based on the contextual knowledge of the 
aviation system and the socio technical system framework, and were 
presented in order to give the results and analyse a structure. As figure 
5.6 shows, article III is based on accident and investigation theories and 
focuses on whether the frameworks and methods for accident 
investigation capture the complexity that characterises the aviation 
transport system. The concepts used and the results within the article fit 
well with the risk governance concept of organizational capacity. 
Especially skills, resources and flexibility needed to capture trends and 
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emergent features appearing within complex systems are highlighted in 
the article. Two open-ended “how” questions were used in the article in 
order to structure the data presentation and analysis.   
As figure 5.6 shows, article IV is based upon resilience engineering 
theories as a framework to analyze the processes of balancing safety 
and efficiency within the Norwegian aviation transport system. The 
main concepts used in the analysis were safety, goal conflict and 
resilience, and together with the results, this fits with the risk 
governance framework concerning risk assessment, risk management, 
actor network, organizational capacity, and social and political climate. 
In article I and the thesis summary, the risk governance framework was 
used to picture the regulatory actor framework of the entire Norwegian 
aviation transport system. Based on my data material and my analysis, I 
wanted a framework that could describe the management of aviation 
safety in a more general manner than focusing on parts of the system or 
parts of the existing safety theories. The risk governance framework’s 
focus on actors both horizontal (amongst the various level) and vertical 
(within each level) (Renn 2008) was decisive for my choice of 
framework in the latter phases of the PhD work and was easily 
adaptable to my former work and aims of  exploring the processes and 
structures of safety within Norwegian civil aviation. Another 
framework that could have been used is the risk perception theories 
(Boholm 1998, Daniels & Walker 1996, Fishoff 1995, Slovic 1992,) 
focusing on strategies for mutual learning and relationships amongst 
the aviation actors. Even though risk governance can depict the 
Norwegian aviation risk and safety system in a conceptual manner, the 
framework is still complicated to use to model and analyse empirical 
data (Lofstedt & van Asselt 2008, Renn & Jager 2008, Rosa 2008). The 
comprehensive integration of various theoretical perspectives in an 
overall framework will always be challenging to transform to 
operational empirical concepts, and in this PhD work the risk 
governance framework has been used as a conceptual framework 
giving rise to important discussions concerning actors, processes and 
structures and the necessity of knowledge and resources available to 
assess and manage risk.  
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6 Discussion 
The main aim of this thesis has been to explore the Norwegian aviation 
transport system in light of a risk governance framework and thereby to 
gain insight into the complexity, changes and goal conflicts to which 
the system has been subjected during the period of my data collection, 
2005-2008.  
The risk governance of Norwegian civil aviation is organised within a 
transnational framework. The aviation transport system is global and 
therefore in need of a common risk governance system to capture all of 
the challenges with regard to operating across national borders. As 
elaborated in this thesis, the origin of this transport system’s regulatory 
framework was founded on transnational common agreements for 
harmonising and securing the standards in operating air traffic. Due to 
the transition from common national agreements to a juridical-binding 
regulatory framework, it is of interest to explore the system concepts 
within the risk governance framework and to discuss whether or not 
this framework allows for the integration of ongoing changes and 
evaluation of their influence on risk management.  
The findings in my PhD thesis show that within the core risk 
governance of which Norwegian aviation transport system is part, an 
appropriate process seems to be occurring to implement contextual 
knowledge. The actors are involved by their competence, and are aware 
of the risk that might result from the ongoing changes. They clearly 
express a need for more knowledge and networking. There is a deficit 
in the organisational capacity to arrange for resources in the form of 
knowledge about safety issues in change-intensive situations. Another 
deficit is the lack of structures, for example, in networking. The most 
alarming deficit is found within the political framework, due to the 
state’s failure to formulate an overall safety goal to guide risk 
governance in emergent situations.  
The discussion is organised in accordance with the risk governance 
model presented in Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, adjusted in line with the 
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main results of my research studies within the Norwegian aviation 
transport system: (1) core risk governance processes and actor network, 
(2) organisational capacity, and (3) political and regulatory climate.  
The reasons for the adjustments within the model are that no core risk 
governance process (risk-assessment, appraisal, management, 
evaluation, and communication) will function optimally unless the 
contextual level of the actor network is generated, so the actor network 
should be integrated in the core risk governance in the figure and, the 
link between the two is therefore shown in the figure as a stippled line. 
I view these the core risk governance process and actor network as two 
sides of the same coin. Likewise, the social and economic climate and 
political and regulatory climate are intervened due to the impact on the 
core risk governance process. The couplings of the two are also 
illustrated by the stippled line. ‘Political and regulatory climate’ is the 
heading of the contextual level within the discussion. 
The discussion starts with a presentation of the remodelled contextual 
risk governance model. Added to this model are boxes that indicate the 
main findings related to deficits and surpluses within the risk 
governance framework of which the Norwegian civil aviation is a part.  
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Figure 6.1 A remodelled contextual risk governance model.  
The risk governance framework values a transparent model of risk 
assessment and risk management as a means to  avoid the blurring of 
science and politics (Renn 2008, Jasanoff 2004, Liberatore & 
Funtowicz 2003, Webler & Tuler 1999, Weingart 1999, Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1992, Otway 1992, Wynne 1992) and to implement all 
necessary contextual knowledge, assuring equality and argumentation 
for all types of claims through a mutual understanding and learning 
process (Renn 2009, 2008, Stirling 2009, a,b., 2008, 2007, Webler & 
Tuler 1999, Pidgeon 1998, Habermas 2004, 1995). I am interested in 
discussing whether such a transparent model has been implemented in 
the core risk governance processes of which the Norwegian aviation 
transport system is part.  
Core Risk  
Governance 
Figure 3 
Organisational 
capacity
Actor 
network
Social and 
economic climate 
Political and regulatory 
climate
Deficit: 
- Knowledge resources. 
- Limited resources to 
maintain the flexibility. 
- Scant of inspections 
activities to generate more 
knowledge about the system. 
-Economic resources to 
generate knowledge about 
the system. 
 - Scant focus on structures 
for networking. 
Deficit: 
-Supranational goals focusing 
on standardisation vs. 
contextual knowledge. 
-  Lack of directing safety goals.  
- Lack of elaborated operational 
safety goals to prioritise.  
Surpluses 
- Professional 
knowledge. 
-Safety 
consciousness. 
- Valuing 
networking 
-Flexibility in 
work operations. 
 
Surpluses 
-Professional 
knowledge. 
- Informal 
networking. 
Deficit: 
-Prescribed regulatory 
framework. 
-Absence of Norwegian 
participation in the final 
decision phase. 
Surpluses 
- Prioritisation of 
networking, at 
institutional 
level. 
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6.1 Core risk governance process and actor 
involvement 
The involvement of actors is consistent with the arguments of opening 
up the process to stakeholders (Stirling 2008, 2007, Wynne 1996, 1992) 
in a fair manner, encouraging participants to bring their knowledge 
competence into the discussions (Renn 2008, 1995). Such involvement 
is in need of an understanding of the relevant actors who are the best-
informed and most willing to overcome prejudices (Pidgeon 1998). 
Hajer & Wagnenaar (2003) stated that the ‘demands of business 
highlight interdependencies and relationships among tasks and prompt 
development of inter-organisational networks’ (2003:6). The 
deregulation, merging and transition to the EASA regulatory 
framework make the whole aviation system much more interconnected 
and in need of networking. Within these networks, the actors might 
experience solidarity in their need of a joint commitment to establish 
force behind arguments and to gain knowledge about the complex 
system (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003). 
The Norwegian aviation transport system is highly influenced by the 
actors’ and stakeholders’ knowledge and values. The government and 
the industry have brought representatives into the arena in the processes 
of risk appraisal, evaluation, and decision making for the regulatory 
framework. The arena covers meetings, hearings, discussion forums 
and lobbying that structure the dialogue of the risk assessment process. 
This process of negotiating common agreements in order to meet the 
substantive criteria of better ends (Stirling 2008) has been a hallmark of 
the Norwegian aviation transport system from the beginning of the 
post-war period (Tjørhom forthcoming). It seems as though the 
negotiating process for the regulatory framework has been expanded 
with more actors due to their own demands for participating within the 
elaboration of the regulatory framework. The stakeholders of 
established organisations have gained entry to the arenas where risk 
decisions are taken. The closing process of the regulatory framework is 
made within each state that has committed to the common agreements 
to the rules framework, in accordance with their respective legal 
frameworks.  
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My studies have documented that, as it has been subjected to an 
increasing degree of complexity, the Norwegian transport system needs 
an open process to implement stakeholders’ knowledge during all 
stages of the risk governance process. With regard to the deliberative 
imperatives of debating all relevant issues during an exchange of 
observations and viewpoints, followed by balancing this information in 
further discussions (Renn 2008, 2004, Habermas 2004, 1995, Daniels 
& Walker 1996), it seems well documented in this thesis that the 
deliberative process is concentrated in the risk appraisal and risk 
assessment stages, where the exchange of observations about risk 
issues is taking place. Nevertheless, my research did not explore the 
core risk governance regarding the final decisions and, for that reason, I 
offer no analytical explanation of whether the deliberative imperative 
has been fully implemented in the core risk governance process. But 
the data clearly show a deliberative process by the implementation of 
contextual knowledge to foster mutual learning. The studies further 
showed that the process with deliberative elements had started even 
before the establishment of the EU, but that the transition to an EASA 
framework created more formal structures that might make the 
exchange of observations and viewpoints more transparent.  
This study has documented both positive and negative implications to 
the core risk governance process (Tjørhom forthcoming) of replacing 
the former international common agreements with a regulatory 
framework within the EU framework. Due to the new framework, a 
more formalised style seems to suit some actors well, while others 
experience this formalisation as a challenge. The actors from the 
Ministry, Investigation Board and most of the employees in 
management positions within the Aviation Authority are mainly 
familiar with a bureaucratic style and are thus comfortable with EASA 
as a framework for the decision-making process. Other actors from the 
Aviation Authority and from the industry are less comfortable with the 
new framework. These actors experience the new framework for risk 
governance as cumbersome, making statements such as, ‘there is a long 
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way from Norway to Cologne9‘(Tjørhom forthcoming). There could be 
many interpretations for this experience of inconvenience with the 
formalised structure. The more formalised structure creates a more 
profound prioritisation of risk management, something that might be 
challenging to the industry given the prevalent focus on cost 
effectiveness. Another explanation could be that the industry is more 
pleased with a consensual risk governance structure where the 
decisions are taken in more closed circles and thereby reluctant to the 
transitions toward more corporatist or meditiative decision making 
styles (Renn 2008) where the openness and transparency within the 
process are more dominant. 
In addition to the increased formalisation, the new regulatory 
framework is described by the actors as more prescriptive, consisting of 
more detailed rules. This description is most prevalent with actors from 
the industry and with some of the inspectors in the Aviation Authority. 
It seems that the rush for harmonisation and standardisation conflicts 
with the elaboration a pragmatic and functional regulatory framework 
that covers emergent risks. The prescriptive EASA regulatory 
framework is worth questioning in a context of changes that create 
complexity within the system. The intensive change within the aviation 
safety system creates a lag in the ability to develop safety rules 
(Rasmussen 1997), caused by the need for more knowledge and for the 
establishment of feedback mechanisms (Rosness et al., 2004). My 
studies show that lack of appropriate safety rulemaking creates a 
tension between focusing on safety or production (Tjørhom & Aase 
forthcoming). Additionally, one might expect that prescriptive rules in 
the future will show the same deficit, lack of possibility to prioritise 
safety in emergent situations that calls for requisite imagination 
(Westrum 2006, 1996).   
Another issue that is of interest is the Norwegian government’s role 
within the EU. The transition to the development of the regulatory 
                                                 
9 The EU agency, EASA, is based in Cologne, Germany. 
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framework in the EU might create some challenges for the Norwegian 
aviation system, since Norway as a state is omitted from the closing 
part of the core risk governance processes (Tjørhom forthcoming). The 
fact that Norway is not in this stage of the process might be considered 
a threat to having a transparent core risk model, as described in the 
literature (Renn 2008). Even though the Norwegian government has 
participated in the assessment, appraisal, and evaluation phase of the 
elaboration of the regulatory framework, the experience of being left 
out of the final closing process might have implications for the risk 
governance framework. 
Also important to question is whether processes for both input 
legitimacy and output legitimacy are present within core risk 
governance of aviation. My findings indicate input legitimacy through 
actors’ involvement in a structural and processual manner that 
legitimates a transparent, deliberative process. My results further show 
that important contextual knowledge are captured through involvement 
of stakeholders with interests in the outcome of the risk decision 
making process. Nevertheless, the industry’ resistance towards the new 
structure is worth noting, in order to ascertain whether this finding 
shows a deficit with other actors as well, and whether this deficit might 
be improved by structural or processual changes to the core risk 
governance processes. Another issue concerning the input legitimacy is 
the role of the non-members states of EU. Since non members are 
excluded from the EU Commission, and EU Parliament where the final 
regulatory decisions are taken, one should be vigilant to the discussion 
of input legitimacy. Even though these non members participate and 
bring their knowledge to the governance process, they do not 
participate in the final phase of risk governance.  
When it comes to output legitimacy within the Norwegian core risk 
governance process, my studies show that the transition to an EU 
governance framework has demanded both human and economic 
capital. The transition phase has required employees to follow new and 
old regulations simultaneously. This has become an additional burden 
to the concurrent relocalisation of the Aviation Authority. Both the 
regime of double regulations and the contemporary relocalisation 
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process compromised the effectiveness of the risk governance 
processes. Most likely the eventual output gains in forms of 
effectiveness will become visible when the transition phase is 
completed.  
6.2 Organisational capacity 
The system’s organisational capacity clearly influences its dealings 
with the core risk governance process. The organisations within the 
civil aviation transport system must display the capacity to handle a 
core risk governance process (Renn 2008). Required questions to ask 
include: are there assets and resources to deliver the necessary 
contextual knowledge into the core risk governance process; and, is the 
implementation process of the regulatory framework appropriate for 
handling the intensive change?  
To make use of the assets and resources, there is a need for skills, 
together with a demand for a structure that ensures that the assets, 
resources and skills are used in an efficient, legitimate, integrating and 
socially-acceptable manner (Renn 2004). The economic resources 
should include the budget to secure adequate knowledge and to utilise 
the knowledge collaboratively. 
The results of this PhD project have documented that the Norwegian 
civil aviation transport system possesses many of the required assets to 
develop a sufficient core risk governance model. The entire system 
comprises actors who have the professional knowledge to recognise the 
necessity of integrating knowledge to execute the risk work. The 
informal networks within the organisations, together with the seminars 
and meetings where the actors from the entire system are gathered, are 
highly valued by the aviation sector (Tjørhom & Aase forthcoming, 
Tjørhom forthcoming, Tjørhom & Aase 2007.). This thesis has also 
documented the actors’ receptiveness and their willingness to acquire 
new knowledge in order to improve their competence, with a focus on 
the knowledge needed to manage the core risk governance process 
appropriately ( Tjørhom & Aase 2010, Tjørhom & Aase 2007).  
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Nevertheless, the ongoing changes within the aviation system have 
evidently affected the knowledge resources. Deregulation, the 
relocation of the Aviation Authority, the competitive situation and the 
transition towards the EU regulatory framework, have all affected the 
knowledge resources Some of the interfaces within the aviation 
transport system have been transformed (Høyland et al. 2008). 
Knowledge according to area of technical expertise has been dispersed 
(Pettersen 2008, 2006), the Aviation Authority’s expertise has been 
altered by a 80% turnover  in the workforce as a result of the relocation 
process (Eriksen et al., 2009), the collaborating inspection procedures 
between technicians and operational personnel have been terminated 
(Tjørhom & Aase 2007), and some of members of the Aviation 
Authority are demanding more collaboration inside their organisation, 
e.g., with the Ministry (Tjørhom & Aase 2007). The actors are arguing 
for an increased focus on knowledge improvement by increasing the 
networking across the system. The risk governance structure clearly 
highlights the importance of knowledge resources. The alterations in 
the knowledge base, combined with the alteration in the production 
system indicate a deficit of knowledge resources. Changed interaction 
and discontinuation of former communication (e.g., within work 
groups) besides to the demand for increased knowledge of risk issues 
caused by the change intensiveness, indicate a possible lack of 
knowledge resources to handle the change intensiveness and 
complexity of the system.  
One way to broaden the knowledge base is to use accident and incident 
investigations as feedback mechanisms in the industry. In recent 
decades, the Investigation Board unit has extended its investigative 
methods from technical and human factors into finding explanations of 
accidents by using accident models with a more systemic focus. 
Nevertheless, the analytical tools used to gain knowledge about 
possible systemic interdependencies are still immature. The learning 
potentials by using more holistic investigation approaches is thus less 
utilised than what could be expected. 
In the Aviation Authority case, it appears that the ongoing changes call 
for an expansion of the resource pool in order to monitor the industry. 
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Studies show that increased supervisory activities are needed in a 
deregulation phase in order to monitor companies, especially those that 
have been newly established (Rosness et al., 2005). Since the intensity 
of changes has created new interfaces and possibly new paths to 
accidents, there are demands for monitoring trends that might threaten 
safety. Our studies showed neither an increase in inspection activities 
nor an increased focus on monitoring trends (Tjørhom & Aase 2007). 
Even though the Ministry recommended that the Aviation Authority 
adopt a risk-based framework in order to collect information on 
ongoing trends, the Aviation Authority did not have the resources to 
adjust its work activities. Furthermore, our findings showed that the 
government has been reluctant to reallocate economic resources to 
supervise the industry in a period when new companies are entering the 
market; it is also hesitant to develop a supervisory methodology that 
matches the intensive change within the system. Within the Aviation 
Authority, resources have been focused on the relocation process and 
the transition towards an EU regulatory framework. The Aviation 
Authority has, therefore, not reprioritised its resources to develop risk-
based supervision and analytical work.  
The organisation’s capacity to implement the new EU regulatory 
framework seems problematic due to the nature of the rules. The EASA 
places a great emphasis on prescribed rules. Due to the transition to the 
EASA framework, the rules have become stricter (Tjørhom 
forthcoming, Stockmann & Wiener 2008). A shift towards a sharper 
focus within the regulatory framework seems to be a contradiction in a 
system that is subject to change and that has scant knowledge about 
safety work in this new production situation. Too much attention to 
implementation of a detailed regulatory framework might create a 
system in which actors lack the resources to monitor emergent risk and 
goal conflict situations (Tjørhom & Aase forthcoming). In unforeseen 
situations, the actors then lack the resources to be flexible (Wilpert 
2008) and to use the requisite imagination, understood as the ability to 
anticipate the possible negative course of events (Westrum 2006), 
typically seen as the ability to create worst-case scenarios. A detailed 
regulatory framework might be overwhelming and, thereby, deprive the 
actors of the cognitive space to anticipate such a course of events. 
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Given the complexity that is the hallmark of the aviation transport 
system, possible interconnections and feedback loops become invisible 
(Weick & Suthcliffe 2007) and when an emergency arises there is 
clearly a need for effective handling of possible negative effects.  
The findings that show that the actors within the system expressed a 
willingness to learn, are competent, and are aware of changes and the 
operational vulnerabilities resulting from these circumstances (Tjørhom 
& Aase forthcoming, Tjørhom forthcoming, Tjørhom & Aase 2007), 
are surpluses in the risk governance model due to an organisational 
capacity to handle a core risk governance processes. A prioritisation of 
resources to extend knowledge, prepare for flexibility and knowledge 
feed-back by strengthening the actor networks can all compensate for 
the deficits within organisational capacity.  
6.3 Political and regulatory climate 
The context for the core risk governance process has been constituted 
by Norwegian politicians in a legal framework. These politicians are 
the representatives of the Norwegian people. By assuming 
responsibility for the aviation transport system, these elected actors 
organise the regulatory framework by making decisions about the 
process, structure, and style of the regulations. These decisions create 
the framework for all core risk governance processes (IRGC 2009, 
Renn 2008). The political framework constitutes the basis of risk 
governance by the politicians’ determination of the kind of rules 
considered appropriate (prescriptive/goal-based) to take action in the 
case of of possible negative adverse effects of an activity (Grote 2008, 
2004, Wilpert 2008, Kirwan et al., 2002). 
The results of this PhD project show a deficit in the political and 
regulatory climate because of the lack of clear safety goals within 
aviation. The Norwegian government seems reluctant to formulate and 
elaborate guiding safety goals; instead, the Ministry expresses a 
twofold goal of safety and service to the community (Tjørhom & Aase 
forthcoming, Tjørhom & Aase 2007. b). The government has 
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traditionally left it to the aviation transport system to elaborate the 
regulatory framework for aviation safety, by delegation in yearly 
allotment letters. These delegations of the regulatory framework are in 
accordance with a contextual framework, where the rules, standards 
and procedures are elaborated by the actors with expertise in the field. 
This form of delegation is in line with a risk governance framework, 
and as such the knowledge resources are appropriately utilised. 
Nevertheless, the lack of clear safety goals weakens the structure of the 
regulatory framework and the ability to use the actors’ flexibility in 
work situations. In the absence of clear guidance for safety work from 
the political actors and the Ministry, the operators in the Norwegian 
aviation transport system experience a tension between safety and 
production in circumstances with goal conflicts (Tjørhom & Aase 
forthcoming.). This tension between safety and production is a common 
result of a social and economic climate fostering production pressure. 
The economic climate seems to be demanding in a situation subject to 
deregulation (Hovden 2002). The aviation industry is expected to focus 
on cost-effectiveness, which is easier to measure than safety (Gaba 
2000). Such a cost pressure climate calls for the government to be 
aware of the possible threats towards shift in focus (Turner & Pidgeon 
1997).  
My PhD research shows that the lack of clear safety goals creates 
frustrations for the actors and their risk management practices 
(Tjørhom & Aase forthcoming.). The lack of an explicit safety policy 
and the safety objectives create a tension in situations where, for 
example, regional policy and safety policy are in conflict (Tjørhom & 
Aase forthcoming.) or when economic and safety issues must be 
weighed against each other (Tjørhom & Aase forthcoming, Loquist 
2008). Examples of such circumstances are when the managers act 
forcefully to require the operators to prioritise production over safety; 
for example, in situations where weather conditions might affect safety 
or when cost pressures create tension between safety and production. In 
such situations, the operators experience the outcomes of a production 
prioritisation uncertainly, creating a threat to safety in the operation. 
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The decision to shift the regulatory framework towards a unified 
juridical EU framework is a result of a political process occurring 
outside the Norwegian state, caused by Norway’s non-membership in 
the EU. Results show that the previous common agreement regulatory 
framework’s (by ICAO and JAA) translation to Norwegian rules might 
progress slowly. The transition from common agreements to 
implementation to Norwegian acts of law is often fragmentary and 
handled by the actors in the system in a top-down manner. It takes a 
long time from the time the recommendations are agreed upon until 
they are fully implemented in the Norwegian acts of aviation. The 
transition to an EASA framework with merely a prescriptive regulatory 
framework that has juridical force is clearly a change in the political 
and regulatory climate, a change that Norway is required to make. In 
one way, this alteration from common agreements to juridical laws is 
positive, due to the sanctioning force within the EU that can speed up 
the implementation of the new regulatory framework. This increase in 
dispatch due to the regulatory framework is extremely important in a 
change-intensive climate, where the safety regulatory framework must 
be in accordance with the modification of the production system. The 
question is whether or not this rulemaking climate fosters a core risk 
governance process that can accommodate changes and complexities. 
In a start-up phase of a new framework to elaborate rules, it might be 
difficult to get the actors to reflect on common goals (Morgan & Yeung 
2007). As discussed above, the regulatory framework is, to some 
degree, a prescriptive framework and thereby reflects reactive risk 
management in a system distinguished by changes and complexity. 
Based on the number of states constituting the EU, along with the fact 
that these states -- after the enlargement in 2004 and 2007 -- are rather 
heterogeneous, it is worth asking if the EASA should take the last step 
into full safety regulatory of each member state and the affiliated states 
(Smith & Fishbacher 2009). It might seem like a rush to agreements to 
implement the framework, even though the rules create challenges for 
the different states. The thesis also finds that it is very demanding to get 
permission for an exemption from the regulatory framework (Tjørhom 
forthcoming). These facts point to a slowdown in the process to install 
the EASA as the main elaborator of the regulatory framework. 
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Given these circumstances and the lack of resources with which to 
develop knowledge about safety issues related to change processes, the 
Norwegian aviation transport system is clearly in need of focused 
attention on safety by the political part of the risk governance system. 
A system that neglects to state clear safety goals will become 
vulnerable to safety issues when the industry pays attention to its main 
goal of surviving in a competitive industry. A good governance 
framework based on the normative principle of deliberative processes 
and structures might become a buffer to degradation in the safety work 
practices, but until such processes and structures are fully developed, 
the deficit within the political framework must be addressed. 
6.4 Utilisation of a risk governance framework in 
this thesis 
By using the risk governance model as a framework to explore risk 
regulation within the Norwegian aviation transport system, I have been 
able to view the system holistically and simultaneously to separate 
elements of importance to risk governance. The model is a helpful tool 
for separating the different elements needed to handle the core risk 
governance process. The model also explores interconnections, 
interdependencies and complexities. The risk governance model 
illustrates both how the actors are connected within the single layers 
and how the layers, constituted by these connected actors, depend on 
each other. As a framework, the risk governance model is similar to 
other systemic models for analysing risk management within systems. 
Leveson’s (2004) STAMP model is a safety control structured program 
for analysing a comprehensive system and its operations. Rasmussens’ 
(1997) model of the socio-technical system involved in risk 
management illustrates the levels of politicians, managers, safety 
officers and work planners that are involved in the safety management 
process. Hood et al., (2001), present the theoretical framework of 
regulatory regimes in order to capture both the context and content of 
policy making and to clarify the importance of network regulatory 
systems.  
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The risk governance model differs from the other models by consisting 
of new terminology that better captures the fluidity within a global 
context. Introducing the word ‘governance’ instead of ‘government’ 
might give rise to new cognitive commitments about how to manage 
systems (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003). According to Hajer and Wagenaar, 
this vocabulary might give both practitioners and theorists a new 
framework for rethinking governing, politics and administration. 
Released from tacit cognitive patterns, the actors within a system might 
become amenable to focusing on institutional designs that capture the 
change processes to which the Norwegian civil aviation system is 
subjected. The risk governance model might then turn attention to the 
networking and processes required to encompass the entire risk 
management process. Such a focus aims at rethinking the old patterns 
of hierarchy, where some levels are often valued as more important 
than others. The risk governance model illustrates that risk knowledge 
and the requisite resources are spread throughout the aviation system.  I 
would contend that both the theoretical foundation and the way of 
illustrating risk governance contribute positively to a better analytical 
framework, given decision making in a global world. The model might 
then be a fruitful tool for analysing how we constitute the decision 
processes (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003) and what kind of policy outcomes 
are warranted when the structures and processes are changed in more 
fluid situations in which relationships are changed. Nevertheless, the 
deliberative focus within EU risk governance is just dawning. The 
focus on efficiency, as manifested in the rush for standardisation and 
harmonisation is clearly an obstacle to the development of a deliberate 
governance process. If the normative theory of risk governance is going 
to become an empirical reality, the focus on input elements in the 
governance process is just as important as the outcome. Risk 
governance of the aviation transport system has to develop the 
contextual elements to arrange for the necessary knowledge base and 
structure within the core risk governance process. By focusing on the 
structure and requisite knowledge, the risk governance of Norwegian 
aviation transport system might become a valuable process capable of 
taking into consideration the elements of complexity, change and goal 
conflicts. 
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7 Conclusions 
This thesis has explored risk governance within the Norwegian aviation 
transport system, which, during the last two decades, has been 
subjected to several changes that added complexity to the system.  
Deregulation has changed business structures to handle competition. 
The aviation transport system has likewise been subjected to a 
transition from a national framework for safety rules to a supranational 
framework, as the EU assumes the leadership for elaborating the 
regulatory framework. There is the added continuous introduction of 
new technology, which also creates new circumstances for the actors 
within the aviation transport system. In sum, all of these changes are 
creating a situation wherein the prevailing system must be explored in 
order to scrutinise whether the risk governance system is keeping pace 
with the ongoing changes. It might be a challenge to the safety work if 
production is extensively altered. This thesis has examined risk 
governance due to the current situation characterised by change, 
complexity and goal conflicts. 
7.1 Answering the research questions 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the following research questions 
guided my four studies on risk governance: 
1. How is risk governance conducted within the global aviation 
system? 
This study clearly shows that the Norwegian aviation transport system 
is part of the supranational risk governance. Actors from all over the 
transport system are grouped within organisations and are, thereby, 
represented within the risk governance. The previous regulatory 
framework featured by common supranational agreements has been 
further developed by the Norwegian actors. The previous framework 
also showed traits of governance processes by actors participating in 
decision making and elaboration of the regulatory framework. The 
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transition to the EU framework is documented within the study to 
present both the possibilities and the challenges to the risk governance 
framework – possibilities in the form of formal structures for 
participation and challenges in the form of integration and 
implementation of all the contextual knowledge - within such an 
extensive framework. 
The study also points to the fact that the EU regulatory framework is 
more prescriptive than the former common agreements framework 
(developed within ICAO) and aims at harmonisation in a prescriptive 
framework that might undermine the contextual knowledge. The study 
concluded by questioning the transition to a comprehensive EU safety 
regulatory framework in light of Norwegian non-membership in the 
EU, thereby excluding Norway from participation in the final decision 
part of risk governance. 
2. What is the role of the national legislator and the regulator 
within the risk governance system? 
This study demonstrates a lack of response and of resources by the 
legislator (the Ministry) to follow up its responsibility for the totality of 
aviation safety. Given the intensive changes, the Ministry should take 
charge by setting overarching safety goals and allocating the requisite 
resources. The study showed that there was no explicit safety policy 
and no increase in resources in order to elaborate new tools for 
measuring risk.  
The study shows that the regulator (Aviation Authority) lacks the 
directing goals from the Ministry and that the increased supervision we 
assumed by the Aviation Authority is lacking. The study also 
documents that inspectors within the Aviation Authority found that the 
networking seems too weak to manage the intensive change to which 
the system is being subjected.  
The study concludes that the strong sense of responsibility and self-
organised networking within the legislator and the regulator seems to 
be a buffer against possible negative side effects from the current 
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changes, and although the informality with which this takes place 
seems to strengthen the safety conditions, it also induces a certain 
vulnerability due to the dependency on individuals. 
3. Is the framework for conducting accident investigations in 
accordance with the current complexity and change picture 
within the aviation system? 
This study documents the existence of a normative framework due to 
conducting accident investigations within the Investigation Board. 
Nevertheless, this framework has not been developed into a set of 
common work practices, which this study revealed as unique in the 
practice of writing investigation reports. This uniqueness was from 
actors viewing it as important to have open-minded perspectives and 
advocating a response that avoided prejudice and bias. Furthermore, the 
study demonstrates a development in investigation practices by 
revealing an increased awareness and attention to organisational and 
institutional factors within aviation accident investigation. This 
development of a reconstruction accident practice was shown to be 
inspired by different sources (enthusiasm on the part of the 
Investigation Board, networking, and science). Nevertheless, the study 
emphasises the need for a common investigation framework that covers 
the organisational and institutional factors.  
4. How are trade-offs between safety and efficiency (goal 
conflicts) handled within the Norwegian aviation transport 
system?  
The study shows that the daily operation and management of risks 
within aviation are handled in a resilient manner. There is a strong 
commitment to safety at the operational level of the Norwegian 
aviation transport system. In cases with trade-offs between safety and 
efficiency, the operators work thoroughly and prioritise safety. The 
challenge within the transport system is the lack of clear safety goals 
from the Ministry. This absence of clear guidance to balance safety and 
efficiency might make the aviation transport system vulnerable in 
situations with high cost pressures. The study shows examples of such 
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situations, where the operators report lack of support, lack of time 
allowed to prioritise safety,  and pressure to be efficient at the expense 
of safety. Such a lack of a guiding safety prioritisation might make the 
system vulnerable over time. The operators lack an overall picture of 
the system as such and are therefore in need of guidelines to make the 
requisite safety prioritisations.  
7.2 Research contribution 
This thesis expands the knowledge of risk governance within a global 
transport system. My exploration of the Norwegian aviation transport 
system in this work contributes to the development of the risk 
governance framework as an analytical tool to explore a risk 
governance system. Given several recent risk management studies that 
focus on the system perspective to understand and manage safety 
(Leveson 2004, Rasmussen 1997) and by valuing the interfaces and 
interdependencies (Snook 2000, Vaughan 1996) and drawing attention 
to the complexities (Hollnagel e.g. 2009, 2008, LeCoze 2008, 2005), 
this thesis functions as a theoretical continuation of such research.  
Few empirical studies have been conducted to explore a industrial 
system using a risk governance framework. The main application of 
risk governance framework has been done on issues regarding 
environmental or new technology issues (e.g Renn & Walker 2008). 
This exploratory study will expand the knowledge of governance 
processes within a global transport system, and thus present some 
implications for the regulatory framework in a system marked by 
change, complexity and goal-conflicts.  
7.3 Further research needs 
Given the circumstances characterised by complexity and the 
associated uncertainties, I see two follow-up research needs of special 
interest: 
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 To study decision making within the parts of the governance 
framework, especially within the core risk governance process 
and by exploration of the normal operations. 
One of the more prominent research aims is to explore and elaborate 
upon the deliberate decision-making process. Dealing with complex, 
uncertain and ambiguous outcomes is tricky; even though everyone 
might agree upon the goal - safety- there are still many challenges to 
overcome to determine how safe is safe enough. What knowledge must 
be implemented within the decision processes, and what is the most 
appropriate way to structure the knowledge?  
 To establish comparative studies by which to explore the 
governmental prioritisation within every complex system that is 
subjected to ongoing changes, where cost effectiveness is a 
topic. 
A comparative study of risk governance would be fruitful. Railway and 
sea transport should be empirical objects to explore pursuant to risk 
governance. Of interest in the comparison will be to trace similarities 
and differences arising from structures and knowledge processes.  
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Safety and changes in the Norwegian aviation transport system – 
What is the role of the legislator and the regulator? 
B. Tjørhom & K. Aase 
University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway 
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to study how political priorities at the legislative level, how enforcing practices at the 
regulatory level, and how changes at these levels might have an impact on safety in the aviation transport system. We will explore 
the political part of the aviation system: the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the executive part of the system, the 
Civil Aviation Authority. Besides describing and seeking to understand the role of the legislator and the regulator, we also search 
for their interactions with the other parts of the aviation transport system. An understanding of the political, legislative, and 
regulative levels of the aviation transport system is necessary for understanding the work and priorities of maintaining safety at 
the lower levels of the system. The data in the paper is based on 38 qualitative interviews, and participant observation at different 
levels of the aviation transport system. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about safety and changes in the Norwegian aviation transport system, and the possible relation between the two. As 
in most commercial and even public sectors, the civil aviation transport system has been subject to fundamental changes the last 
decade. In industries that go through upheavals, a study of how different stakeholders and organizations act and respond to 
changes, and how they maintain safety under such circumstances is interesting. The aim of the study is to get an understanding of 
the role of the legislator (Ministry of Transportation and Communication) and the regulator (Civil Aviation Authority) in a change 
intensive system, and how they work with safety. An understanding of the political, legislative, and regulative levels of the 
aviation transport system is necessary for understanding the work and priorities of maintaining safety at the lower levels of the 
system (Alamberti 2005, Leveson 2004, Moray 2000, Rasmussen 1997). 
2 CONTEXT 
At the surface, the voluminous system of legislation, regulations and formal procedures within the aviation industry make it seems 
like there is little or few questions left for the employees’ own judgment. As documented in Pettersen (2006), there is more to 
operational problem solving in aviation than a predescribed set of procedures. In light of current changes both nationally and 
internationally, the legislative and regulatory body is also in a transition stage. Such legal and regulative transitions are 
comprehensive and timeconsuming, creating possible maneuvering problems and periodically double sets of rules to comprehend 
to. 
2.1 A change-intensive aviation system  
The Norwegian civil aviation system is subject to general societal trends such as increased air traffic, a technological pace that 
calls for continuous upgrade on technical competence, and a globalization of markets. At a company level, airlines, air traffic 
control providers, ground services, and aircraft maintenance organizations are being restructured, merged, downsized, sold, and 
bought to “fit” the competitive global marketplace (Pettersen & Aase 2006). The aviation industry is regulated by supranational 
rules. In Europe, there has been a shift from standards regulated by common understanding to a EU regulative prescribed by law. 
The European Aviation Safety Authority, EASA, replaces former national regulations within the aviation industry and also the 
joint Aviation Regulations (JAR). EASA is a framework of rules and directives to be filled by decisions and resolutions made by 
the constitutional EU member states. Norway, as a non-member of EU has a license to participate and comment in different 
agencies, without the right to vote. So far, the EASA regulations concerning technical issues have come in force, while the EASA 
regulations concerning operational issues is still in process. 
In addition to the changes induced by societal trends and regulations, the Norwegian aviation system has been subject to several 
specific changes during the last decade. The deregulation of the marked from 1994 to 1998 permitted new participants to operate 
within the Norwegian aircraft system. The deregulation had an impact on the competition within the aviation industry, and also 
called for a change in the regulation regime. One of the implications was that detail supervision was replaced by system 
supervision. Another implication was a splitting up of technical and operational inspection activities.  
Until 2000, the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport Management handled the operation of airports and safety management. This 
agency was then divided in Avinor, the Accident Investigation Board, and the Civil Aviation Authority. Avinor is responsible for 
handling airport operations, the Accident Investigation Board for accident investigation, and the Civil Aviation Authority for 
supervision of the aviation transport system. The Civil Aviation Authority was until 2005 located in the capital, but as a 
consequence of a regional policy decision in 2002–2003 (Royal Proposition 17 2002/2003) it was relocated to the north of 
Norway. The decision was made by the Norwegian parliament in June 2003, and the first employees were situated at the new 
headquarter autumn 2004. 
2.2 The legislator 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications has a superior responsibility for managing the Norwegian aviation transport 
system. The administrative work is delegated to the Air, Post and Tele department, holding a separate aviation unit. The manager 
of the Air, Post and Tele department reports to the Secretary General, which again reports to the political direction. A separate 
aviation unit in the Ministry was established in 1992. Until then, the aviation responsibility was spread out “on the entire house”. 
The aviation unit is governed by the National Transport Plan (Report to the Norwegian Parliament 46 99/2000), and are 
responsible for four broad categories of tasks: (1) Administration of framework conditions, laws, and regulations; (2) Aviation 
safety work in general; (3) Department of government for the Civil Aviation Authority, and the Accident Investigation Board; (4) 
International collaboration and negotiation.  
The employees of the aviation unit have backgrounds and competences within political science, economics and law, with work    
tasks linked to their competence. The unit’s safety work is linked together with other work tasks. Safety is described to be a bit 
everywhere. Or as one employee said: “I work indirectly with safety since I am responsible for competitive tendering.” Or as a 
colleague said: “My role in this is a bit distant. With regards to safety questions, I do not have a direct role. But it is all mixed in 
because when there is a new EU directive influencing safety, someone has to handle it. It might be my responsibility.” 
2.3 The regulator  
The Civil Aviation Authority gets a yearly allotment letter from the Ministry of Transport and Communication, containing the 
premises for their duties. Their main activity is to contribute to increased aviation safety. The Civil Aviation Authority prescribes 
rules and regulations (in collaboration with EU), performs entrance control, and carries out inspections. The Civil Aviation 
Authority’s core operations are divided into five: operative inspections, technical inspection, airport safety and security,  
jurisdiction, and administration. In addition there are staff support services such as information management, community contact, 
quality, and safety.  
Because of the relocation process in the Civil Aviation Authority there are at present two organizations. The technical inspection 
department is mainly in place at the new headquarters, while parts of the operative inspection department is still located in the 
capital. Due to a loss of employees related to the relocation process, the Civil Aviation Authority experienced recruitment 
problems, and was forced to abandon their demand related to “background within civil aviation”. Today, the technical inspection 
department consists of personnel with a broader technical and/or management background. 
3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Our theoretical framework is based on a sociotechnical systems approach (Alamberti 2005, Leveson 2004, Moray 2000, 
Rasmussen 1997). By that we reject traditional cause-effect accident models. Rasmussen argues that: “The usual approach to 
modelling socio-technical system is by decomposition into elements that are modelled separately” (1997: 186). He further 
explains that this decomposition may have some unintended effects because we loose the interrelation between system levels that 
might influence work processes and safety conditions. As a consequence, all participants in the aviation transport system, from 
legislator to operator, or at least all parts of the system, should be viewed as linked together. Safety is then an interactive, dynamic 
process that takes place in the entire aviation transport system. Moray (2000) displays similar thoughts. Changes in the nature of 
work need to be followed by changes in the theoretical framework for risk. There is a need for a system approach, specially taken 
into account the national characteristics, economic and political constraints by the industry. 
Alamberti (2005) claims that the main challenge in working with safety is to capture the structures and work operations in the 
concrete work systems more than adopting successful safety tools. He further refers to several success criteria regarding increased 
safety level: (1) the need to limit the discretion of workers, (2) the need for a system level arbitration, (3) the need to simplify 
professional rules. First, limiting the discretion of workers means that without limits there will be an attitude towards production 
as the main goal in the organization. Research studies document that operators in lack of risk limitations will challenge their  
maximum performance. Second, system level arbitration means that it is a problem that people in safe systems are held 
responsible for incidents and accidents.  Instead of catching scapegoats, multiple causes should be searched for at all levels of the 
industrial system. An operator conducting an erroneous work task may for example stem from a lack of regulation. Third, 
simplifying professional rules means that there might be too many rules because of new rules added to the old ones without an 
overall discussion of the rules. At the end, rules that are meant to improve safety end up making the system more complex. 
The legislator and the regulator restrict the acts of the operators in the socio-technical system (Kirwan et al. 2002). In a system   
perspective, the legislative and regulative process is complicated when dealing with an entire industrial sector. In this perspective, 
the legislators and regulators become “agents of social control” (Reason 1997: 173). But the regulation may also influence 
behaviour in an enabling and facilitating manner (Baldwin & Cave 1999). The regulation process is constrained by the inter-
organizational relation existing between the regulatory body and the regulated body (Vaughan 1996). This relationship is in turn a 
relation between to autonomous parts and may find place in different ways, like for instance collaborating or fighting.  
During the past two decades we have seen a shift from a regulation regime focusing on a detailed “nuts and bolts” level towards a 
regime of self-regulation through internal control (Reason 1997). In a self regulation regime the role of the regulator become more 
of a system controller. To control the organizations as a whole, instead of controlling technical details requires another type of   
competence. System supervision calls for a careful understanding of what to discover and how to focus the monitoring to catch 
the risks in the system, and to prevent the regulated organizations from covering their own weaknesses and faults.  
A change-intensive nature of a socio-technical system may have several effects on the regulation of the system due to the level of 
uncertainty. Grote (2004) describes the consequences of uncertainty as follows: “With higher levels of uncertainties any attempt 
to design the uncertainties out of the system will fail and therefore the system has to be enabled to cope with uncertainties locally. 
This understanding lies at the heart of the socio-technical design principle of handling variance at their source” (Emery 1959 in 
Grote 2004). By this we understand that in times with many and simultaneously changes it might be difficult to design and 
upgrade the rules according to continuous changes. Amalberti (1999 in Grote 2004) claims that if rules get developed 
incrementally there is a tendency that they become inadequate when situations get abnormal. He further argues for strong but 
flexible guidance in abnormal states (Amalberti 2005) because guidance from higher levels in the system is needed in times with 
turbulence. 
4 METHODOLOGY 
Based on the contextual description of the aviation system, and based on our theoretical framework, the following research 
assumptions have been developed: 
1. In order for the Ministry ofTransportation to follow up their responsibility for the totality of the aviation transport
system, this requires resources, network, and an overall safety policy making explicit how to prioritize between
conflicting goals.
2. 2. In order for the Civil Aviation Authority to handle simultaneous changes such as transition from national to European 
legislation, geographic relocation, and effects of deregulation, this requires flexibility in competence, network, 
increased inspection activity, and an overall safety policy making explicit how to prioritize between conflicting goals. 
 Due to the explorative nature of the research assumptions, we have chosen a research design based on a qualitative case study 
approach (Blaikie 2005, Seale et al. 2004, Yin 1994, 2004). Two case studies have been conducted, one within the legislator and 
one within the regulator using qualitative interviews as the main data collection method supported by participant observation 
through attendance at regional and national meetings and seminars within different parts of the aviation system. In addition, a 
network with participants representing different levels of the aviation system was established to develop current problem areas 
and test results. 
The data material consists of 38 qualitative interviews with employees in the Ministry of Transport and Communications and in 
the Civil Aviation Authority, and observational data at different levels of the aviation transport system. The informants at both 
system levels represented different levels of experience and different work areas such as jurisdictional, technical, operational, and 
administrative issues. A total of 11 interviews were conducted in the Aviation unit (consisting of 13 employees) within the 
Ministry during a three-day visit. In addition, the manager of the Air-, Post and Tele unit was interviewed. A total of 26  
interviews were conducted in the Aviation Authority (consisting of 145 employees), 17 of them during a two-day visit at their 
former head office, and 9 of them during a two-day visit at their new head office. Each interview lasted for about one hour, and a 
semistructured interview guide was used to organize the interviews. Themes in the interview guide were currentwork tasks and 
responsibilities, safety philosophy, safety related work tasks, current changes at each system level, and interactions with other 
system levels. 
All interviews were transcribed in detail, and memos, summaries and field-notes were written based on the observational data. All 
data were analyzed according to a categorization strategy (Miles & Huberman, 1994) using safety policy, network, competence, 
inspection activities, and changes as the main categories. In addition, documents and observational data were used to get a general 
knowledge of the aviation industry. The selection of quotes used in the paper is made based on the purpose of representing trends 
and depth in the data material.  
The current data material in our opinion represents a valid description of the safety work practices at the two system levels due to 
the substantial number of interviews. Nevertheless, the data material represents perceptions and descriptions at a certain point of 
time, and given the change-intensiveness of the Norwegian aviation system it may represent a threat to validity. 
5 FINDINGS 
5.1 Safety policy? 
Employees in both the Ministry and the Civil Aviation Authority have difficulties in reporting a concrete and common safety 
policy. Answers were vague, and the informants had trouble expressing a policy, and expressions were not consistent within the 
organization: “There is no safety policy communicated”, “We work according to ICAO’s objectives”, “The National 
Transportation plan guides ourwork”, “Our objectives are stated in the annual plan”, “We follow the rules” or “Our goal is to be 
community serving and contribute to an increased safety level within aviation”. Most of the informants express a frustration by 
not having a common and committed safety policy. In their annual report from 2005, the Civil Aviation Authority states that their 
vision is to be “An active initiator for safe and community serving aviation services”. Our results document that the vision to a 
limited degree has been communicated and made operational in the organization, neither is there an expressed policy from the 
Ministry that gives a unified direction in safety questions. 
If there is no overall committed safety policy how then do these two instances handle their safety responsibility? Several 
informants refer to an individual safety responsibility embedded in each and every member of the transport system: “Yes, we all 
have an individual safety policy” or “most people act on safety in a responsible manner”. They further elaborate on how they 
make their work tasks attend to safety: “My view is that our main objective is to promote aviation safety. First of all to make sure 
that the companies stick to present safety level, which we consider as reasonably high, but also to work for an even higher level”. 
This individual or local safety responsibility is a consequence of a lack of safety standards from the political part of the aviation 
system. The politicians leave the standard setting to the executive officer in the Ministry of Transport and Communication, which 
again leave it to the Civil Aviation Authority. If an employee then handles a safety question in an inexpedient way, it will be 
corrected from the cabinet ministers office. In lack of an appropriate safety policy, employees use their own discretion because 
they have an in-depth knowledge of the aviation system. 
5.2 Network 
Employees in the Ministry of Transportation reported an extensive and frequent interaction with EU, the Civil Aviation Authority, 
a common Scandinavian collaboration and regulation association, and with contact persons in the aviation companies. The 
network within EU is to prepare for the new extensive EASA regulation frame, and with regards to the blacklist (operators 
that are not satisfying ICAO’s minimum demands). The contact with the Civil Aviation Authority is two ways. The Ministry 
delivers rules for the Civil Aviation Authority to follow, but are dependent on feedback on technical and juridical question. The 
feedback is seen as a necessity for the Ministry because of their lack of technical competence. To get insight into technical 
issues employees in the Ministry contact technical or operational personnel by telephone, letters or by inviting them to meetings 
or work groups. 
Employees of the Civil Aviation Authority describe their relationship with the Ministry as less colored by collaboration than the 
employees in the Ministry. By the interviews we reveal the shape of the relationship. Reasons for this is that the juridical section 
in the Civil Aviation Authority handles the majority of enquiries from the Ministry regarding handling and follow-up on 
regulations. Technical personnel give their feedback on technical questions to their own juridical personnel and are not in direct 
contact with the Ministry. The assistant director of the technical and operational section has weekly and monthly contact with the 
Ministry of Transportation, and participates at the tertiary meeting arranged by the Ministry. Inspectors in the 
Civil Aviation Authority have little or no perception of the responsibility or the work tasks of the Ministry. An exception is when 
they might get involved in thematic ad-hoc work groups for special reasons, but most informants have problems with 
remembering any contact or collaboration with the Ministry.  
The processes of restructuring and relocating of their head office mark the employees of the Civil Aviation Authority. A number 
of experienced employees have terminated their work contracts, and the remaining are unfamiliar with the new organizational 
setting. This influences the network relations in the organization. Even though employees seem to have a small threshold for 
contacting colleagues with questions, they also report about limited contact: “As a colleague of mine says: This is a bunch of one-
man businesses! I am not happy with this. We have little or no formal meetings with time for discussion”. The informal nature of 
the network relations is a consequence of the level of aviation experience amongst the employees of the Civil Aviation Authority. 
Even if they are recently employed in the Civil Aviation Authority, they hold long experience within the aviation industry in some 
way or another. This means that they know the people in the aviation system and talk to them informally: “This is the way it has 
always been, we speak to each other but nothing is formalized. We have tried to put pressure on getting a formal quality 
assurance system”. 
5.3 Flexibility in competence 
Both in the Ministry of Transportation and in the Civil Aviation Authority there is a strong will among the employees to increase 
their competence by learning from experience related to incidents and accidents: 
“When it comes to safety, you never get fully qualified”. At the same time they seek better systems for organizing this work: “We 
speak to each other about safety but it is quite sporadic and takes place when we lack answers to our safety questions”. The 
informants refer to a lack of arenas for communicating about safety, and systems or procedures for bringing tacit knowledge 
forward.  
The relocation of the head quarters of the Civil Aviation Authority has resulted in a new competence composition in the 
organization.A number of employees have resisted moving to the new office, resulting in an extensive recruitment process. The 
combination of newly hired employees and a lack of experience transfer from the “old” ones have resulted in an alteration 
in competence. Some of the informants refer to a change in technical competence as a consequence of the relocation process. 
Others claim that the newly hired personnel’s competence is not that different from the former. Several of the newcomers are 
recruited from the National Air Defense, meaning that they have both technical and management experience. The challenge for 
these employees is to transfer their knowledge from the National Defense regulations to the regulations within Civil Aviation. The 
timing for this transfer seems to be suitable because of the change in regulation regime from JAA directions and national 
regulations to EASA regulation. The new inspectors can then use the new regulations directly, thus achieving new knowledge that 
meet the needs of the technical organizations in the airline companies not holding this competence yet. The new inspectors report 
about a feeling of good timing for their new employment.  
In addition, the restructuring of the Civil Aviation Authority gives the organization an opportunity to reconstruct the technical 
department from consisting of inspectors each responsible for an assigned set of companies, to a pool of inspectors responsible for 
surveillance and inspections of all airline companies. This restructuring means less vulnerability due to less dependence on the 
individual inspector. 
5.4 Inspection activities 
In 2005, the Accident Investigation Board concluded in a report (Royal Proposition 35/2005) carried out on assignment from the 
Ministry of Transportation, that the Civil Aviation Authority should prepare for more system-orientated and risk-based 
supervision activities. This would increase the opportunity to capture possible negative effects on safety from different 
change initiatives within the airline companies.  
Our interviews document insecurity among the employees regarding risk-based inspection. The Civil Aviation Authority has 
started a process to direct their inspections towards a risk-based approach. The problem is that it is difficult to define and 
implement the concept of risk-based supervision. Employees are frustrated because they do not know how to perform risk-based 
supervision activities. The informants reflect a will to develop the supervision towards a risk-based approach, but are frustrated 
because of a lack of knowledge: “Risk-based supervision is just a word”, “We have not been able to discover what it (risk-based 
supervision) is, we have had seminars resulting in a decision to stop calling it risk-based supervision” or “We ought to have 
somebody monitoring what’s the problem. Many people mean that’s risk-based supervision”. In the employees’ opinion they 
perform risk-based supervision when they search for new risks and try to choose the essential between many risks. The problem 
lies in the fact that this process involves an extensive body of unconscious knowledge. The relocation process in the Civil 
Aviation Authority has further negatively affected the development of a risk-based supervision approach. The work started before 
the relocation decision was taken, and the relocation process moved the focus from developing risk-based inspection as a new 
inspection tool to organizational changes. 
System-oriented supervision activities have been developed over the years in the Civil Aviation Authority, and informants report 
about a shift in focus from components and details in the technical system to the system as such. Inspectors try to capture 
circumstances related to organizational issues and search for underlying causal relation: “…much of the interaction 
with the airline company is based on confidence, so we are not…we do not intend to carry out millimeter control”. The inspectors 
view their role as a combination of control instance and advisor: “I ask questions with two purposes: To get an answer and to 
stimulate reflection. That is how I acquire a lot of knowledge on what they (supervision object) think and what they believe, 
assume, suppose, and also how they live”. The informants further point to rumours as an information channel for focus in the 
inspection activities: “It is much about rumours. We have a lot of contacts in the industry. It is direct relations between people 
working within technical services in the airline companies and people in the Civil Aviation Authority. They provide our inspectors 
with a lot of inside information. In addition, we have to be aware of conditions to watch up for” or “We have our contacts within 
the industry. We can read their pulse, and in my view we have a sufficient overview”. 
The changes of regulation (from JAA to EASA) and the change of competence within the Civil Aviation Authority have separated 
inspections within technical and operational providers that were formerly united. Earlier, the JAA regulative was common for 
these two sectors and thereby it was natural to perform common inspections. The informal agreement on common inspections was 
also abandoned with the alternations in the workforce competence. 
6 DISCUSSION 
Our results have documented that within the two studied organizations, no explicit operational safety policy exists. What we find 
to compensate for this lack of superior guidance is a strong individual safety consciousness within all informants in both the 
Ministry of Transportation and in the Civil Aviation Authority. In addition, there is a broad informal network 
within the entire aviation system with several contact points. Employees are open-minded, want to learn, and improve their 
competence in safety issues. With regards to handling the change intensity in the aviation system, we did not identify an increase 
in resources or frequency of inspection activities, neither a clear move towards a risk-based inspection philosophy. 
What do these findings mean for regulating and controlling the safety level within the aviation system? Out findings have 
indicated that the sum of external and internal forces of change has made the control of the aviation system more unpredictable, 
especially due to the pace and simultaneousness of the changes. The changes make it difficult to understand the “big picture” 
of the aviation system, and thus a challenge to regulate and inspect (Rasmussen, 1997; Snook, 2000). Local responses to forced-
upon changes can be unpredictable, missing the overall focus, resulting in coordination problems. The lack of an overall  
operational safety policy might reinforce this comprehension.  
Even if there is a sense of overall safety understanding in the Ministry of Transportation and the Civil Aviation Authority, this 
understanding lacks the operational dimension, giving directions to the work processes in the aviation system. The official safety 
policy of the Civil Aviation Authority, “…safe and community serving…” might further become confusing due to its two 
concurring elements, safety and community serving. Situations may occur where these two considerations will be in conflict with 
each other. When an operational description of the vision lacks, it seems difficult to find the right balance between the possible 
commercial elements of community serving and safe aviation operations. As Rasmussen says, “Commercial success in a 
competitive environment implies exploitation of the benefit from operating at the fringes of the usual, accepted practice” (1997: 
189). When conflicting goals is concurrent with possible interaction effects of decisions made by participants at other system 
levels, this might set the stage for unknown and unwanted incidents.  
The individual safety consciousness throughout the workforce within the two studied organizations in the aviation system seem to 
act as a buffer against some of the precarious change effects, together with a strong sense of responsibility, and a will to search for 
the best safety solutions. The transparent network within the aviation also makes it possible to develop and share these solutions. 
In addition, employees regard their own role as important by expressing a feeling of being fallible, and are in constant search for 
new knowledge. This means that employees perform comprehensive searches for solutions to different safety question and are not 
afraid of admitting their own uncertainty and consult colleagues across the aviation system to test their solutions. All the above- 
mentioned elements are considered important elements of safe work practices (Gherardi & Nicolini 2000; Pettersen & Aase 
2006), and constitute flexibility in competence that acts as a valuable prerequisite in handling several and simultaneous changes. 
To some extent, a certain degree of inflexibility was identified in the Civil Aviation Authority when it comes to technical 
competence, displaying a conflict between the former and the new organization. Employees of the former organization express a 
rigid understanding of what kind of technical competence that matches the inspection tasks. It has been a complicated and time 
consuming process to redefine the demands for the technical competence related to the inspector position. Even if there has been 
no increase in the frequency of inspection activities as a result of the current changes in the aviation industry, the Civil Aviation 
Authority are searching for solutions to the recommended risk based supervision philosophy. So far, this supervision approach is 
not a reality, lacking an operative understanding and belonging routines. As a result of the transition from JAA procedures to the 
EASA regulative, common inspection activities covering both technical and operational work areas are reduced to a minimum. 
The new EASA regulative, together with the deregulation of the industry, the splitting of organizations, and the relocation of the 
Civil Aviation Authority may have the consequences that rules and procedures tend to get more fragmented (Amalberti 2005). 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In our first research assumption, we claimed that for the legislator (Ministry of Transportation) to follow up their responsibility 
for the totality of the aviation transport system, it requires resources, network, and an overall safety policy making explicit how to 
prioritize between conflicting goals. Today, the resources and network activities with the legislator seem too scant for capturing 
and making explicit an overall safety policy. An operational safety policy will make it possible for the rest of the transport system 
to prepare concrete safety objectives and develop limits for how to prioritize between conflicting goals. 
In our second research assumption, we claim that for the regulator (Civil Aviation Authority) to handle simultaneous changes 
such as transition from national to European legislation, geographic re-localization, and effects of deregulation, this requires 
flexibility in competence, network, increased inspection activity, and an overall safety policy making explicit how to prioritize 
between conflicting goals. What we find is a work force that is responsible, flexible and has a hunger for elaborating newwork 
practices to match the current changes.The process of restructuring and relocation of their head office have set the development of 
new inspection methods back. The strong sense of responsibility and selforganized networking within the legislator and the 
regulator seems to be a buffer against possible negative side effects from the current changes, and the degree of informality in   
which this takes place seems to strengthen the safety conditions, but also induces a certain vulnerability due to the dependency of 
individuals. 
REFERENCES 
Alamberti, R.Auroy,Y. Berwick,D. Barach, P. 2005. Five System Barriers to Achieving Ultrasafe Health Care. Annals of Internal Medicine. 142 
(9): 756–764.  
Baldwin, R. & Cave, M 1999. Understanding regulation. United States: Oxford University Press. 
Blaikie,N. 2005. Designing social research. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gherardi, S. & Nicolini, D. 2000. The Organizational Learning of Safety in Communities of Practice. Journal of Management Inquiry, 9(1): 7–18. 
Grothe G. 2004. Uncertainty management at the core of system design. Elsevier. 28: 267–274. 
Kirwan, B. Hale, A. & Hopkins, A. 2002. Changing regulation. Oxford: Elsevier Science. 
Miles, M.B.&Huberman, M.A. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis – An Expanded Sourcebook. Sage Publications, 2nd edition. 
Moray, N. 2000. Culture, politics and ergonomics. Ergonomics. 43(7): 858–868. 
Leveson, N. 2004. A New Accident Model For Enginering Safer Systems. Safety Science 42(4): 237–270. 
Pettersen, K. & Aase, K. 2006. Reasons for safe work practices in aviation line maintenance operations- and possible threats. Proceedings from 
3rd working on safety conference 2006. The Eemhof: Netherlands, 12–15 September. 
Pettersen. K. 2006. Operational problem solving in aviation – the role of social and organisational factors in safety. Proceedings from ESREL 
2006 conference. Estoril: Portugal, 19–22 September. 
Rasmussen, J. 1997. Risk management in a dynamic society: a modeling problem. Safety science. 27: 183–213. 
Reason, J. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. England: Ashgate. 
Report to the Norwegian Parliament 46 99/2000 http://odin.dep.no/sd/norsk/dok/regpubl/stmeld/028031-040002/dok-bn.html 
Royal Proposition 17 2002/2003 http://odin.dep.no/fad/norsk/dok/regpubl/stmeld/002001-040025/dok-bn.html 
Royal Proposition 35/2005 http://www.aibn.no/items/912/144/1475977908/Spesialrapport.pdf 
Seale, C. Gobo, G. Gubrium, J. F.& Silverman.D2004. Qualitative Research Practice. London: Sage Publications. 
Snook, S. A. 2000. Friendly Fire. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Vaughan,D. 1996.The Challenger Launch Decision. London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Yin, R. 1989. Case Study Research. California: Sage Publications. 
Yin, R. 2004. Case Study Anthology. California: Sage Publications. 
Article III 
Article III 
Tjørhom, B. B., & Aase, K. (2010) The role of complexity in accident 
investigation practice. International Journal of Emergency 
Management, Vol. 7, No.2, 167-189. 

The article is not available in Brage.
Article IV 
Article IV 
Tjørhom, B, B., & Aase, K. (2010) The art of balance: Using upward 
resilience traits to deal with conflicting goals. In Hollnagel, E., Woods 
D & Wreathall, J. (Eds.) Resilience Engineering in Practice: A 
Guidebook (in press). 
A previous draft of this article was presented as a poster at the 
Resilience Engineering 3rd Symposium, France October 28-30, 2008  
Article IV 
244 
The art of balance: Using upward resilience 
traits to deal with conflicting goals 
Berit Berg Tjørhom & Karina Aase 
Abstract. This chapter describes some of the processes involved in 
balancing conflicting goals (e.g., between safety and operation) in a 
change-intensive environment by using examples from civil 
aviation transport. The ability to handle multiple goals involves the 
use of both downward and upward resilience traits to address 
potential conflicts. By downward resilience, we mean that macro 
level directions and solutions prepare for resilience through clear 
goal structures, infrastructure, and procedures that handle the trade-
offs between safety and efficiency. Upward resilience means that 
decisions made at the micro level in a system reflect a commitment 
to safety in case of goal conflicts. Changes, caused either by 
external or internal drivers, may alter these resilience traits by 
introducing loss of oversight. Changes made at the macro level of 
the system might have unintended consequences on the micro level, 
and vice versa. The chapter is based on studies conducted in the 
Norwegian civil aviation transport system. 
1. Introduction
Even though a range of incentives exists in our society to ensure that 
commercial aviation operates safely (e.g., public opinion, passenger 
lists, lawsuits), the importance of highlighting the balance between 
safety and production goals is still prevalent (Perrow, 1999). In a 
change-intensive environment with coexisting and conflicting pressures 
from macro and micro-level actors, managers may set their priority on 
cost optimization without having good aviation safety indicators to 
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warn them about the erosion of safety margins (Rasmussen 1997, 
Woods 2005, Woods 2006a, 2006b).  
 
During the last decade, the civil aviation transport system has been 
exposed to several externally and internally motivated changes. Such 
changes may come in the form of new EU legislation and regulations, 
deregulation of the market, new business structures (e.g., mergers, 
restructurings, relocations), and new technologies. An increased focus 
on efficiency and cost reduction has been observed, thus resulting in 
questions about whether this pressure has negative effects on the 
prioritisation of safety (Høyland & Aase, 2009, Aase et al., 2009). 
Historically, conflicting goals have been shown to be part of the causal 
explanations of several serious aviation accidents in Norway. Analysis 
of accident investigation reports has revealed that in the Skagerak 
accident (1989, 55 fatalities), pressure to uphold the flight program due 
to a critical company economy was part of the accident picture. In the 
Namsos accident (1993, six fatalities), the investigation board 
recommended that the airline company’s board of directors and top 
management clarify their principles for safety priority versus regularity, 
timeliness, and economy (Tjørhom & Aase, 2009). 
 
In this chapter, we want to explore how the processes of balancing 
conflicting goals are handled in today’s aviation system and whether 
the balance between safety and production in a system becomes more 
complicated when changes, caused by either external or internal 
drivers, represent major elements of the context in which the system 
operates. The chapter uses empirical examples based on qualitative 
studies at different levels of the Norwegian aviation system (legislation, 
regulation, air traffic control, airport operation, and airline 
maintenance). The main topics of the studies have been safety, 
management commitment to safety, change, and safety prioritisation 
(Aase et al., 2009, Tjørhom & Aase, 2009, 2007, Høyland & Aase, 
2009, Høyland et al., 2008, Pettersen & Aase, 2008, Pettersen, 2008, 
Hauland et al., 2007, Pettersen, 2006, Bjørnskau, 2005). 
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2. The art of balance  
According to Reason (1990), ‘All organisations have to allocate 
resources to two distinct goals: production and safety.’ In his opinion, 
these goals are agreeable in the long term, but from a short-term 
perspective, given a lack of resources, it appears as though production 
takes precedence over safety. Hollnagel describes the process of 
balancing safety and efficiency by using the efficiency-thoroughness 
trade-off (ETTO) principle (2009, 2004, 2002). In this perspective, 
people adjust their work according to current conditions. It is never 
possible to be completely thorough, or fully efficient in view of scant 
resources, such as time, workforce, and money. According to 
Hollnagel, every work situation calls for trade-offs between 
thoroughness and efficiency. The trade-off tendency or favouritism of 
either efficiency or safety is dependent upon the dominant concern 
within an organisation or a system. It follows from the ETTO principle 
that it is never possible to maximise both efficiency and safety.  
 
The problems with tradeoffs involving safety, resilience or 
thoroughness are reinforced by the difficulties associated with 
measuring safety. Gaba (2000) points to the fact that signals of safety 
are weaker than signals of production, and further refers to the 
asymmetry regarding measuring of these two goals. Where economic 
performance has a history of measurement for anticipation, safety often 
comes up short due to lack of leading indicators (see also chapter 4 in 
this book), thus creating difficulties in stating the relationship between 
resources and gains regarding safety. The picture becomes even more 
blurred as a result of the focus placed on ‘best practice’ (Hubbard, 
2009) during the last decade. By collecting examples from successful 
organisations, one seeks to adapt to best practice standards for 
operation. These standards might address both safety and operation, but 
as Woods (2006a) pinpoints, what if there are too many goals 
implemented within an organisation? What if the different ‘good’ 
solutions compete and thereby create tension, and even worse, make 
the system less resilient?  
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To ensure that a system is able to handle the balance of fundamental 
tradeoffs such as safety versus production (efficiency -thoroughness, 
optimality - brittleness, acute - cronic goals), one must create 
knowledge of the state of the art regarding safety and the ability to 
handle uncertainties. Where are the system’s borders with regard to 
safety? The interactions of tradeoffs create a need to consider sacrifice 
judgments or decisions where acute goals are sacrificed to put more 
emphasis/ resources on achieving cronic goals like safety (Woods 
2006a, 2006b). Sacrifice judgments involve the process of temporarily 
sacrificing acute production or efficiency related goals, or relaxing the 
pressure to achieve these goals, in order to reduce the risks of 
approaching too near safety boundaries (Woods 2006a, p. 32). Sacrifice 
judgments may occur when an approach to an airport are broken off 
during weather that increases the risks of wind shear, or when a take-
off is delayed due to maintenance technicians’ suspicion of airplane-
related technical faults (Pettersen 2008). In other contexts, safety might 
get sacrificed at the expense of effectiveness due to double binds 
created by poor accountability and brittle strategies that exacerbate goal 
conflicts. An aviation example is when an aircraft is de-iced and then 
enters the queue for takeoff. The effectiveness of the de-icing agent 
degrades with time. Delays in the queue may raise the risk of ice 
accumulation. There have been several airplane crashes where, in 
hindsight, crews accepted delays of too great a duration and ice 
contributed to a failed takeoff (Woods et al., 1994).      
 
2.1 Downward and upward resilience 
Woods (2006a) uses the phrase cross-scale interactions to describe the 
interrelations within a system. Decisions made at the strategic, or 
macro level of the system, might impact decisions made at the 
operational level or micro level, and vice versa. Woods (2006a) further 
operationalises cross-scale interactions by using the concepts of 
downward and upward resilience to describe the interrelated processes 
of value to resilience within a system, such as the civil aviation 
transport system, where decisions made at one level might have 
implications for system functions elsewhere in the system. Downward 
resilience includes macro level directions and solutions preparing for 
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resilience through clear goal structures, infrastructure, and procedures 
to handle tradeoffs. Upwards resilience includes decisions made at the 
micro level reflecting a commitment to safety in cases of goal conflicts 
(sacrifice judgments).  
Downward resilience is of importance because the context and 
structures of a system either foster resilience or induce pressure 
towards resilient operations. For instance will the ability of macro level 
actors or “distant supervisors” to communicate intent about goals, 
plans, and procedures act as a downward resilience trait influencing 
how people at the micro level adapt to these governing tools. Local 
micro level actors may use the distant macro level supervisors’ or 
authorities’ statements of intent behind goals, plans, and procedures in 
cases of unexpected events or changes (Shattuck & Woods 1997, 
Woods & Shattuck 2000). The absence of a clear goal structure, 
communication of intent behind the goals, and a lack of willingness to 
implement adequate technology might create poor conditions for 
resilient operations and sacrifice judgments for frontline personnel. 
Safety goals should act as yardsticks meaning that deviations from the 
goals could appear as warning signals for operators and managers when 
operations exceed safety margins. Frontline operators may not be fully 
able to understand the consequences of a chosen deviation from 
prescribed rules because their actions or tradeoffs are made in a specific 
contextual frame of reference - from their point of view in the 
organization (Dekker, 2006). Repeated deviations from the prescribed 
design may, over time, become a new rule, which means that the design 
and the real operations become unequal (Snook, 2000, Vaughan, 1996, 
2006). An accumulation of such deviations makes the system opaque, 
and it becomes difficult to know if the decisions made regarding 
tradeoffs are really sacrifice judgments.  
Upward resilience is of importance because local micro level actors   
might create resilience in a system using their experience, flexibility, 
and professionalism to handle the gap between rules and procedures, 
and the actions required to adapt to new circumstances (McDonald 
2006, Pettersen & Aase 2008, Morel et al., 2008). These actions of the 
micro level actors might be reflected in decisions made at the macro 
level as new strategic goals, elaboration of new procedures, or 
implementation of new technology. The opposite, creating a threat to 
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upward resilience is when operators and decision makers in the front 
line get stuck in a single problem frame and miss or mis-interpret new 
information that should force re-evaluation and revision of the situation 
(Klein et al., 2005, Patterson & Woods 2001). Research appears to 
indicate an emerging understanding of the gap between design, 
procedures, and rules, and the work that is really going on in the 
frontline (Snook, 2000, McDonald, 2006, Pettersen, 2006, Pettersen & 
Aase, 2008). This gap can be described by hidden grey zones 
potentially inherent in design, procedures, and rules that call for new 
ways to handle the operations (Pettersen & Aase, 2008). When 
situations appear that call for such flexibility, the operators and 
manager make sacrifice judgments (McDonald, 2006). These 
judgments are frequently based on experience, and depend on the 
professionalism amongst frontline operators. Professionalism means 
that within a system, there exists an ability to use experience and 
knowledge in addition or even instead of written procedures. In a study 
of professional sea-fishing skippers, Morel et al., (2008) found that they 
used multiple expert strategies to reduce risk without giving up on their 
fishing activity. They relied on a high level of adaptability, linked to an 
exposure to frequent and considerable risk. Such professionalism or 
craftsmanship serves as a buffer in situations of trade-offs between 
safety and production goals (Høyland & Aase 2009, Morel et al., 2008). 
As we have seen, the ability to balance multiple goals involves 
using both upward and downward resilience traits, and most important 
the interactions between them and across system levels. Changes 
caused by either external or internal drivers may alter these resilience 
traits by introducing loss of oversight or emerging risks. Let us now 
turn to some examples from real practice.  
 
3. Traces of balancing within the Norwegian aviation transport 
system 
During the last decade, the Norwegian aviation transport system has 
been influenced by numerous and extensive changes. These changes, 
along with the interconnectedness of the transport system, might impact 
the ability to handle multiple goals within the system. The complexity 
within the system is greater than ever, meaning that the risks associated 
Article IV 
250 
 
with these interdependencies might be extensive and it could be useful 
to discuss them using the concepts of downward and upward resilience.  
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3.1 Methodology 
To illustrate the issues of balancing, we will in the following use 
examples from different research studies undertaken within Norwegian 
civil aviation (Aase et al., 2009, Tjørhom & Aase, 2009, 2007, Høyland 
& Aase, 2009, Høyland et al., 2008, Pettersen & Aase, 2008, Pettersen, 
2008, Hauland et al., 2007, Pettersen, 2006, Bjørnskau, 2005). The 
studies cover empirical data (collected over a period of four years, 2004 
- 2007) from three cases that represent different levels of the aviation 
system: 
 The legislation/regulation case consists of 26 interviews with 
inspectors, advisors and managers in the Norwegian Civil Aviation 
Authority (NCAA) and 12 interviews with employees in the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. The objective of the 
study was to describe safety policies, perceptions of safety, safety 
practices and changes. 
 The air traffic control (ATC)/airport operation case contains a 
study of five airports with 126 informants (interviews), aimed at 
diagnosing the safety culture as a means for improvement. The case 
also includes qualitative free text data concerning changes and 
safety aspects from a questionnaire survey, with 231 respondents 
(managers, planners, engineers, air traffic controllers) from ATC 
and airport operation. 
 The maintenance case was carried out as an exploratory study of a 
line maintenance department, with participant observation, 15 
interviews and a number of informal discussions. The goal was to 
gain insight into how safety is created and maintained through work 
practices at an individual/group level. The case also includes free 
text data from a questionnaire survey, with 283 respondents within 
maintenance (managers, planners, engineers, aviation technicians). 
Using data from the different case studies in this study was done by 
searching the empirical material and the previous research publications 
for issues covering the topic of goal conflicts and for empirical 
examples on processes of balancing safety and production. 
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3.2 Downward resilience? 
There has been a transition towards deregulation of the aviation 
transport market, which has influenced the economic situation within 
the aviation business. Due to economic pressure, the structure of the 
companies has changed. Companies have been downsized, bought, and 
merged. Further, within the safety regulation framework, there has been 
a transition from national regulation towards a standardised EU 
framework for safety rules. The Ministry of Transport and 
Communications states the following: 
“The Ministry is responsible for the framework conditions 
within aviation transport in Norway.”  
This general and overall statement is handled by the Ministry’s 
subordinate agency, the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), 
which is assigned responsibility for ensuring that civil aviation in 
Norway is operated safely and efficiently. This responsibility is made 
explicit in the NCAA’s vision:  
“NCAA should be an active initiator for safe and community-
serving aviation services.” 
The background for this vision influenced by the current Ministry is the 
knowledge that civil aviation plays a more important role in the 
transport pattern in Norway than it does in most European countries, 
and that civil aviation makes an important contribution to maintaining 
settlement and employment throughout Norway. The result is a 
network of 46 state airports across the entire country (approximately 
4.8 million inhabitants). The objective of being both ‘safe’ and 
‘community-serving’ seems to contain potential goal conflicts 
according to an informant from NCAA: 
“Our goal is to be both community serving and contribute to an 
increased safety level within aviation. I do not agree with such 
double-edged goal, in my opinion our job should be to say NO 
to anything that may harm safety! But there are lots of difficult 
decisions regarding exemptions from rules and regulations that 
we have to deal with.”  
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The Norwegian Aviation Act of 1993 is a so-called delegation act, 
which leaves to other institutional bodies the responsibility to elaborate 
on the details found in the body of rules. There are no clear statements 
from the Ministry on how potential conflicts should be handled by the 
NCAA in their activities related to supervising and ensuring 
compliance with regulations and conditions. The challenge of 
conflicting goals inherent in the statements of the Ministry and the 
NCAA might be even more prevalent because the political system in 
Norway is transitory, consisting of many small political parties that 
form coalitions. In practise, this transitory nature means a new political 
environment emerges every fourth year. Employees in the Ministry 
express the following about changes in government: 
“The department changes colour, quite a lot of the attitudes 
change. But from day to day, the jobs we do are the same.” 
“New government? Then we have to fling ourselves into the new 
government’s declaration.”  
“It often happens during preparation of different cases or 
elucidations that we become aware of the fact that what we 
prepare is against political decisions. It is important for us to 
act tidy on these issues.”  
Changes in political climate might generate a change in the goals and 
statements of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and 
consequently, the NCAA, i.e., if a political party is especially focused 
on regional policy, the implication could be that when this party 
assumes power in the government, it might abandon existing plans for 
closing down some of the short take-off and landing (STOL) airports in 
Norway that do not satisfy the demands for airports within the EU or 
follow the international body of rules.  
 
Because the NCAA still holds the technical competence to license the 
operation of STOL airports, it becomes their task to decide whether 
exemptions from existing regulations must be granted in order to 
operate these STOL airports. In the absence of an overall defined trade-
off, the decision to exempt or not becomes a struggle between 
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professional considerations and current political composition. This 
struggle indicates a vulnerability regarding the commitment to safety 
(or not) among the employees in the NCAA. It also returns to the role 
of the Ministry of Transportation to demonstrate a commitment to 
safety. As one NCAA employee said: 
“We are the government’s instrument for both a safe and 
community-serving aviation. Viewing resilience as an 
interrelated system, it becomes important to know the Ministry’s 
opinion about commitment to safety.”  
This lack of clear guidance from the Ministry on how to prioritise 
conflicting goals is what Grote (2004, 2008) denotes as a deficiency in 
rules management. She suggests ‘rules management as a source for 
loose coupling in high-risk systems’ (2008, p. 91). Rules can function 
as glue within organisations, which makes the working operations 
consistent even when workers must adapt to unfamiliar events. If rules 
should be resources rather than determinants for action, we must 
distinguish between different specification levels of rules. We can 
differentiate rules for goals, processes, and actions (Hale & Swuste, 
1998). These three types of rules could be viewed as following an axis, 
where goal rules are the most strategic of the three and action rules are 
the most detailed. 
 
The lack of distinct goal rules worked out by the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications has created an inherent tension between the 
double-edged objective of both ‘safe’ and ‘community-serving.’ None 
of the stated visions by the Ministry or the NCAA can serve as goal 
rules that give the organisation a common direction for making trade-
offs between safety and production. Indeed, the visions of both 
organisations lack the dimension of giving direction for determining 
trade-offs between safety and efficiency. Decision makers then lack the 
directions that give them the power to make sacrifice judgements 
(Woods 2006a). Without any clear or well-defined overall goal rules 
for safety from the macro level of the Norwegian aviation system, it is 
difficult to claim that the system has an inherent downward resilience.  
 
3.3 Upward resilience? 
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Within ATC/airport and operation, goal conflicts have been identified 
as being related to prioritisation between efficient traffic handling and 
safety. Differences between airports exist, in which some handle the 
possible conflicts by choosing safe work practices, some by addressing 
the conflict upwards in the hierarchical system, and some by providing 
the necessary resources for safe operations. The experience of other 
airports indicates that efficient traffic handling gets prioritised over safe 
operations, thus resulting in procedure violations (Høyland & Aase 
2008, Høyland et al., 2008). The examples show that when the 
operators experience a commitment to safety by their managers, they 
dare to make sacrifice decisions, as they do at the airports where they 
feel that commitment. The opposite is true at airports where the 
operators experience a lack of commitment from their management, 
and thereby tend to give efficiency precedence over safety. At the 
airports where economic pressure gets precedence towards safety, the 
employees expressed the situation as:  
“It is not possible to get support for safety by the managers.” 
“We feel pressure towards too much overtime work.” 
“Operative personnel might lack of time to [resolve] safety 
issues caused by continual pressure towards administrative 
work task[s].” 
Within aviation maintenance, the technicians report that formal 
descriptions of work are part of their knowledge base. In addition to the 
written procedures, they must elaborate on their problem-solving 
procedures. These procedures are used when situations call for 
flexibility. The standard operating procedures are static tools that need 
to be justified to keep the system resilient. Such problem-solving 
procedures are ‘embedded in the heads and hands of the practitioners’ 
(Pettersen 2006, 2008). The technicians report about intuitive feelings 
that guide their judgements, based on years of experience, which offer 
them a comprehensive view of their part of production in an 
appropriately safe manner. According to the technicians, their freedom 
to choose safety over efficiency has changed. They experience 
conflicting goals related to keeping the aircraft safe from technical 
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faults while simultaneously getting the aircraft operational within the 
time limit of its planned schedule. They report that when they 
experience conflicts regarding making (in their view) good trade-offs, 
they often resolve those conflicts by creating time spaces (‘delays due 
to technical reasons’) to ensure the airplane becomes technically 
airworthy (Pettersen & Aase 2008). In the trade-off between 
punctuality and safety, the operating technicians were committed to 
making sacrifice judgements.  
Due to the current change intensity of the Norwegian civil aviation 
system, many technicians have experienced increased demands for 
productivity. When they were asked about their perception of how the 
current changes affect safety, the following statements were frequent: 
“Economy gets precedence over safety.” 
“There is an odd mixture of safety and profit.” 
“Generally increased demands for improved efficiency.” 
“The trust in central management is considerably weakened 
caused by their one-sided focus on economy.” 
Their perception of an increased focus on production is a challenge 
when it comes to their commitment to safe work practices. According 
to Woods (2006a), the frames for making sacrifice judgements have 
then been altered. Lacking a framework for sacrificing judgements 
based on clear and common goal rules that create downward resilience, 
the technicians must make their own action rules (Grote 2008), as 
exemplified by ‘delays due to technical reasons’ rooted in their 
technical competence. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In the Norwegian aviation transport system, different studies have 
shown that there is a lack of commitment to downward resilience at the 
macro level, due primarily to the tension inherent in the double-edged 
objective of being both safe and community-serving. The prioritisation 
of regional policy (community-serving) and an unwillingness to 
develop distinct goal rules for balancing safe and community-serving 
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air transport, place downwards pressure on the aviation system. Despite 
deficiencies in the downward resilience, upward resilience traits at the 
micro level of the aviation system seem to counterbalance the picture 
by characteristics such as a clear commitment to safety, sacrificing 
decisions, and establishing resource buffers to handle safety in critical 
situations. The critical issue regarding resilience in the Norwegian 
aviation transport system seems to be the awareness towards 
vulnerability caused by the system’s dependency on upward resilience.  
These findings have implications for different levels of the aviation 
transport system. We propose following actions to strengthen 
downward resilience:  
 
1. Development of clear safety goal rules at the governmental level.  
 Downward resilience is threatened by the unwillingness to state 
clear goal rules at the strategic level. After years of changes 
within the aviation transport system, employees need clear 
statements that give them a framework to remain flexible and 
committed to safety despite economic pressure.  
 The goal rules should be based on worst-case scenarios using 
input from the entire aviation transport system. The institutional 
level of the system must be responsible for collecting 
information regarding trends that threaten resilience.  
2. Development of guidelines and requirements for addressing cross-
scale interactions. 
 The training tools should include participants from different 
levels and professions. 
 
We propose following to strengthen upward resilience: 
3. Foster perpetual awareness among operators. 
 Without a constant unease about the way to handle an operation, 
one might become lost in routine and fail to notice variations. 
Even a seemingly insignificant variance in operation must be 
taken as a potential leading indicator regarding threats against 
resilience.  
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4. Extend operators’ collaboration with other parts of the system.  
 A strong focus on professional values might have some 
downsides (McDonald, 2006). Within a profession, self-
confidence may evolve to the level of overconfidence. In a 
trade-off situation, this may result in over-reliance on the 
individual’s judgement - at the expense of cautious prudence. 
Technicians and airport operators might rely too heavily on 
experience and knowledge, thus taking unnecessary chances 
without fully embracing the body of rules. Interrelations 
necessitate an exchange of knowledge across professions.  
 
The tension between downward and upward resilience in the 
aviation system that we have studied is balanced by a strong 
professionalism throughout the system, which functions as a buffer and 
makes safety goals prevalent over production goals. To uphold this art 
of balancing, in our opinion, it is crucial to develop strong but flexible 
goal rules at the macro level to demonstrate a commitment to safety 
and that micro level actors find trustworthy. At points of intensified 
production pressure and higher organizational tempo, extra investments 
in sources of resilience are required to keep production/safety trade-offs 
from sliding out-of-balance. In other words, safety investments are 
most important when least affordable (Woods 2006b). 
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APPENDIX  
Interview guide, the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications 
(Air, Post and Tele Department- Aviation unit) 
General understanding of work practices 
 Number of employees? 
 Types of competencies? 
 Organisation of work tasks 
o Functional task distribution? 
o Work teams? 
 
Areas of responsibility 
What do you perceive as your work tasks? 
 Frame work conditions in the civil aviation transport system. 
 Legal framework and regulation of safety 
 General direction of the Civil Aviation Authority and the 
Accident Investigation Board 
 Aviation safety work 
Changes in frame work conditions 
 Do you perceive any changes in the frame work conditions of 
aviation? 
 What types of changes are critical in your or your  and your 
departments work tasks? 
The components of change 
 What has changed in the aviation industry? 
 What are the consequences for your daily work practices? 
 Have specific measures been implemented to address the 
changes? 
 What role do you have in the change processes? 
 What are the consequences of changes for your department? 
  
 Do you perceive the changes as affecting the interactions within 
the civil aviation transport system? 
  
Interview guide Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
General information 
 Competencies and background 
 Work task`s 
 
Safety philosophy 
 Do you have a safety policy that directs your supervision work? 
o What is the content of this philosophy 
 
Areas of responsibility 
 What do you perceive as the aviation authority’s areas of 
responsibility? 
 What role does supervision play in the aviation system? 
 How do you carry out the supervision?  
o Do you work according to a risk based supervision 
approach? 
o Do you carry out impact studies concerning 
change/downsizing, reorganisations, and political 
decisions? 
 
Learning and safety 
 How do you transfer the knowledge gained by supervision? 
 
Changes in frame conditions 
 Do you perceive any changes in the framework conditions of 
aviation 
 What are the consequences of deregulation of aviation? Positive 
negative effects? 
 What types of changes are critical in your and your departments 
work tasks? 
 
The components of change 
 What has changed in the aviation industry? 
  
 What are the consequences for your daily work practices? 
 Have specific measures been implemented  to address the 
changes? 
 Do you perceive the changes as affecting the interactions within 
your organisation, or within the civil aviation transport system? 
 How has the relocalisation of the CAA affected the 
organisation? Work environment, organisational issues, 
conflicts, collaboration, communication?  
 
Collaboration/ networking 
 How do you perceive the relationship and collaboration with the 
other actors in the aviation system (Ministry, airline companies, 
etc.?  
o Degree of formalisation? 
o Informal relations? 
  
Interview guide, the Investigation Board (AIBN) 
Safety philosophy/ investigation philosophy  
 Do you have a defined safety philosophy that you are working 
according to? 
 What is the content of this philosophy? 
 Is there a common overall safety philosophy in the aviation 
transport system? 
o If so, what is the content of this philosophy? 
 Do you have a particular philosophy within the investigation 
board?  
o If so, what is the content of this philosophy? 
 Are you using a particular accident model in your 
investigations?  
 
Investigation practice  
 How do you conduct a typical investigation within the aviation 
transport system? 
 How do you compose the work team? How do you divide the 
work operations? How do you perform as a team? 
 What kind of questions are you asking? 
 Do you use checklists?  
 Latent causality, how do identify such conditions within your 
investigation practices? 
 
Changes 
 Changes within the aviation transport system? Important to 
safety/less important to safety? 
 Change in investigation philosophy/practice? 
 Connection between changes and risk level? Examples? 
 
SL REP 35/2005  ”Safety in the Norwegian aviation during the 
process of change” 
  
 Main findings according to the report?  
 The process of producing the report.  
 System approach? How to define the aviation transport system? 
o How to influence the aviation transport system, e.g. how 
to implement risk management initiatives?  
 
Collaboration/Networking 
 Who are the investigation boards most important collaborators?  
o Within the Norwegian aviation transport system? 
o Internationally? 
o Others? Research/external/other investigation boards? 
o Relationship to the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications and the Civil Aviation authority? 
 
Investigation reports  
 How to ensure quality? 
 Do the reports reflects the investigation philosophy? 
 Time perspective and implementation?  
 How do you describe and emphasis latent factors in casual 
effect relationships in the reports? 
 Reports that document elements of change in the explanation of 
incidents/accidents? Examples? 
  
